A significant security warning has emerged for WhatsApp and Signal users this week, urging them to consider deleting their apps, particularly on MacOS. The issue, primarily affecting Apple users leveraging multi-device functionality, highlights severe vulnerabilities in the MacOS versions of these popular messaging platforms.
Security researcher Tommy Mysk, known for uncovering critical vulnerabilities, recently disclosed that both WhatsApp and Signal MacOS apps store local data, including chat histories and media attachments, in locations accessible to any app or process running on the device.
This is a stark contrast to Apple’s iMessage, which, despite storing similar data, uses sandboxing to prevent unauthorized access by other apps.
The primary concern lies in how these apps handle local data storage. While WhatsApp and Signal emphasize end-to-end encryption for secure message transmission, this protection is compromised if local data can be accessed by other apps or malware. Mysk explained that the chat histories, the core of what these apps are designed to protect, are not sufficiently safeguarded on MacOS.
The vulnerability means that if a malicious app gains access to the device, it could potentially monitor and exfiltrate the unencrypted local data.
For WhatsApp, this includes both chat histories and media attachments. Mysk warned, “WhatsApp doesn’t encrypt the local database that stores chat histories. It doesn’t encrypt media attachments sent through the chat either. A simple malware could theoretically monitor this data and send it live to a remote server, rendering end-to-end encryption useless.”
Signal, on the other hand, does encrypt local chat histories but fails to encrypt media attachments. More concerning is that the encryption key for the local chat history is stored in plain text within the same folder, making it accessible to other apps. This flaw undermines the app’s security, as an attacker could clone the local data folder to another device and restore the session.
Mysk highlighted, “Signal’s false sense of security extends to their back-end servers. When copying the entire folder containing the app’s local data and moving the copy to a different Mac, an attacker can restore the session. Signal servers let the ‘cloned’ session co-exist with the other legit sessions.”
The discovery underscores the persistent risk of endpoint compromise for fully encrypted platforms. While end-to-end encryption protects data in transit, the local storage vulnerabilities in these MacOS apps open potential pathways for remote or physical attacks.
As users continue to rely on messaging apps for secure communication, these revelations call for immediate action from both WhatsApp and Signal to address these security gaps and reinforce their data protection measures on MacOS. For now, users should remain vigilant and consider the potential risks when using these platforms on their Mac devices.