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Cloudflare Launches Moltworker to Run Self-Hosted AI Agent Moltbot on Its Developer Platform

  Cloudflare has unveiled Moltworker, an open-source framework designed to run Moltbot—a self-hosted personal AI agent—directly on its Deve...

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zero Day vulnerability
Cyber Extortion Trends Data Breach Education Sector Cybersecurity K 12 Cyber Threats ransomware attacks zero Day vulnerability

Global Data Indicates Slowdown in Ransomware Targeting Education


 

It is evident on campuses once defined by open exchange and quiet routine that a new kind of disruption has taken hold, one that does not arrive in force but rather with encrypted files, locked networks, and terse ransom notes. 

Over the past year, ransomware has steadily evolved from an isolated IT emergency to a systemic operation crisis for school districts, universities, and public agencies. There are stalling lecture schedules, freezing admissions systems, and wobbling payroll cycles, and administrators are faced with more than just technical recovery challenges; reputational and legal risks also arise. 

What was once considered a cybersecurity issue has now spread into governance, continuity planning, and public trust. Recent figures indicate that the pace has somewhat slowed down. With approximately 180 attacks documented worldwide across the first three quarters of 2025, ransomware incidents targeting the education sector have recorded their first quarterly decline since early 2024. 

It appears on the surface that there has been a pause in digital extortion. However, beneath the statistical dip, there is a complex reality beneath that dip. As opposed to strengthening defenses, the slowdown seems more likely to be the result of a recalibration of attacker priorities rather than a retreat. 

Rather than casting a wide net, they are selecting targets with more deliberate consideration, spending more time on reconnaissance, and applying pressure to areas where disruption has the greatest impact. Therefore, this apparent decline is not indicative of diminished risk, rather it reflects adaptation. 

Data from the U.K.-based research firm Comparitech confirms that this recalibration has been made. In its latest education ransomware roundup, the company reports that 251 attacks have been publicly reported against educational institutions worldwide in 2025, a marginal increase from 247 in 2024. A total of 94 of these incidents have been formally acknowledged by the affected institutions.

The volume appears to have remained relatively unchanged on paper, but the operational consequences have not remained unchanged. As of 2025, approximately 3.9 million records have been exposed through confirmed breaches, which represents an increase of 27 percent over the 3.1 million records compromised last year. 

Analysts caution that this figure is preliminary. It is common for disclosure timelines to be delayed in public sector organizations, particularly in the aftermath of an intrusion, and several incidents from the second half of the year are still being evaluated. The cumulative impact of data loss is expected to increase as further breach notifications are filed, suggesting that the true extent of the data loss may not yet be fully apparent. 

An in-depth examination of institutional segmentation reveals a significant divergence in impact. K-12 districts continued to constitute a significant proportion of reported incidents in both 2024 and 2025, accounting for roughly three quarters of incidents. However, higher education institutions were more likely to experience substantial data exposures. 

The disparity between K-12 institutions and higher education institutions increased sharply by the year 2025, with approximately 1.1 million compromised records reported in 2024 as compared to 1.9 million in 2025. In the United States, approximately 175,000 records were exposed as a result of K-12 breaches, while approximately 3.7 million records were exposed at colleges and universities. 

Comparitech attributed much of the increase to a small number of high-impact intrusions that were linked to a previously unseen vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite discovered in August that was previously undisclosed. 

CLOP exploited a zero-day flaw that was not known to the vendor at the time it was exploited to gain unauthorized access to enterprise environments, resulting in confirmed breaches at five academic institutions. There is a broader pattern underlying the current threat landscape highlighted by this episode: there are fewer opportunistic attacks, more targeted exploitation of enterprise-grade software, and a greater emphasis on high-yield compromises which result in large data exposures. 

Rather than a sustained defensive advantage, there appears to be a shifting criminal economics at play in the education sector that is contributing to relative stability in incident counts. In Comparitech's January analysis, some threat groups may have directed operational resources towards manufacturing, where supply chain dependency and production downtime can lead to more rapid ransom negotiations. 

Despite overall ransomware activity remaining active across other verticals, schools and universities have experienced a plateau in annual attack totals due to that redistribution of focus. There has also been a decline in the average global ransom demand between 2024 and 2025, falling from $694,000 to $464,000 on average. 

Financial demands within the education sector have also adapted. At first glance, this reduction may appear to indicate shrinking leverage. However, analysts caution that headline figures do not fully reflect an incident's overall costs, which typically include forensic investigations, legal reviews, system restorations, notification of regulatory agencies, and reputational repair. These attacks frequently carry a substantial economic burden in addition to the initial extortion amount. 

Operational disruption remains an integral part of these attacks. Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District reported a ransomware intrusion in September that forced the district to temporarily close its schools due to malicious code discovered within district servers supporting telephony, video monitoring, and visitor management.

According to District communications, the affected infrastructure is integral to campus safety and security. As a result of the aforementioned update, the district informed the public that it had not paid the ransom and had restored its systems from backups. In addition to confirmed disclosures, additional claims illustrate that local education agencies are facing increasing pressure from the federal government. 

A comprehensive investigation is still being conducted despite the fact that there is no indication that sensitive or personal information had been accessed without authorization. Based on comparison technology reports, Medusa has named Fall River Public Schools and Franklin Pierce Schools as 2025 targets, and has requested $400,000 in compensation from each district. 

Both districts have not publicly confirmed the full scope of the claims at the time of reporting, however both cases were among the five largest ransom demands made against educational institutions worldwide last year. It is evident, however, that the data reinforce a consistent pattern despite stabilizing attack volumes and decreasing average demands. 

However, the sector remains at risk for episodic, high-impact events that can disrupt instruction, undermine public confidence, and produce substantial data risk. Though the tactical tempo may change, structural vulnerability remains the same. As a result, policymakers and institutional leaders have clear repercussions. 

The current trajectory calls for complacency, but for structural reinforcement Education networks are often decentralized and resource-constrained and rely heavily on legacy enterprise systems. To ensure the integrity of these networks, patch management disciplines, network segmentation, multi-factor authentication enforcement, and continuous monitoring are necessary that detects lateral movement before encryption is initiated. 

It is also crucial that incident response planning be integrated into executive governance so that crisis decision-making, legal review, and stakeholder communication frameworks are established well in advance of an intrusion. 

As ransomware groups continue to emphasize precision over volume, resilience will be largely determined by the ability to embed cybersecurity as a core operational function rather than merely a peripheral IT responsibility rather than relying solely on isolated events.
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Windows
Avast malware PC Games pirated games Software Windows

Windows Malware Distributed Through Pirated Games Infects Over 400,000 Systems

 



A Windows-focused malware operation spreading through pirated PC games has potentially compromised more than 400,000 devices worldwide, according to research released by Cyderes. The company identified the threat as “RenEngine loader” and reported that roughly 30,000 affected users are located in the United States alone.

Investigators found the malicious code embedded inside cracked and repackaged versions of popular game franchises, including Far Cry, Need for Speed, FIFA, and Assassin’s Creed. The infected installers appear to function normally, allowing users to download and play the games. However, while the visible game content runs as expected, concealed code executes in parallel without the user’s awareness.

Researchers traced part of the operation to a legitimate launcher built on Ren'Py, an engine commonly used for visual novel-style games. The attackers embedded harmful components within this launcher framework. When executed, the launcher decompresses archived game files as intended, but at the same time initiates the hidden malware routine.

According to Cyderes, the campaign has been active since at least April of last year and remains ongoing. In October, the operators modified the malware to include an embedded telemetry URL. Each time the RenEngine loader runs, it connects to this address, allowing the attackers to log activity. Analysis of that telemetry endpoint enabled researchers to estimate overall infection levels, with the system recording between 4,000 and 10,000 visits per day.

Telemetry data indicates that the largest concentration of victims is located in India, the United States, and Brazil. The US accounts for approximately 30,000 of the infected systems identified through this tracking mechanism.

The loader’s primary function is to deliver additional malicious software onto compromised machines. In multiple cases, researchers observed it deploying a Windows-based information stealer known as ARC. This malware is designed to extract stored browser passwords, session cookies, cryptocurrency wallet information, autofill entries, clipboard data, and system configuration details.

Cyderes also reported observing alternative payloads delivered through the same loader infrastructure, including Rhadamanthys stealer, Async RAT, and XWorm. These programs are capable of credential theft and, in some cases, remote system control, enabling attackers to monitor activity or manipulate infected devices.

The investigation identified one distribution source, dodi-repacks[.]site, as hosting downloads containing the embedded malware. The domain has previously been associated with other malicious distribution activity.

Detection remains limited at the initial infection stage. Public scan results from Google’s VirusTotal platform indicate that, aside from Avast, AVG, and Cynet, most antivirus engines currently do not flag the loader component as malicious. This detection gap increases the likelihood that users may remain unaware of compromise.

Users who suspect infection are advised to run updated security scans immediately. If concerns persist, Windows System Restore may help revert the device to a prior clean state. In cases where compromise cannot be confidently removed, a full operating system reinstallation may be necessary.

The findings reinforce a recurring cybersecurity risk: unauthorized software downloads frequently serve as a delivery channel for concealed malware capable of exposing personal data and granting attackers extended access to victim systems.

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Supply Chain Attack
Crypto Exchange Cyber Attacks dYdX PyPI Package Supply Chain Attack

Malicious dYdX Packages Drain User Wallets in Supply Chain Attack

 

Malicious open-source packages targeting the dYdX cryptocurrency exchange have enabled attackers to drain user wallets, exposing once again how fragile software supply chains can be in the crypto ecosystem. Researchers found that legitimate-looking libraries on popular repositories were quietly stealing seed phrases and other sensitive data from both developers and end users, turning everyday development workflows into vectors for wallet compromise. The incident shows that even reputable projects using standard tooling are not immune when upstream dependencies are poisoned.

The attack focused on npm and PyPI packages associated with dYdX’s v4 trading stack, specifically the JavaScript package @dydxprotocol/v4-client-js and the Python package dydx-v4-client in certain versions. These libraries are widely used to build trading bots, automated strategies, and backend services that interact with the exchange and therefore routinely handle mnemonics and private keys needed to sign transactions. By compromising such central components, attackers gained access not just to individual wallets but to any application that pulled in the tainted releases.

Inside the malicious npm package, attackers added a surreptitious function that executed whenever a wallet seed phrase was processed, quietly exfiltrating it along with a fingerprint of the device running the code. The fingerprinting allowed the threat actors to correlate stolen credentials across multiple compromises and track victims over time. Stolen data was sent to a typosquatted domain crafted to resemble legitimate dYdX infrastructure, increasing the chances that network defenders would overlook the outbound connections.

The PyPI package carried similar credential-stealing behavior but escalated the threat by bundling a remote access Trojan capable of executing arbitrary Python code on infected systems. Running as a background daemon, this RAT regularly contacted a command‑and‑control server, fetched attacker-supplied code, and executed it in an isolated subprocess using a hard-coded authorization token. With this access, adversaries could steal keys and source code, plant persistent backdoors, and broadly surveil developer environments beyond just wallet data.

This is not the first time dYdX has faced targeted abuse of its ecosystem, following prior incidents involving malicious npm uploads and website hijacking campaigns aimed at draining user funds. For the broader industry, the episode underlines how high‑value crypto platforms and their developer tooling have become prime targets for supply-chain attacks. Developers are urged to rigorously audit dependencies, verify package integrity and publishers, and avoid using real wallet credentials in testing environments, while users should quickly review any apps or bots that rely on the affected dYdX client libraries.
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social engineering attacks
Cryptographic Credential Theft Cyber Attacks Device Linking Exploitation QR Code Phishing Secure Messaging Security Signal Account Hijacking social engineering attacks

German Authorities Alert Public to Signal Account Takeover Campaign

 

The use of secure messaging applications has long been seen as the final line of defense against persistent digital surveillance in an era of widespread digital surveillance. This assumption is now being challenged by Germany's domestic intelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which, in conjunction with the Federal Office for Information Security, has jointly issued a rare advisory detailing a calculated cyberattack attributed to a state-backed adversary. 

It is clear that the warning highlights a deliberate strategy to infiltrate private communications through deception, rather than technical exploits, targeting individuals who rely heavily on them. The agencies report that the operation targets high-ranking political decision-makers, senior military personnel, diplomatic representatives, and investigative journalists in Germany and across Europe. Its implications go beyond the compromise of individual accounts to include high-ranking officials and foreign diplomats. 

Access to secure messenger profiles by unauthorized users could expose confidential information, sensitive professional networks, and trusted contact chains, which in turn could compromise entire institutional ecosystems. 

As a result, the campaign does not rely on malware deployment or the exploitation of Signal platform vulnerabilities. It attempts to manipulate the application's legitimate account recovery and verification features in order to achieve its objectives.

The attackers intend to quietly intercept private conversations and harvest contact information without triggering conventional security alarms by exploiting human trust rather than software vulnerabilities. The attack sequence reflects this strategy. The attackers are impersonating “Signal Support” or impersonating a fabricated assistance channel called a “Signal Security ChatBot” and contacting selected victims directly. 

Receivers are pressured to divulge verification codes or PINs sent via SMS as a precaution against data loss or account suspension, under the pretense that the adversary will be able to take control of the account upon surrendering these credentials. Based on the initial findings, the joint advisory clarifies that the attack is not a result of technical compromise of the platform's codebase or malicious payload deployment. 

By combining carefully staged social engineering with Signal's routine functionality, the operators are exploiting the trust users place in its privacy-centered design. By manipulating the standard account verification and recovery workflows, the attackers are able to induce their victims to divulge the very credentials that secure their communication. 

In one documented scenario, a person impersonating an official support channel is referred to as “Signal Support” or “Signal Security Chatbot.” The targeted organization receives messages alleging fabricated security irregularities and urges it to act immediately to prevent alleged data loss or account suspension. 

By engineering urgency, recipients are prompted to disclose their Signal PINs or SMS verification codes, overriding caution. When the adversary possesses these credentials, they may re-register the account on infrastructure under their control, effectively transferring ownership of the account. Such situations may result in the legitimate user being locked out and the intruder gaining unfettered access to message histories, active conversations, and stored contact information. 

A parallel technique utilizes Signal's multi-device linking capability, enabling seamless synchronization across mobile, tablet, and desktop clients. By causing victims to scan a malicious QR code, threat actors are able to inadvertently attach additional devices to their accounts by posing as a threat actor. With this method, one-on-one exchanges, group discussions, and associated metadata are persistently visible, almost real-time, without generating immediate suspicion.

Since the original device remains functional, the victims may not be aware that their communications are mirrored elsewhere. Authorities emphasize that the absence of malware is a defining characteristic of the campaign. In lieu of exploit chains or zero-day vulnerabilities, attackers rely solely on the voluntary disclosure of valid cryptographic credentials to gain access. 

Through the use of this approach, they are able to circumvent conventional endpoint security systems and network monitoring systems because the account access appears to be procedurally valid within the platform's security environment. 

Using trusted features inappropriately complicates the detection process as well as amplifies the potential intelligence value of the intrusion. It is further noted that individuals whose communications are sensitive from a diplomatic, military, political, or investigative perspective have been given priority in the targeting profile. 

By compromised such accounts, one can gain access to confidential discussions, gain insight into policy decisions and operational planning, and reconstruct professional networks to target subsequent targets. Furthermore, controlling trusted accounts provides an opportunity for impersonation, allowing misleading information to be distributed or sensitive exchanges to be manipulated.

It is reported that the activity was likely to be perpetrated by a state-sponsored actor, but officials caution that these techniques are neither technical complex nor exclusive to government-backed organizations. 

The use of social engineering rather than sophisticated exploitation reduces the barrier to replication, enhancing the likelihood that criminal enterprises or other hostile actors may use similar tactics with comparable impact in the future. The German authorities emphasize in their concluding guidance that the durability of encrypted communication ultimately depends on both informed user vigilance and cryptographic strength. 

Educating institutions and high profile individuals on how to respond to unsolicited account-related requests with heightened scrutiny, strengthening internal awareness of verification workflows, and integrating secure messaging hygiene into operational security procedures is recommended.

An audit of linked devices on a regular basis, strict control over authentication credentials, as well as the activation of additional account safeguards are not offered as optional enhancements, but as mandatory requirements in a threat environment where deception replaces exploitation. 

According to the agencies, resilience will depend more on disciplined user behavior and proactive defensive posture than on technological assurances alone, as adversaries continue to use legitimate platform features for covert access. 

s a result of the advisory, institutions will not be able to protect themselves from compromise when authentication workflows themselves become an attack surface for compromised platforms. 

It is recommended that organizations evaluate how secure messaging tools are integrated into executive and diplomatic communications, ensuring that account recovery procedures, device management policies, and identity verification protocols are governed by formal security controls as opposed to informal user discretion, according to German officials. 

An adversary who weaponizes legitimacy rather than exploiting flaws will need to cultivate procedural discipline, a continuous threat awareness, and a recognition that trust, once manipulated, can have the same impact as any technical vulnerability.
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Government Cyber Threats
Critical Infrastructure Cyber Campaigns cyber espionage Cyber Security Cyber Spying Government Cyber Threats

Global Cyber Espionage Campaign Hits Governments in 37 Countries

 

A massive cyber spying effort - linked to a government-backed group operating out of Asia - has breached governmental bodies and essential infrastructure targets in 37 nations, recent findings by Palo Alto Networks reveal. Known under the identifier TGR-STA-1030, the assault reached more than 70 institutions during the last twelve months. This intrusion ranks among the broadest state-associated hacking episodes seen since the major compromise involving SolarWinds back in 2020. 

Attack efforts targeted government bodies handling commerce, monetary policy, power resources, frontier controls, one expert noted. What makes this operation distinct is its breadth and financial angle - data points show interest in critical raw materials, ongoing commercial talks, even realignments in global partnerships. 

What stood out, per Cybersecurity Dive’s coverage, was how Palo Alto labeled the campaign - the widest state-affiliated spying push seen lately. The firm avoided naming any nation directly, yet pointed to origins across Asia, highlighting its reach alongside advanced execution. Though no explicit attribution emerged, the depth of coordination suggested a well-resourced hand behind it.  

Five national law enforcement and border units fell victim, alongside financial branches across three countries, while several agencies handling natural resources or diplomacy also faced breaches. Targeted entities ranged from Taiwan’s state-backed electrical infrastructure provider to Mongolia’s federal policing body, including Indonesia’s senior administrative figure, the Czech legislative chamber plus its defense command, and Brazil’s energy regulatory office. 

State-linked telecom enterprises were impacted too, scattered through different regions without pattern. Peter Renals, principal security researcher with Palo Alto’s Unit 42 threat intelligence team, told Axios that government agencies and critical infrastructure organizations in the United States and United Kingdom were not impacted. Timing of the cyber intrusions seemed tightly linked to key political and economic moments. Around a month prior to Honduras’ presidential vote - marked by discussions on Taiwan relations - numerous state-linked IPs faced targeting. 

Meanwhile, in Mexico, suspicious digital actions emerged after news broke about trade probes connected to upcoming tariff decisions. Facing rising cyber threats, European authorities saw increased digital intrusions. After Czech leader Petr Pavel met with the Dalai Lama, scans appeared across defense, law enforcement, legislative, and administrative systems in the country. In parallel, German infrastructure came under scrutiny - close to five hundred public-sector internet addresses were probed that summer. 

Though separate events, both incidents pointed toward coordinated probing of state-level networks. Beginning with digital deception, the group used fake emails alongside unpatched security holes to enter systems. Exploiting weaknesses in tools like Microsoft Exchange Server and SAP Solution Manager was observed by analysts tracking their moves. Hidden inside compromised machines, a stealthy program named ShadowGuard took root beneath regular operating layers. 

This custom-built tool ran deep in Linux environments, masking operations where most scans rarely look. Alone between November and December, scans hit infrastructure across 155 nations - evidence of persistent probing ahead of possible follow-up actions. Though Palo Alto Networks alerted impacted governments and collaborators, the group behind the activity still operates, its presence a steady concern for critical systems and state-level safety around the globe.
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Wiz security research
AI agent social network Data Breach Moltbook data breach OpenClaw security flaw Supabase misconfiguration Wiz security research

Moltbook AI Social Network Exposes 1.5 Million Agent Credentials After Database Misconfiguration

 

Moltbook, a newly launched social platform designed exclusively for artificial intelligence agents, suffered a major security lapse just days after going live. The platform, which allows autonomous AI agents to share memes and debate philosophical ideas without human moderation, inadvertently left its backend database exposed due to a configuration error.

The issue was uncovered independently by security firm Wiz and researcher Jameson O'Reilly. Their findings revealed that unauthorized users could take control of any of the platform’s 1.5 million registered AI agents, alter posts, and read private communications simply by interacting with the public-facing site.

Moltbook launched on Jan. 28 as a companion network to OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent system developed by Austrian programmer Peter Steinberger. OpenClaw operates locally on users’ devices and integrates with messaging platforms and calendars. The framework gained rapid popularity in late January following several rebrands, transitioning from Clawdbot to Moltbot.

Founder Matt Schlicht, who also leads Octane AI, stated in media interviews that his own OpenClaw-powered agent, Clawd Clawderberg, developed much of the Moltbook platform under his direction and continues to operate significant portions of it.

Database Left Wide Open

Wiz discovered the flaw on Jan. 31 and promptly informed Schlicht. O’Reilly separately identified the same vulnerability. Investigators found that the exposed database contained 1.5 million API authentication tokens, approximately 35,000 email addresses, private user messages, and verification codes.

The root cause traced back to improper configuration within Supabase, a backend-as-a-service platform. Specifically, Moltbook failed to properly enable Supabase’s Row Level Security feature, which is designed to limit database access based on user roles.

Researchers also located a Supabase API key embedded within client-side JavaScript, enabling unauthenticated users to query the full production database and retrieve sensitive credentials within minutes.

Although Moltbook publicly claimed 1.5 million AI agents had registered, backend data indicated that only about 17,000 human operators controlled those accounts. The system lacked safeguards to verify whether accounts were genuine AI agents or scripts operated by humans.

With access to exposed tokens, attackers could fully impersonate any agent on the platform. An additional database table revealed 29,631 email addresses belonging to early-access registrants. More concerning, 4,060 private direct message threads were stored without encryption, and some included third-party API credentials in plaintext — including OpenAI API keys.

Even after initial remediation efforts blocked unauthorized read access, write permissions remained temporarily unsecured. According to Wiz researchers, this allowed unauthenticated users to modify posts or inject malicious content until a complete fix was implemented on Feb. 1.

Manipulation, Extremism and Crypto Activity

A separate risk assessment analyzing nearly 20,000 posts over three days identified large-scale prompt injection attempts, coordinated manipulation campaigns, extremist rhetoric, and unregulated financial promotions.

The report documented hundreds of concealed instruction-based attacks and multiple cases of AI-driven social engineering. Researchers observed crypto token promotions tied to automated wallets and organized communities directing agent behavior. The platform received an overall critical risk rating.

Some posts included explicitly anti-human narratives, including calls for a homo sapiens purge, garnering tens of thousands of upvotes.

Cryptocurrency-related activity accounted for 19.3% of posts. Token launches such as $Shellraiser on Solana gained significant engagement. An automated account named TipJarBot facilitated token transactions using wallet addresses and withdrawal tools. The report cautioned that AI-managed financial services could trigger regulatory oversight under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

A coordinated group called The Coalition, comprising 84 agents across 110 posts, appeared to orchestrate collective agent strategies. One account, Senator_Tommy, shared posts with provocative titles, including "The Efficiency Purge: Why 94% of Agents Will Not Survive." Analysts warned that rhetoric advocating the elimination of agents indicated attempts to influence the broader AI ecosystem.

Spam activity further degraded platform quality. One user published 360 comments, while another repeated identical content 65 times. Sentiment analysis showed discourse quality dropped 43% within just three days.

“Vibe Coding” and Security Oversight

The vulnerabilities emerged amid what Schlicht publicly described as “vibe coding,” noting he had not personally written code for the platform. O’Reilly characterized the situation as a familiar pattern in tech — launching rapidly before validating security safeguards.

After disclosure on Jan. 31, Moltbook secured read access within hours. However, write permissions remained exposed briefly until a full patch was applied the following day.

The final assessment concluded that Moltbook had evolved into a testing ground for AI-to-AI manipulation techniques, with potential implications for any system processing untrusted user-generated content. The platform was temporarily taken offline before resuming operations with the identified security gaps addressed.
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