Major browser vendors and certificate trust stores have blacklisted eight intermediate certificates issued by Indian certificate authority...
The FBI, alongside cybersecurity authorities in Germany and the United Kingdom, issued a joint advisory this week warning that a ransomware group called SafePay has compromised at least 600 organizations across the United States and Europe since it surfaced in late 2024, placing it among the most active extortion operations active right now.
The advisory, which draws on FBI and German law enforcement investigations, marks a significant escalation in attention for a group that operated in relative obscurity before racking up victims at a pace that rivals far better-known criminal networks. The most recent incident cited in the advisory occurred in August.
A Group Built on Borrowed Code
SafePay is not a ransomware-as-a-service operation, meaning it does not rent out its tools to outside affiliates the way groups like RansomHub do. Instead, it runs as a centralized crew, which security researchers say likely keeps operations tighter and reduces the risk of internal leaks.
Its malware, however, did not emerge from nothing. Analysts at Bitdefender and others found that SafePay's ransomware binary closely mirrors a late-2022 version of LockBit's code, with additional elements borrowed from ALPHV and INC Ransom. The group surfaced around the same period that law enforcement actions gutted LockBit in early 2024, and some researchers suspect its members include former Conti or LockBit operators who reconstituted under a new name. A telling technical detail: the ransomware includes a kill switch that deactivates itself on systems with Russian or Cyrillic as the default language, a pattern commonly associated with Eastern European criminal groups trying to avoid prosecution at home.
Getting In and Moving Fast
SafePay gets into networks through a combination of methods. The advisory lists password guessing, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities, including flaws in Cisco VPN products and Veeam backup software, as primary entry points. The group also buys stolen credentials from initial access brokers on dark web markets and uses automated scripts to scan the internet for exposed systems.
Once inside, the group moves quickly. Attacks have been documented going from initial access to full ransomware deployment in under 24 hours. Operators create new accounts or hijack existing ones, use Windows' own built-in tools to map the network, and disable security software using living-off-the-land techniques that avoid dropping obvious malware. Data is archived with WinRAR or 7-Zip and transferred out via FileZilla or RClone before encryption begins. In some cases, attackers change user passwords to lock out IT staff and slow down the response.
The group has also adopted a social engineering playbook that goes well beyond a simple phishing link. In several documented attacks, SafePay flooded employees with thousands of spam messages to overwhelm their inboxes, then followed up by impersonating IT support over Microsoft Teams or through direct phone calls. Vishing specialists, sometimes hired as a third-party service, would then convince employees to hand over remote access through Microsoft Quick Assist or approve multi-factor authentication prompts.
A Pattern of High-Profile Hits
Three incidents stand out in terms of impact. Government technology contractor Conduent confirmed an attack that disrupted Medicaid payments, child support disbursements, food assistance programs, and roadway tolls in multiple U.S. states. Conduent recently agreed to an $80 million class action settlement over the breach. British transport technology firm Microlise was hit in October 2024, disrupting DHL delivery operations and security systems installed in UK Ministry of Justice prisoner transport vans. In July 2025, researchers linked SafePay to an attack on Ingram Micro, one of the world's largest IT distributors, with analysts estimating the disruption cost the company at least $136 million in daily sales while order fulfillment was offline.
Germany as a Primary Target
Among the countries SafePay has focused on, Germany stands out. During the first quarter of 2025, Check Point Research found that 24 percent of all publicly reported ransomware victims in Germany were attributed to SafePay, the highest concentration of any single ransomware group in any single country during that period. The advisory confirms that dozens of German companies appear on SafePay's dark web leak site alongside government organizations across Latin America and the United States.
Ransom Demands Framed as a Business Transaction
SafePay's ransom notes describe the payment demand as "a subset of company revenue," typically falling between one and three percent of the victim's annual revenue. The group uses cryptocurrency for payments and, according to the advisory, sometimes employs third parties to make phone calls to pressure victims into paying. In cases where paying could expose a victim to regulatory penalties, the group has reportedly offered reduced demands.
The joint advisory stops short of attributing SafePay to any specific country or naming individual suspects.
Attackers replaced the binary releases of OVHcloud's open-source CLI tool on GitHub with malicious builds designed to harvest secrets from developer machines, the company confirmed this week. The incident, which affected versions v0.11.0 through v0.15.0, went live on October 19 and was only caught after a customer raised an alarm about a suspicious release.
The malicious files were live for roughly 94 minutes. A customer's CI pipeline, which had a pinned SHA-256 checksum for the v0.15.0 Linux binary, failed when the hash no longer matched, and the customer opened issue #300 on the public GitHub repository. OVHcloud pulled the replaced assets at 14:21 UTC and shipped a clean replacement, v0.16.0, three hours later.
A Compromised Account, Months in the Making
The attack traced back to a single GitHub account: `HassenBF`, belonging to a legitimate OVHcloud contributor who had write access to the release repository. According to the security research group OpenSourceMalware, the account was compromised roughly seven months before the attack, with evidence pointing to early March 2026.
On March 5 and 6, four personal repositories on the account were force-pushed within a scripted window. Three of those rewrites embedded a `preinstall.js` loader file containing a payload hidden inside invisible Unicode variation-selector characters. A fourth repository inlined the same decoder into a React source file. The push cadence for the first three repositories was 42 seconds, which OpenSourceMalware interpreted as automated rather than manual activity.
After that, the account went quiet on the CLI project. It continued contributing to `ovh/ovhcloud-docs` through May to September 2026, with several pull requests merged normally. That cover of normalcy made the account hard to flag.
How the Malicious Binaries Were Built
The attacker did not touch OVHcloud's CI/CD pipeline. Instead, they built the infected packages locally and uploaded them directly using the GitHub Releases API, replacing the macOS (Intel and ARM), Linux (x86_64 and ARM64), and Windows x86-64 binaries across five versions. The i386, Windows ARM64, and WASM builds were left alone, which OpenSourceMalware read as deliberate targeting of developer and operations workstations.
Critically, the attacker also replaced the `checksums.txt` file last, so the new hashes matched the malicious binaries. Anyone who verified the checksum would still get a false sense of security.
OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba confirmed that GitHub's release immutability setting had been turned off on the repository, which is what allowed an account with write access to silently overwrite already-published releases without triggering any CI checks. Since the incident, OVHcloud has re-enabled that setting. The v0.16.0 release is now marked immutable, meaning its files cannot be replaced.
A forensic check of the malicious binary using `go version -m` revealed it was built from a git checkout with uncommitted changes (`vcs.modified=true`), a dead giveaway that it came from a local workstation build rather than the official GoReleaser pipeline.
The Payload: A Solana Dead Drop and GlassWorm Fingerprints
OpenSourceMalware dug into the `preinstall.js` file loaded into the compromised account's repositories back in March. The loader uses a two-stage design. The first stage AES-256-CBC decrypts a hex blob, and the resulting second-stage script checks whether the victim machine appears to be based in Russia by testing language and timezone settings; if it is, the script exits after 10 seconds.
Otherwise, it contacts public Solana RPC endpoints, queries transactions from a specific wallet address, and reads a JSON memo embedded in the blockchain. That memo carries a base64-encoded URL pointing to the next-stage payload. This "dead drop" technique lets the attacker swap out the payload URL anytime without touching any code repository.
The Solana wallet in question, `BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC`, appears in public indicator lists for GlassWorm, a threat actor that has been running campaigns since late 2025 targeting VS Code, OpenVSX, GitHub, and npm. OpenSourceMalware attributes this attack to GlassWorm with moderate confidence.
Who Is Affected and What to Do
Any developer or CI pipeline that downloaded or ran the CLI through `install.sh`, the Homebrew cask, or a direct GitHub release between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on October 19 may have been exposed. Klaba said the malware's goal was to collect secrets sitting on disk, and while he described the binary as low quality, he warned it was still capable of doing real damage.
Affected users should update to v0.16.0 or roll back to v0.10.0 immediately, but updating the tool alone is not enough. Any machine that ran a compromised version should be treated as having all its readable secrets exposed. That means rotating OVHcloud API keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, package registry tokens, and anything stored in `.env` files, from a separate, clean machine. Users on macOS should also check for an `~/init.json` file in the home directory, which the second-stage script writes as a throttle marker.
OVHcloud has said a full post-mortem is coming. Key questions remain open: how the developer account credentials were first stolen, whether the same actor maintained access for the entire seven months, and exactly what the final payload did before OVHcloud deleted the files.