Concerns around digital sovereignty are rapidly becoming one of the most important debates shaping the future of cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and government technology infrastructure across Europe and the UK.
The discussion recently gained attention after Chi Onwurah, chair of the UK Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee, criticized Britain’s broader technology strategy and warned about growing dependence on a small group of major US technology companies. Her remarks pointed to reliance on providers such as Microsoft and Amazon Web Services, while also referencing Palantir Technologies because of its involvement in NHS and defence-related contracts. She also raised concerns about foreign-controlled technology supply chains supporting critical public infrastructure.
At the centre of the debate is the meaning of “digital sovereignty,” a term that is increasingly used by governments but often interpreted differently. In practical terms, sovereignty refers to a country maintaining legal authority and control over its citizens’ sensitive data, including where that information is processed, accessed, and governed. Experts argue that sovereign data should only fall under the jurisdiction of the nation to which it belongs, rather than being exposed to foreign legal systems or overseas regulatory reach.
The issue has become especially significant in the era of public cloud computing. Before large-scale cloud adoption, most government and enterprise data was stored and processed inside domestic datacentres, limiting both physical and remote access to national borders. While foreign software vendors occasionally required access for maintenance or support purposes, control over infrastructure largely remained local.
That model changed as governments and businesses increasingly adopted cloud services operated by US-headquartered providers. As organizations shifted toward subscription-based cloud platforms, concerns began emerging over whether sensitive national data could still be considered sovereign if it was processed through globally distributed infrastructure.
Much of the modern sovereignty debate intensified following the Schrems II ruling, a landmark European court decision that challenged how personal data could be transferred outside the EU to countries viewed as having weaker privacy protections. Since then, governments across Europe have pushed for tighter oversight of where data travels and who ultimately controls cloud infrastructure.
Although sovereignty concerns are often framed as a problem tied only to hyperscalers, industry analysts say the challenge is broader. Companies including IBM, Oracle Corporation, and Hewlett Packard Enterprise also face pressure to adapt their cloud and data processing models to meet stricter sovereignty expectations.
The debate has also been intensified by geopolitical tensions. European governments have become increasingly cautious about long-term dependence on foreign-owned digital infrastructure, particularly as cloud computing and artificial intelligence become more deeply connected to defence, healthcare, and public services. Analysts note that data infrastructure is now being viewed similarly to energy or telecommunications infrastructure: strategically important and politically sensitive.
Among the prominent providers, Microsoft was one of the earliest companies to experiment with sovereign cloud initiatives, including a dedicated German version of Microsoft 365. However, that model was eventually discontinued in 2022. Critics argue the company now faces greater difficulties adapting because many of its cloud services operate through highly interconnected global systems spread across more than 100 countries.
Questions around transparency have also created challenges. Reports previously indicated that Microsoft struggled to provide detailed information about certain data flows when requested by the Scottish Police Authority under data protection obligations. Investigative reporting from ProPublica also stated that US authorities encountered similar difficulties while attempting to evaluate Microsoft cloud services under FedRAMP certification requirements for government environments.
Additional scrutiny has emerged around Microsoft’s artificial intelligence infrastructure plans. The company had previously indicated that in-country AI processing capabilities for Copilot services in the UK would arrive by the end of 2025, though timelines have reportedly shifted into 2026. Some European customers are also expected to receive regional AI processing instead of fully sovereign national deployments.
Industry experts increasingly categorize sovereign cloud approaches into multiple levels. One common method involves creating “data boundaries,” where providers attempt to restrict where customer data is stored or processed while still operating under global cloud architectures. Critics argue this model may not fully satisfy stricter interpretations of sovereignty because some operational control can still remain overseas.
A second approach focuses on partnerships with local operators that manage sovereign services regionally. Amazon Web Services has promoted its European Sovereign Cloud initiative using this framework, arguing that the platform aligns with EU regulatory requirements. However, some analysts contend that EU-level governance is not the same as national sovereignty, particularly for non-EU countries such as the UK. Concerns have also been raised over whether US legislation, including the CLOUD Act, could still apply in certain circumstances.
Meanwhile, Google Cloud has attracted attention through its partnership with French defence and technology company Thales Group. Their joint venture, S3NS, is designed around France-specific sovereign infrastructure with air-gapped operations, meaning the systems can function independently without continuously communicating with external global networks for updates or validation checks.
Security specialists consider air-gapped architecture an important benchmark for sovereign cloud environments because it reduces reliance on foreign operational control. Google’s Distributed Cloud Air-Gapped platform is currently viewed by some analysts as one of the more mature sovereign cloud offerings available, despite still lacking some features present in its broader public cloud ecosystem.
The approach has already attracted major defence-related interest. France, NATO members, and the German military have all shown interest in sovereign infrastructure models, while the UK Ministry of Defence recently announced a £400 million contract spanning five years tied to these types of capabilities.
Competing alternatives are still evolving. AWS offers LocalStack-focused options largely aimed at development environments, while Microsoft’s disconnected Azure Local products have faced criticism from some analysts who argue the offerings remain less mature than competing sovereign platforms.
Despite rapid investment, experts say the sovereign cloud market is still in its early stages. Google’s France-based partnership model currently appears to offer one of the clearest examples of locally controlled hyperscale infrastructure, while AWS continues refining its European-focused model and Microsoft works through broader architectural and transparency challenges.
At the same time, the sovereignty movement may create new opportunities for regional cloud providers and domestic technology companies. However, analysts warn that building competitive sovereign infrastructure will require long-term investment, government support, and procurement strategies that allow interoperability between multiple vendors rather than locking public institutions into a single provider.
Many experts believe the future of sovereign technology infrastructure will likely depend on hybrid and partnership-driven models combining hyperscale cloud capabilities with locally managed operations. Supporters of the S3NS approach argue it offers an early blueprint for how global cloud providers and national operators could collaborate while still preserving local control over sensitive data and critical digital systems.
The commission disclosed the attack on March 27, when Bleeping Computer confirmed the breach of the European Union’s primary executive body.
Recently, the European Commission informed CERT-EU about the breach, informing them that their Cybersecurity Operations was not warned about an API exploit, a possible account hack, or any malicious network traffic until March 24.
In March, TeamPCP exploited a compromised AWS API key to manage rights over different Commission AWS accounts (hacked in the Trivy supply-chain breach).
After that, the gang deployed TruffleHog to look for more secrets, then added a new access key to an existing user to escape detection before doing more spying and data theft.
In the past, TeamPCP has been known for supply-chain attacks targeting developer code forums like NPM, Docker, PyPi, and GitHub. The gang also attacked the LiteLLM PyPI package in a campaign that affected tens of thousands of devices via its “TeamPCP Cloud Stealer” data-stealing malware.
Later, data extortion gang ShinyHunters posted the stolen data on their dark web leak site as a 90 GB archive of documents (around 340GB uncompressed), which includes email addresses, contacts, and email information.
According to the CERT-EU analysis, hackers have stolen tens of thousands of documents; the leak affects around 42 internal European Commission clients and around 20 other Union firms.
"The threat actor used the compromised AWS secret to exfiltrate data from the affected cloud environment. The exfiltrated data relates to websites hosted for up to 71 clients of the Europa web hosting service: 42 internal clients of the European Commission, and at least 29 other Union entities,” CERT-EU said. Regarding the dataset, CERT-EU said it also contained “at least 51,992 files related to outbound email communications, totalling 2.22 GB. The majority of these are automated notifications with little to no content. However, 'bounce-back' notifications, which are responses to incoming messages from users, may contain the original user-submitted content, posing a risk of personal data exposure."
No websites were taken offline or altered as a result of this attack, and no lateral movement to other Commission AWS accounts has been found, according to CERT-EU.
Although it would probably take "a considerable amount of time" to analyze the exfiltrated databases and information, the Commission has informed the appropriate data protection authorities and is in direct contact with the impacted organizations.
After learning that a mobile device management platform used to oversee employees' devices had been compromised, the European Commission revealed another data breach in February.
Amazon has announced that its threat intelligence division has intervened in ongoing cyber operations attributed to hackers associated with Russia’s foreign military intelligence service, the GRU. The activity targeted organizations using Amazon’s cloud infrastructure, with attackers attempting to gain unauthorized access to customer-managed systems.
The company reported that the malicious campaign dates back to 2021 and largely concentrated on Western critical infrastructure. Within this scope, energy-related organizations were among the most frequently targeted sectors, indicating a strategic focus on high-impact industries.
Amazon’s investigation shows that the attackers initially relied on exploiting security weaknesses to break into networks. Over multiple years, they used a combination of newly discovered flaws and already known vulnerabilities in enterprise technologies, including security appliances, collaboration software, and data protection platforms. These weaknesses served as their primary entry points.
As the campaign progressed, the attackers adjusted their approach. By 2025, Amazon observed a reduced reliance on vulnerability exploitation. Instead, the group increasingly targeted customer network edge devices that were incorrectly configured. These included enterprise routers, VPN gateways, network management systems, collaboration tools, and cloud-based project management platforms.
Devices with exposed administrative interfaces or weak security controls became easy targets. By exploiting configuration errors rather than software flaws, the attackers achieved the same long-term goals: maintaining persistent access to critical networks and collecting login credentials for later use.
Amazon noted that this shift reflects a change in operational focus rather than intent. While misconfiguration abuse has been observed since at least 2022, the sustained emphasis on this tactic in 2025 suggests the attackers deliberately scaled back efforts to exploit zero-day and known vulnerabilities. Despite this evolution, their core objectives remained unchanged: credential theft and quiet movement within victim environments using minimal resources and low visibility.
Based on overlapping infrastructure and targeting similarities with previously identified threat groups, Amazon assessed with high confidence that the activity is linked to GRU-associated hackers. The company believes one subgroup, previously identified by external researchers, may be responsible for actions taken after initial compromise as part of a broader, multi-unit campaign.
Although Amazon did not directly observe how data was extracted, forensic evidence suggests passive network monitoring techniques were used. Indicators included delays between initial device compromise and credential usage, as well as unauthorized reuse of legitimate organizational credentials.
The compromised systems were customer-controlled network appliances running on Amazon EC2 instances. Amazon emphasized that no vulnerabilities in AWS services themselves were exploited during these attacks.
Once the activity was detected, Amazon moved to secure affected instances, alerted impacted customers, and shared intelligence with relevant vendors and industry partners. The company stated that coordinated action helped disrupt the attackers’ operations and limit further exposure.
Amazon also released a list of internet addresses linked to the activity but cautioned organizations against blocking them without proper analysis, as they belong to legitimate systems that had been hijacked.
To mitigate similar threats, Amazon recommended immediate steps such as auditing network device configurations, monitoring for credential replay, and closely tracking access to administrative portals. For AWS users, additional measures include isolating management interfaces, tightening security group rules, and enabling monitoring tools like CloudTrail, GuardDuty, and VPC Flow Logs.
The modern internet, though vast and advanced, remains surprisingly delicate. A minor technical fault or human error can disrupt millions of users worldwide, revealing how dependent our lives have become on digital systems.
On October 20, 2025, a technical error in a database service operated by Amazon Web Services (AWS) caused widespread outages across several online platforms. AWS, one of the largest cloud computing providers globally, hosts the infrastructure behind thousands of popular websites and apps. As a result, users found services such as Roblox, Fortnite, Pokémon Go, Snapchat, Slack, and multiple banking platforms temporarily inaccessible. The incident showed how a single malfunction in a key cloud system can paralyze numerous organizations at once.
Such disruptions are not new. In July 2024, a faulty software update from cybersecurity company CrowdStrike crashed around 8.5 million Windows computers globally, producing the infamous “blue screen of death.” Airlines had to cancel tens of thousands of flights, hospitals postponed surgeries, and emergency services across the United States faced interruptions. Businesses reverted to manual operations, with some even switching to cash transactions. The event became a global lesson in how a single rushed software update can cripple essential infrastructure.
History provides many similar warnings. In 1997, a technical glitch at Network Solutions Inc., a major domain registrar, temporarily disabled every website ending in “.com” and “.net.” Though the number of websites was smaller then, the event marked the first large-scale internet failure, showing how dependent the digital world had already become on centralized systems.
Some outages, however, have stemmed from physical damage. In 2011, an elderly woman in Georgia accidentally cut through a fiber-optic cable while scavenging for copper, disconnecting the entire nation of Armenia from the internet. The incident exposed how a single damaged cable could isolate millions of users. Similarly, in 2017, a construction vehicle in South Africa severed a key line, knocking Zimbabwe offline for hours. Even undersea cables face threats, with sharks and other marine life occasionally biting through them, forcing companies like Google to reinforce cables with protective materials.
In 2022, Canada witnessed one of its largest connectivity failures when telecom provider Rogers Communications experienced a system breakdown that halted internet and phone services for roughly a quarter of the country. Emergency calls, hospital appointments, and digital payments were affected nationwide, highlighting the deep societal consequences of a single network failure.
Experts warn that such events will keep occurring. As networks grow more interconnected, even a small mistake or single-point failure can spread rapidly. Cybersecurity analysts emphasize the need for stronger redundancy, slower software rollouts, and diversified cloud dependencies to prevent global disruptions.
The internet connects nearly every part of modern life, yet these incidents remind us that it remains vulnerable. Whether caused by human error, faulty code, or damaged cables, the web’s fragility shows why constant vigilance, better infrastructure planning, and verified information are essential to keeping the world online.
Salesloft, a popular sales engagement platform, has revealed that a breach of its GitHub environment earlier this year played a key role in a recent wave of data theft attacks targeting Salesforce customers.
The company explained that attackers gained access to its GitHub repositories between March and June 2025. During this time, intruders downloaded code, added unauthorized accounts, and created rogue workflows. These actions gave them a foothold that was later used to compromise Drift, Salesloft’s conversational marketing product. Drift integrates with major platforms such as Salesforce and Google Workspace, enabling businesses to automate chat interactions and sales pipelines.
How the breach unfolded
Investigators from cybersecurity firm Mandiant, who were brought in to assist Salesloft, found that the GitHub compromise was the first step in a multi-stage campaign. After the attackers established persistence, they moved into Drift’s cloud infrastructure hosted on Amazon Web Services (AWS). From there, they stole OAuth tokens, digital keys that allow applications to access user accounts without requiring passwords.
These stolen tokens were then exploited in August to infiltrate Salesforce environments belonging to multiple organizations. By abusing the access tokens, attackers were able to view and extract customer support cases. Many of these records contained sensitive information such as cloud service credentials, authentication tokens, and even Snowflake-related access keys.
Impact on organizations
The theft of Salesforce data affected a wide range of technology companies. Attackers specifically sought credentials and secrets that could be reused to gain further access into enterprise systems. According to Salesloft’s August 26 update, the campaign’s primary goal was credential theft rather than direct financial fraud.
Threat intelligence groups have tracked this operation under the identifier UNC6395. Meanwhile, reports also suggest links to known cybercrime groups, although conclusive attribution remains unsettled.
Response and recovery
Salesloft said it has since rotated credentials, hardened its defenses, and isolated Drift’s infrastructure to prevent further abuse. Mandiant confirmed that containment steps have been effective, with no evidence that attackers maintain ongoing access. Current efforts are focused on forensic review and long-term assurance.
Following weeks of precautionary suspensions, Salesloft has now restored its Salesforce integrations. The company has also published detailed instructions to help customers safely resume data synchronization.
The incident underlines the risks of supply-chain style attacks, where a compromise at one service provider can cascade into breaches at many of its customers. It underscores the importance of securing developer accounts, closely monitoring access tokens, and limiting sensitive data shared in support cases.
For organizations, best practices now include regularly rotating OAuth tokens, auditing third-party app permissions, and enforcing stronger segmentation between critical systems.
A recent cyber incident has brought to light how one weak link in software integrations can expose sensitive business information. Salesloft, a sales automation platform, confirmed that attackers exploited its Drift chat integration with Salesforce to steal tokens that granted access to customer environments.
Between August 8 and August 18, 2025, threat actors obtained OAuth and refresh tokens connected to the Drift–Salesforce integration. These tokens work like digital keys, allowing connected apps to access Salesforce data without repeatedly asking for passwords. Once stolen, the tokens were used to log into Salesforce accounts and extract confidential data.
According to Salesloft, the attackers specifically searched for credentials such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) keys, Snowflake access tokens, and internal passwords. The company said the breach only impacted customers who used the Drift–Salesforce connection, while other integrations were unaffected. As a precaution, all tokens for this integration were revoked, forcing customers to reauthenticate before continuing use.
Google’s Threat Intelligence team, which is monitoring the attackers under the name UNC6395, reported that the group issued queries inside Salesforce to collect sensitive details hidden in support cases. These included login credentials, API keys, and cloud access tokens. Investigators noted that while the attackers tried to cover their tracks by deleting query jobs, the activity still appears in Salesforce logs.
To disguise their operations, the hackers used anonymizing tools like Tor and commercial hosting services. Google also identified user-agent strings and IP addresses linked to the attack, which organizations can use to check their logs for signs of compromise.
Security experts are urging affected administrators to rotate credentials immediately, review Salesforce logs for unusual queries, and search for leaked secrets by scanning for terms such as “AKIA” (used in AWS keys), “Snowflake,” “password,” or “secret.” They also recommend tightening access controls on third-party apps, limiting token permissions, and shortening session times to reduce future risk.
While some extortion groups have publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, Google stated there is no clear evidence tying them to this breach. The investigation is still ongoing, and attribution remains uncertain.
This incident underlines the broader risks of SaaS integrations. Connected apps are often given high levels of access to critical business platforms. If those credentials are compromised, attackers can bypass normal login protections and move deeper into company systems. As businesses continue relying on cloud applications, stronger governance of integrations and closer monitoring of token use are becoming essential.
An American education technology company, PowerSchool, is the latest giant to fall a victim of hacking and data breaches, which probably compromised millions of records of students and teachers in North America. As one of the leading providers of school records management software, PowerSchool serves 18,000 schools who manage data over 60 million students.
How the breach happened
The compromise was discovered on December 28 and was traced to a subcontractor's account. The new report said, however, that another incident of hacking-a compromise of the access of a PowerSchool software engineer-may have had something to do with the breach. Malware infected the engineer's computer and exfiltrated login credentials for internal systems, such as Slack, AWS, and other tools.
According to the logs retrieved by researchers, the infostealing malware known as LummaC2 was used to steal the engineer's passwords. The malware extracted saved passwords and browsing histories from the web browsers of the engineer and uploaded them to a server run by cybercriminals. The stolen credentials were shared in cybercrime groups, which further exposed PowerSchool's systems.
What Data Was Stolen?
The hackers accessed a range of sensitive personal information, including:
School districts impacted by the breach reported that the attackers stole all historical data stored in PowerSchool’s systems.
The lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) on a compromised maintenance account was one key vulnerability. PowerSchool has implemented MFA and reset passwords across its customer support portal. Many of the employee credentials discovered were weak and have been exposed in other breaches.
The breach, which has underlined the threats of infostealing malware in hybrid work setups where employees operate company systems using personal devices, has left much to be expected from PowerSchool.
Response and Investigation
PowerSchool, the company concerned, is reportedly working with a cybersecurity firm named CrowdStrike for the investigation into the incident. According to them, no signs of malware have been found neither has any sign of system-layer access. But they are analyzing the stolen data.
Effects on Schools
Many school districts are operating independently to gauge the scope of the breach, relying on collective knowledge from other administrators. As the investigation continues, there are questions about PowerSchool's security measures and how it managed this extensive breach.
Schools, parents, and educators are urged to be vigilant and ensure additional layers of security are put in place to prevent future incidents.