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A sophisticated cyberattack was carried out by a Russian state-sponsored group, which is believed to be APT28 (Fancy Bear), which exploited a large U.S. enterprise's Wi-Fi network remotely. This breach was first detected by cybersecurity firm Volexity on February 4, 2022, while it targeted a Washington, DC-based organization whose projects related to Ukraine were being carried out.
A group of Russian hackers, reportedly linked to Russia's GRU military intelligence, managed to gain access to the wireless network through a password-spraying attack on another service, which allowed them to obtain the credentials needed to connect.
The Russian state-sponsored hackers known as "APT28" have exploited a novel attack technique called 'nearest neighbour attack' to penetrate a U.S. company's enterprise WiFi network to spy on employees' activity.
Although the hackers were thousands of miles away, they could compromise an organization nearby within WiFi range, providing a pivot from where they could reach their destination. Security firm Volexity was able to detect the attacks on February 4, 2022, as it had been monitoring the hackers, codenamed 'GruesomeLarch', as they had been monitoring the attack for many weeks beforehand.
APT28, which is associated with the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and is part of the Russian military's 26165 unit, has been conducting cyber operations since at least 2004 in conjunction with a Russian military unit.
Using a hijacked device in a neighbouring building across the street, Russian state-sponsored hackers were able to log into a Wi-Fi network in the United States without ever leaving their country of residence.
Volexity, a security vendor, documented a rare hacking technique that they call the "Nearest Neighbor Attack." The company discovered the incident in January 2022, when an unnamed customer, calling itself Organization A, suffered a system hack. Initially, the attackers, whom Volexity tracks as GruesomeLarch, gained access to the target's enterprise WiFi network by accessing that service through a password-spraying attack that targeted the victim's public-facing services, as the passwords were flooded.
Nonetheless, the presence of one-time password (OTP) protection meant that the credentials could not be used to access public web-based services. As far as connecting to the enterprise's WiFi network was concerned, MFA was not required, however, being "thousands of miles away from the victim and behind an ocean" posed a significant inconvenience.
It was through this creative use of the hacker's brain that they began looking into buildings nearby that could be potential pivots to the target wireless network, in fact they started to do so.
APT28 compromised multiple organizations as part of this attack and was able to daisy-chain their connection between these organizations by using legitimate access credentials to connect with them. At the end of the investigation, they discovered a device within a certain range that was capable of connecting to three wireless access points near the windows of a victim's conference room to retrieve their data.
An unprivileged account used for the remote desktop connection (RDP) allowed the threat actor to move around the target network from one point to another searching for systems of interest and exfiltrating sensitive information from them.
Three Windows registry hives were dumped by the hackers: SAM, Security, and System. This hive was compressed into a ZIP archive and then exfiltrated by the hackers using a script named 'servtask.bat'.
The most common way they collected data while minimizing their footprint was to use native Windows tools. As a result of Volexity's analysis, it was also identified that GruesomeLarch was actively targeting Organization A so that data would be collected from individuals and projects active in Ukraine who have expertise in and experience with those projects.
Despite Volexity's initial inability to confirm an association between the attacker and any known threat actors, a subsequent report by Microsoft pointed to certain indicators of compromise (IoCs) that matched the information Volexity had observed, indicating that the Russian threat group was responsible.
Microsoft's cybersecurity report indicates that it is highly likely that APT28 was able to escalate privileges before launching critical payloads within a victim's network by exploiting the CVE-2022-38028 vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler service within the victim's network. This is a zero-day vulnerability in Windows.
APT28, a group that executes targeted attacks using the nearest neighbour technique, successfully demonstrated that close-access operations, which are usually performed at close range, can be executed from a distance, eliminating the risk of identifying or capturing the target physically. Even though internet-facing devices have benefited from increasing security over the past year, thanks to services such as multi-factor authentication and other types of protections that have been added, WiFi corporate networks have largely remained unprotected over the same period.
