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Phishing Campaigns Exploit Cloudflare Workers to Harvest User Credentials

 

Cybersecurity researchers are raising alarms about phishing campaigns that exploit Cloudflare Workers to serve phishing sites designed to harvest user credentials associated with Microsoft, Gmail, Yahoo!, and cPanel Webmail. This attack method, known as transparent phishing or adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing, employs Cloudflare Workers to act as a reverse proxy for legitimate login pages, intercepting traffic between the victim and the login page to capture credentials, cookies, and tokens, according to Netskope researcher Jan Michael Alcantara. 

Over the past 30 days, the majority of these phishing campaigns have targeted victims in Asia, North America, and Southern Europe, particularly in the technology, financial services, and banking sectors. The cybersecurity firm noted an increase in traffic to Cloudflare Workers-hosted phishing pages starting in Q2 2023, with a spike in the number of distinct domains from just over 1,000 in Q4 2023 to nearly 1,300 in Q1 2024. The phishing campaigns utilize a technique called HTML smuggling, which uses malicious JavaScript to assemble the malicious payload on the client side, evading security protections. 

Unlike traditional methods, the malicious payload in this case is a phishing page reconstructed and displayed to the user on a web browser. These phishing pages prompt victims to sign in with Microsoft Outlook or Office 365 (now Microsoft 365) to view a purported PDF document. If users follow through, fake sign-in pages hosted on Cloudflare Workers are used to harvest their credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes. "The entire phishing page is created using a modified version of an open-source Cloudflare AitM toolkit," Alcantara said. 

Once victims enter their credentials, the attackers collect tokens and cookies from the responses, gaining visibility into any additional activity performed by the victim post-login. HTML smuggling is increasingly favored by threat actors for its ability to bypass modern defenses, serving fraudulent HTML pages and other malware without raising red flags. One highlighted instance by Huntress Labs involved a fake HTML file injecting an iframe of the legitimate Microsoft authentication portal retrieved from an actor-controlled domain. This method enables MFA-bypass AitM transparent proxy phishing attacks using HTML smuggling payloads with injected iframes instead of simple links. 

Recent phishing campaigns have also used invoice-themed emails with HTML attachments masquerading as PDF viewer login pages to steal email account credentials before redirecting users to URLs hosting "proof of payment." These tactics leverage phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) toolkits like Greatness to steal Microsoft 365 login credentials and bypass MFA using the AitM technique. The financial services, manufacturing, energy/utilities, retail, and consulting sectors in the U.S., Canada, Germany, South Korea, and Norway have been top targets. 

Threat actors are also employing generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to craft effective phishing emails and using file inflation methods to evade analysis by delivering large malware payloads. Cybersecurity experts underscore the need for robust security measures and oversight mechanisms to combat these sophisticated phishing campaigns, which continually evolve to outsmart traditional detection systems.

CISA Published MARs on Samples Targeting Pulse Secure Devices

 

Five new research reports outlining malware detected on compromised Pulse Secure devices were issued this week by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Adversaries have been targeting Pulse Connect Secure VPN appliances to exploit a variety of vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-22893 and CVE-2021-22937, which were found earlier this year.

CISA issued an alert in April this year on assaults on Pulse Secure devices, along with indicators of compromise (IOCs) and details on the malware used by the attackers. Threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are detailed in the malware analysis reports (MARs). 

CVE-2021-22893 is a buffer overflow vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure Collaboration Suite prior to version b9.1R11.4 that allows remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code as the root user through a maliciously crafted meeting room. Two hacking groups have used the zero-day vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN equipment to break into the networks of US defence contractors and government institutions around the world, according to reports issued by FireEye and Pulse Secure in May. 

CVE-2021-22937 is a high-severity remote code execution vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure's admin web interface. A remote attacker might use the weakness to overwrite arbitrary files and gain root-level code execution. The bug has a CVSS score of 9.1 and is the consequence of a bypass of the patch provided in October 2021 to address the CVE-2020-8260 issue, according to experts. Early this month, Ivanti corrected a major code execution issue in Pulse Connect Secure VPN. 

According to CISA, two of the samples are maliciously modified Pulse Secure files received from compromised machines, both of which are credential harvesters. One of the files also serves as a backdoor, allowing attackers to access the hacked device remotely. A malicious shell script in another file might log usernames and passwords. A third sample consisted of many files, one of which had a shell script for converting a Pulse Secure file to a web shell. One file was created to intercept certificate-based multi-factor authentication, while others were created to read web request data.

Two Perl scripts designed to execute attacker instructions, a Perl library, a Perl script, and a shell script designed to manipulate and execute the 'bin/umount' file were included in the fifth sample.

TeamTNT: New Credential Harvester Targets Cloud Services and other Software

 

Secrets must be kept confidential in order for networks to be protected and supply-chain attacks to be avoided. Malicious actors frequently target secrets in storage mechanisms and harvest credentials from systems that have been compromised. DevOps software often stores credentials in plain text that is accessible even without user intervention, posing a significant security risk. 

When inside a victim's device, malicious actors have been known to steal cloud service provider (CSP) credentials. For example, the cybercriminal group TeamTNT is no stranger to attacking cloud containers, expanding their arsenal to steal cloud credentials, and experimenting with new environments and intrusive activities. 

Trend Micro discovered new evidence that TeamTNT has expanded its credential harvesting capabilities to threaten numerous cloud and non-cloud services in victims' internal networks and systems post-compromise in the group's most recent attack routine. 

The malware created by TeamTNT is designed to steal credentials from specific applications and services. It infects Linux machines with vulnerabilities such as exposed private keys and recycled passwords, and it focuses on looking for cloud-related data on infected devices. 

Cloud misconfigurations and repeated passwords, as in the group's other attacks, make it easy to gain access to a victim's device. To gain access to other systems, the community harvests credentials for Secure Shell (SSH) and Server Message Block (SMB), as before. Both intrusion strategies have the ability to disperse their payloads in a worm-like manner. 

The malware searches for app configurations and data based on a search list when running through the linked devices, and sends them to the command-and-control (C&C) server, using a.netrc file to automatically log in using the harvested credentials. Comparing the harvester with the group’s previous versions, Trend Micro saw a significant increase in targets. 

Since TeamTNT's payloads are focused on illegal Monero mining, it's no surprise that the malware searches the infected system for Monero configuration data. The malware looks for Monero wallets on all devices that the group has access to. The malware attempts to remove all traces of itself from the infected device at the end of its routine. According to research, it strongly suggests that this is not being achieved effectively. Although the command "history -c" clears the Bash history, some commands continue to run and leave traces on other sections of the device. 

Malicious actors deliberately search internal networks and systems for legitimate users' credentials in order to facilitate their post-intrusion activities. They could use the cloud services paid for by legitimate organizations for other malicious purposes if they have CSP credentials. 

Furthermore, plaintext credentials are a gold mine for cybercriminals, particularly when used in subsequent attacks. Vulnerabilities, especially those in unpatched and otherwise unsecured internet-facing systems, are the same. 

Customers are advised to use the hidden vaults provided by their CSPs and adopt these best practices to minimize the risks of this TeamTNT routine and other related threats: 
1.Adopt the collective responsibility model and enforce the concept of least privilege. 
2.Replace default credentials with strong and stable passwords and make sure that the security settings of various systems environments are personalized to the needs of the company. 
3.Avoid storing passwords in plain text and use multifactor authentication.