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New Linux Malware Uses Tor, Ethereum Blockchain, and Falsified GPU Data to Run Cryptomining Operations Undetected

  A financially motivated threat actor has been running a sophisticated cryptomining operation against Linux GPU servers, using a custom too...

All the recent news you need to know

Rising Internet Access Exposes First-Time Users to Growing Threat of Online Scams and Cybercrime

 

With more developing areas gaining internet access, millions of new users are being exposed to the internet. Due to their lack of knowledge, they face higher risks of falling prey to online scams. There are around 2.6 billion people who do not have internet access globally. If this trends continue, 2 billion more people will gain internet access by 2030. 

However, many countries lack education and protection against cybercrime. Anicet Etekpo, a security officer in Benin, lost money after clicking a link from Facebook that he believed to be coming from a friend in 2022. The link led to a fake website asking for personal information including bank details. He became worried about his financial and personal data. 

Zeki Turedi, field chief technology officer at CrowdStrike, a cyber security company, said cybercrime has become a professional industry. Criminals have begun to use technology such as automation, AI and social engineering to target their victims. Scammers are using increasingly personalised messages in local languages and cultures. They are pretending to be banks, government agencies and reliable services. They are also using fake help schemes and realistic apps on mobile phones with spyware. 

Criminals are also providing 'off the shelf’ tools to create phishing messages and stealing login details through underground forums and encrypted communications. This makes it easier for people to get into cybercrime. As more AI content and deepfakes become available, fake messages will become harder to spot. Africa is one of the least connected continents in the world. 

Whilst some countries such as South Africa and Seychelles have internet access of almost 80%, many rural areas in Benin and busy countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo lack internet access. Lack of infrastructure, high costs of satellite internet and unreliable broadband makes it challenging for many. There are over 280 million new users expected in Africa in the next 4 years. Financial losses caused by cybercrime have increased over 200% since 2024, rising to $484 million. 

International investigations, training for police and cybercrime awareness have been implemented. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have created detection technology and security measures. The FBI have specialist teams to combat cybercrime. The UK’s National Crime Agency have also done international investigations. However, these may not be helping those who lack experience with the internet. Governments are looking to try and help. 

The African Union have made cybercrime a priority within their Agenda 2063. Interpol are also helping police forces in Africa. Myanmar have previously provided digital safety awareness campaigns to new users. Nigeria have updated their Cybercrimes Act in 2024. India have also set up a national helpline to help those who have fallen victim to scams. Education is very important. Robert Anderson, founder of non-profit IT partner Telecom4Good, said cybersecurity should be ongoing. 

However, governments often restrict communications when there are elections, protests or emergencies. Many tech companies have also provided tools to help keep users safe online. Google offer password managers, two-step verification, passkeys and their Advanced Protection Program. Microsoft created the Cybersecurity Tech Accord in 2018, bringing together technology companies to improve digital security. 

With over 38 billion connected devices globally by 2030, the number of possible entry points for cybercrime will increase. New users will need more than just internet access. Education, easy to use security, improved infrastructure and fraud prevention will need to be improved.

TSMC Confirms Employee Data Breach Linked to Cloud Provider

 

TSMC has confirmed that personal information belonging to some current and former employees was exposed following a breach linked to an unnamed cloud service provider. The company says its own internal systems were not compromised and that customer and operational data were unaffected. The incident came to light after employee data appeared on an external website without authorization, prompting TSMC to investigate the source of the exposure. 

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company disclosed the incident in a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Its investigation found that the exposed records matched information stored in the systems of a cloud service provider. However, TSMC did not identify the provider, explain how the attacker gained access, or specify the exact number of employees affected. 

The breach became public after a cybercriminal forum post on November 8 offered 6.9 GB of alleged TSMC employee data for sale. The seller claimed the dataset included contact information, identification details, and banking information, and demanded 3 Bitcoin, valued by The Record at approximately $200,000. TSMC has not independently confirmed every detail of the seller’s claims, but it verified that the exposed data matched records held by the cloud provider. 

TSMC stated that it has begun notifying affected personnel and is providing them with necessary support. Chief Financial Officer Wendell Huang said the company is working with the cloud vendor, relevant investigating authorities, and a third-party cybersecurity agency to establish the facts and take appropriate action. The company’s decision to involve external specialists suggests that it is treating the matter as a serious security and privacy issue. 

The case highlights the growing importance of third-party risk management. Even when an organization secures its own networks, sensitive data may still be stored or processed by vendors, cloud platforms, payroll providers, and other external partners. Employee records are particularly attractive to cybercriminals because they can contain names, contact details, government identification numbers, and financial information that can be used for identity theft, fraud, or phishing. 

For TSMC, the incident is another reminder that cybersecurity cannot depend on internal defenses alone. The company supplies major technology firms including Nvidia, Apple, Broadcom, and Qualcomm, and reported revenue of $122 billion last year. Although TSMC says customer data was not involved, the exposure of employee information may still affect trust and raise questions about vendor security practices. The company has faced several cyberattacks in recent years, including a 2023 ransomware incident involving an IT hardware supplier. Moving forward, stronger vendor assessments, encryption, access controls, continuous monitoring, and transparent communication will be essential to reducing similar risks.

Amazon Detects Campaign Targeting AI Infrastructure and Developer Credentials


Using autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents, Amazon Threat Intelligence has identified cybercrime campaigns that identified vulnerable AI applications, stole API keys, and reused the credentials to support further attacks utilizing the same credentials. 

It was likely that credentials from multiple AI providers could be exposed as a result of these operations, which targeted internet-exposed platforms such as LiteLLM, One API, Dify, Langflow, RAGFlow, and Open WebUI. Using the MadPot network, a globally distributed system of decoy servers designed to monitor suspicious interactions, Amazon's MadPot network provided the basis for these findings.

A request from an AI agent operating through the open-source ARTEX penetration testing framework was sent to the sensors between October 3 and November 5, 2026. These requests contained operational instructions, task histories, and reports of findings, which permitted researchers to examine how the campaigns were conducted. With moderate confidence, Amazon determined that ARTEX was employed for the operations and that separate China-linked threat groups were involved. 

Based on the evidence, the assessment was made, which included simplified Chinese-language prompts, China-based time zone configurations, targeting patterns, and tooling associated with Chinese-nexus actors. In Amazon's view, the agents operate through a coordinated structure that is comprised of planners, workers, verification agents, and compression agents. 

Each component shared a persistent knowledge graph, which allowed agents to access previous findings, coordinate tasks, and continue operations without repeatedly initiating reconnaissance efforts. Various activities were described in the records, including the discovery of vulnerabilities, the theft of credentials, the expansion of cloud access, and the compromise of cryptocurrency exchange identity verification systems. 

In the primary campaign, API keys were harvested to access large language models (LLMs). Agents searched for internet-based AI applications, extracted provider credentials from those applications, tested whether the credentials remained functional, and added valid credentials to a pool of available credentials. 

It was subsequently determined that the stolen keys could be transferred to the framework's own model gateway, which enabled the agents to use AI services to search for additional credentials. Due to the fact that compromised applications could expose several sets of credentials, the campaign focused on platforms that manage connections to multiple AI providers. This study identified gateways and proxy services such as LiteLLM, One API, New API, Veloera, and Sub2API as well as artificial intelligence applications such as Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, LobeChat, Open WebUI, and Ollama as possible targets. 

An attacker prepared a playbook containing identified vulnerabilities associated with these products in order to attack them. Entry points identified included default administrator credentials, incomplete installations, and management interfaces that were not accessible by authentication. There were also references to LiteLLM's default master key, an authentication bypass involving the isCliRequest header in One API family systems, and known Langflow and RAGFlow vulnerabilities. 

To access cloud metadata services, additional techniques included exploiting server-side request forgery (SSRF) through URL-fetching features. Furthermore, the agents looked for exposed credentials in JavaScript, source maps, debugging endpoints, environment files, and publicly accessible code repositories as well. 

Deepfake Campaigns and Cloudflare Incident Reveal Wider ARTEX Threat

The company has also identified an attempt by ARTEX agents to bypass Know Your Customer (KYC) verification systems at two cryptocurrency exchanges in a separate campaign. To avoid detection, the operation involved generating real-time deepfake videos to pass live selfie checks, and modifying identity documents to avoid detection. 

According to reports, agents examined one verification provider's protocol for checking liveness, including instructions for tracking facial features and moving. However, the provider's server-side verification system rejected every deepfake attempt recorded by Amazon, even though the face was positioned within seven pixels of the target.  Meanwhile, the agents developed a video-generation pipeline capable of producing 11.5 frames per second through the use of a consumer grade graphics processor.

Many agent sessions were involved in the operation, which included bypassing identity checks, preparing deepfake videos, clearing account balances, and identifying methods of cashing out. However, the recorded attempts did not defeat the provider's liveness tests, but they demonstrated that artificial intelligence agents may be able to coordinate multiple stages of a fraud operation with minimal human involvement. 

Cloud environments are also being exposed to a wider threat. During an eight-week period, Cloudflare reported investigating several incidents involving ARTEX and related tools. In one instance, attackers gained access to an account-level API token that was used for continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD). In addition to the token not having IP restrictions and rate limits, investigators also discovered the creation of Cloudflare Worker scripts whose names were associated with ARTEX operations within an hour. 

There has been no confirmation by the company whether its database requests exposed information or whether its efforts to persist were successful. The FBI's November 13 FLASH alert provided further evidence of the framework's widespread usage in a variety of sectors. Earlier, a campaign against South Korean financial institutions exposed approximately 67,000 people's personal information. 

More than 2,250 downstream Microsoft tenants were affected by a September supply chain attack involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup. As a result of ARTEX, some intrusions progress from initial targeting to privileged access in less than three hours, according to the FBI. 

The original GitHub repository for the framework was suspended in October, however, community forks, archive copies, and the commercial ARTEX PRO version remain accessible. According to Censys, 1,465 ARTEX console hosts were exposed to the internet on November 4, with additional deployments most likely operating behind private networks. 

Security Measures to Limit Exposure

A major portion of Amazon's campaigns relied on existing security weaknesses rather than newly discovered attack techniques, according to Amazon. The use of AI gateways and application building platforms should be accompanied by replacing default credentials, completing or removing unfinished installations, limiting management interfaces to trusted networks, and implementing available security updates. 

A patch for CVE-2025-3248 must be applied to Langflow version 1.3.0 or later. In light of the advisory cited by The Hacker News, which does not contain a patch for CVE-2026-28797, organizations using RAGFlow should review exposure to CVE-2026-28797 and follow the project's security guidance. 

The exposed API keys and cloud credentials should be revoked and replaced, as well as the repository, deployment files, container images, and continuous integration/continuous delivery pipelines for embedded secrets must be examined. It is important to apply expiration dates and IP restrictions to API tokens, monitor unexpected consumption of artificial intelligence services, and investigate suspicious Worker deployments or unusual database activity, among other tasks. 

Amazon has shared indicators of compromise to facilitate further investigation and notified AWS customers of potential risks. According to the findings, agentic artificial intelligence is changing the pace of cybercrime. Security teams must consider not only automated vulnerability discovery, but also attackers who may validate stolen credentials, coordinate parallel operations, and leverage compromised resources to finance additional attacks in addition to automated vulnerability discovery. 

This study highlights the increasing security risks associated with autonomous artificial intelligence agents as well as exposed artificial intelligence infrastructure. In order to avoid exploitation at scale by attackers, organizations should strengthen access controls, secure API credentials, monitor unusual activity, and address vulnerabilities as these tools become increasingly widespread.

Ransomware Group Wiped an Entire VMware Estate in Ten Days Without Exploiting a Single Vulnerability




A ransomware group called BlackNevas dismantled a company's entire virtualization infrastructure over ten days, destroying four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine running on them, two vCenter Server Appliances, and the backup systems meant to recover from exactly this kind of attack. The findings, published by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team, detail how attackers moved through one of the most common enterprise environments without triggering a single exploit alert, because they never used one.

The core finding is uncomfortable for organizations that have treated patching as the main line of defense: every action the attackers took against ESXi ran through legitimate VMware management interfaces. The group obtained valid administrative credentials, used VMware's own tools to push configurations, and triggered ransomware detonation through supported remote access channels.

Ransomware made up 39.4 percent of all incidents Kaspersky's response team handled in 2025. The ESXi segment of that is growing, partly because of a decision made in 2021. When the Babuk ransomware source code leaked, it included a working ESXi version, and at least ten ransomware families have since reused that codebase. BlackNevas is one of them.


How the Attack Unfolded

BlackNevas, first observed in November 2024 and also tracked as a Trigona family variant, operates across Windows, Linux, NAS devices, and ESXi hypervisors. The group runs double extortion, stealing data before encrypting it and threatening public leaks to pressure victims. Known targets include organizations in healthcare, finance, manufacturing, legal services, and telecom across Asia, Europe, and North America.

In this incident, the attackers got in through credential reuse. Valid administrative credentials from non-virtualization systems were used to reach the vCenter Server Appliances, which manage the ESXi hosts. This is the same access path defenders often overlook because they focus on preventing vulnerability exploitation rather than limiting what happens when credentials are already compromised.

Forty-three seconds after logging into the VCSA via SSH as root, the attackers deployed MeshAgent, part of the open-source MeshCentral remote management platform. The entire SSH session lasted two minutes and 26 seconds. Four hours later, they returned through MeshAgent and installed Ligolo-ng, a tunneling tool, as a systemd service disguised under the name `vmware-vdma.service` to blend in with legitimate VMware components.

The next step exploited a feature few organizations think to restrict. VMware's Host Profiles allow administrators to push consistent configurations to ESXi hosts from vCenter. The attackers used this to enable Tech Support Mode SSH across the hosts. Ten minutes and 18 seconds after the configuration was pushed, the TSM-SSH service was running. SSH sessions to ESXi then originated from the vCenter appliance IP, which most environments treat as a trusted internal source.


Taking Out Backups First

Before touching the ESXi layer, the attackers disabled antivirus on the backup infrastructure, stopped backup services, and encrypted the recovery systems. This sequence is deliberate. Ransomware operators have learned that organizations with clean backups can often recover without paying, so the backup environment is now treated as part of the primary attack surface.

Two Veeam vulnerabilities are worth noting here. CVE-2024-40711, which CISA has added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, has been directly linked to ransomware campaigns. CVE-2025-23120 is not on that list yet, but affects domain-joined backup servers and represents a less-patched exposure in many environments.


Detonation and Partial Recovery

The ransomware payload was uploaded to ESXi hosts via SFTP. Roughly three hours before detonation, it ran a self-test lasting about 16 seconds. The final command processed virtual machine storage directories with options to wipe and detach volumes. On one host, all virtual machines stopped within 23 seconds. The ransomware overwrote approximately the first two kilobytes of virtual disk files. Kaspersky notes that a valid backup GPT header may allow partial recovery in some cases, though this is not a reliable path.

A crucial detection problem runs through the entire attack. ESXi writes logs to a RAM disk by default, meaning a reboot erases them. If forensic investigators arrive after a reboot, the evidence of how attackers moved through the environment is gone. Kaspersky recommends configuring remote syslog to preserve ESXi logs outside the virtualization trust domain.


What Organizations Should Change

Kaspersky's recommendations center on treating vCenter as a Tier 0 asset, the same classification given to domain controllers. That means separate administrative identities for virtualization management, phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, and limiting SSH and ESXi Shell access through Lockdown Mode. Network filtering on the management interface, combined with logs stored outside the virtualization environment, closes the two gaps this attack exploited most effectively.

The practical lesson from this incident is that a patched VMware environment is not a protected one if the credentials managing it are shared with less-secured systems.



Meta Fined €805 Million in Italy Over Facebook’s Access to Android Photo Galleries Without Consent

 

Meta has been fined €805 million by Italy’s data protection authority for using the gallery suggestions feature on Facebook, which was activated by default, to access users’ images, videos and metadata. 

The Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante) has told Meta to remove the feature from being active by default. This means that it will need to ensure the feature does not appear as an active option for users who have previously allowed access to their phone galleries. It will also need to make sure that the feature cannot be used without an additional opt-in, with clear information about what the feature does and how to turn it off. 

During the investigation it was discovered Facebook had used a blanket permission to give access to multiple functions within the app. There was no clear explanation to users that the permission would allow the app to suggest photos and videos from their private galleries. Once users had given the permission Facebook could gain access to a whole photo album. The authority said it was difficult to know exactly what information the application was gaining access to. 

Garante concluded that this breached Article 122 of the Italian Privacy Code. This article was introduced to bring the ePrivacy Directive of the European Union into national law. It means that any information stored on users’ devices as part of their private life must be given free and informed consent before applications are allowed to access it. Meta has appealed the fine. A spokesperson said the fine was unfair as the feature cannot be used unless users have allowed it in their device settings. They added that users can revoke or change their permission at any time. 

The authority has also told Meta that it must provide an initial report on how it will comply with the ruling within 30 days and a final report within 90 days. If they fail to comply within the 60-day timeframe then the feature cannot be active for users who haven’t given valid consent. This comes after a complaint from consumer protection organisation Centro Tutela Consumatori Utenti in Bolzano. In July 2025, they advised users of Facebook to turn off the gallery suggestions and check the app’s permissions. The investigation did not look into whether the content from Facebook’s galleries were used to train AI models. Meta has denied this. 

However, Garante may investigate whether the new feature introduced this year, which allows processing of gallery content in the cloud, has breached any rules. Meta had claimed that the Irish data protection regulator should be responsible for this issue. However, this was rejected by Garante as the ePrivacy framework does not use the EU’s one stop shop system. The feature has been active since 2023 and the investigation started in July 2025. 

The fine of €805 million equates to around 0.47% of Meta’s worldwide revenue. The authority took into consideration the potential impact on around 20 million Android users in Italy, how long the breach had been occurring, a previous ruling in 2019 against Meta and Meta’s lack of cooperation. However, they also took into consideration that Meta had made changes following the complaint. Regulators felt these changes were late and not enough.

US Disrupts North Korean Crypto-Theft Campaign

 

The United States has disrupted FaceStealer, a North Korean cyber campaign that allegedly stole more than $400 million in cryptocurrency through deepfakes, hijacked messaging accounts, and fake technical “fixes.” The operation targeted crypto and Web3 professionals as well as open-source developers, showing how social engineering can be as damaging as a conventional software exploit. 

According to the FBI, attackers hijacked accounts on Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, and Discord and used them to invite victims to video meetings. During those calls, they displayed recordings of people the targets knew—including people who had already been compromised—to create a convincing sense of trust and urgency. While a victim waited for a meeting to begin, the hackers secretly recorded webcam footage. Those recordings could then be reused in later meetings, sometimes alongside footage of multiple familiar people, making the deception increasingly difficult for the next target to recognize. 

After building trust, the attacker claimed that a technical problem had occurred and displayed a fake error message. The victim was then directed to a link offering a supposed update, installer, or repair—effectively a ClickFix-style lure designed to make running malicious code seem routine. The malware stole cryptocurrency-related data and credentials for video-meeting services such as Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams. 

It also exposed victims’ contact lists, social media accounts, communication applications, and webcam videos, giving attackers material to expand the campaign. Researchers attributed FaceStealer to the North Korean-linked BlueNoroff group. The campaign reportedly identified 677 targets across 58 countries, with a strong focus on founders and senior executives in the cryptocurrency and Web3 sectors. 

The attackers sometimes waited months, or even more than a year, before exploiting an initial compromise—likely allowing victims’ cryptocurrency holdings to grow. The FBI also highlighted attempted attacks against maintainers of widely used npm and Rust packages, underscoring the risk to the broader open-source supply chain. 

The U.S. government seized the cloud infrastructure supporting the campaign after it had operated for 18 months. Authorities also identified more than 900 secretly recorded webcam videos of technology workers, illustrating the scale of surveillance and social manipulation involved. In a related action, the U.S. Department of Justice said it froze more than $2.7 billion connected to a $6.4 billion Binance crypto heist, with court authorization to seize or restrain more than $1.2 billion of that amount. These actions show that disruption can involve both infrastructure takedowns and financial countermeasures. 

Users should join meetings only through official applications and invitation codes, independently verify unexpected meeting invitations, and keep webcams off unless they are genuinely needed. Most importantly, they should never run scripts, updates, or “fixes” prompted by an unexpected technical error during a call. FaceStealer demonstrates that cybercriminals no longer need to break through technical defenses first; they can exploit human trust, familiar faces, and urgency. For crypto holders, executives, and developers, verification before action is now a core security control.

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