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Browsers Revoke Trust in Eight eMudhra Certificates After Private Key Compromise

 

Major browser vendors and certificate trust stores have blacklisted eight intermediate certificates issued by Indian certificate authority eMudhra following the discovery of recoverable private keys. The compromised keys could have been used to create fraudulent HTTPS certificates and impersonate secure websites on affected systems. 

The affected certificates were issued in April 2025, and blocked in Firefox and Chrome on October 17 by Mozilla and Google, followed by Apple on October 19 and Microsoft on October 20. Sectigo took revocation action, and Cloudflare updated its services in response. 

Google stated the keys had been generated with insufficient entropy, allowing an attacker to reconstruct them and use them to create fraudulent, but otherwise valid, certificates. Although eMudhra has revoked the certificates in question and informed downstream trust stores, some systems may require software updates before ceasing to trust the compromised certificate authorities.  

Mozilla’s Dennis Jackson has published a tool to help users check whether their systems trust the affected certificates, warning that “reconstructing the private keys [was] actually kind of easy” due to a severe flaw in the certificate creation process. 

Jackson revealed that, aside from the final byte, all the keys were zero, and therefore could be reconstructed almost instantly using the baby-step giant-step algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem. He added that several people had independently managed to recover the keys. 

Certificate Transparency logs have revealed no evidence of abuse of the compromised keys, but this cannot guarantee that they were not used to compromise HTTPS sites, as not all clients enforce Certificate Transparency policies. Anyone whose systems trust the compromised certificates could be at risk, as the keys could have been used to impersonate secure websites without detection.  

eMudhra stated that the error was caused by a script used in the key generation ceremony which resulted in a second, weaker key pair being created. This was used to generate certificate signing requests because the labels on the keys were similar enough to mislead the process. 

The company stated that the certificates in question were created for export to its data centres in the United States and Europe to satisfy data sovereignty requirements, and were not in production use, with the exception of one.  

eMudhra identified human errors at several points during the process, but stated that it was investigating potential coding issues and process weaknesses, including maker-checker controls, which are meant to prevent errors by ensuring that no single individual has control over any critical process. eMudhra has undertaken to recheck all key generation ceremonies it has performed during the coming week. 

The incident demonstrates the critical importance of key generation security, internal controls and certificate revocation, and the need for organisations to update their software and trust stores following a security incident to prevent further compromises.

Google's Android 17 Locks Accessibility Services to Verified Apps as Malware Threat Branches Out




Google is tightening restrictions on one of mobile malware's most persistent entry points. With Android 17, the company is limiting access to its AccessibilityService API to verified Accessibility Tools only, a change that takes effect the moment a user switches on Advanced Protection.

The move, announced Thursday, targets a problem that has haunted Android security for years. The AccessibilityService API was built to help people with disabilities use their smartphones. Screen readers, voice control apps, and motor-assistance tools all rely on it. But the privileges it carries are significant. Apps that tap into the API can run in the background, observe what appears on screen, intercept UI events, and take actions inside other applications on a user's behalf. That set of capabilities made it a target for malware developers almost immediately after it was introduced.

Google stated in its announcement that the new version automatically restricts AccessibilityService access to verified Accessibility Tool applications, closing off a major attack avenue while keeping genuine assistive technology functional.


A Clichéd Attack Path

Malware families have been weaponizing Android's accessibility services since at least 2017. The list of known offenders runs long: Vultur, SharkBot, Xenomorph, BianLian, Anatsa (also tracked as TeaBot), and more recently BTMOB RAT, a remote access trojan documented attacking banking customers across Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Portugal, and Mexico through 2025 and 2026. According to Kaspersky data, trojans accounted for 40 percent of Android malware infections in Q1 2025, with nearly 12 percent of malicious apps falling into the banking trojan category that specifically abused the Accessibility API, totaling around 154,000 apps.

The attack chain is well understood. A malicious app, typically distributed through sideloaded APKs or disguised as something routine, tricks a user into granting accessibility permissions. The Anatsa trojan, for instance, slipped onto Google Play as a PDF viewer update as recently as July 2025. Once the permission is granted, the malware operates without root access. It can monitor keystrokes, layer fake login pages on top of legitimate banking apps, approve system dialogs silently, and initiate fraudulent fund transfers from financial applications without the user noticing anything unusual on screen. Google noted in its announcement that this access also allows malware to block its own uninstallation, locking users out of any easy remedy.


What Changes in Android 17

The new restriction applies specifically when Advanced Protection is active, a device-level security mode introduced with Android 16 that consolidates multiple hardening features under a single toggle. When a user enables it, the system now automatically enforces that only verified, legitimate accessibility apps can request AccessibilityService access. Everything else is denied.

This is part of a gradual tightening that has been underway for several years. Android 13 made it significantly harder for sideloaded apps to acquire accessibility permissions. In-call protections, rolled out more recently, prevent users from granting those permissions during a phone call, cutting off a common social engineering scenario. Google also introduced the `accessibilityDataSensitive` flag to let developers mark UI elements as off-limits to third-party accessibility readers.


The Rest of Android 17's Security Updates

The accessibility change is one piece of a wider hardening effort in Android 17. Intrusion Logging, developed in collaboration with Amnesty International's Security Lab and other civil society organizations, creates a persistent, privacy-preserving forensic record of sensitive system events. Amnesty's team simultaneously updated AndroidQF and its Mobile Verification Toolkit to process the new log format, making it immediately useful for researchers investigating suspected spyware infections.

USB Protection blocks new data connections over a USB port while the device is locked, preventing physical access attacks where an attacker might attempt to extract data or push commands through a connected cable. Google has also included an option to disable WebGPU, a graphics API that has surfaced in sophisticated browser-based exploit chains. Failed Authentication Lock responds to repeated incorrect login attempts by locking the device entirely, making brute-force attempts against a stolen or seized phone substantially harder.

A fifth addition, View Supporting Apps, gives users a clear window into which installed applications have checked whether Advanced Protection is active on the device.

For developers, Google confirmed that applications can receive a notification when a user enables Advanced Protection, allowing them to switch on their own high-security features automatically for that audience.

Existing Advanced Protection users will receive a notification when the new capabilities land on their device. Intrusion Logging is not switched on by default and must be enabled manually from the Advanced Protection settings page.


Google’s Incognito Mode Does Not Make Users Invisible. Here’s What It Actually Protects

 



Google’s Chrome Incognito mode can keep browsing history off a device, but it was never designed to make users anonymous online. A class-action lawsuit over the feature exposed how far that distinction could be misunderstood, with Google agreeing to delete or remediate billions of private-browsing records and change how it explains Incognito to users.

The lawsuit, Brown v. Google, was filed in 2020 and alleged that Google continued collecting information about users while they browsed through Chrome’s Incognito mode and other browsers’ private-browsing modes.

The plaintiffs initially sought billions of dollars in damages, with their claims eventually putting at least $5 billion at stake. However, Google did not ultimately agree to pay $5 billion. Under the settlement, there was no class-wide monetary payout. Instead, Google agreed to data deletion and remediation measures, changes to its privacy disclosures, and additional restrictions on data collection. Plaintiffs’ lawyers valued the settlement’s non-monetary relief at more than $5 billion, with estimates reaching $7.8 billion.

The case nevertheless exposed a fundamental problem with private browsing: preventing a browser from retaining a user's history is not the same thing as preventing websites, network operators or online services from observing that user's activity.


Google employees raised concerns about Incognito

The legal dispute became particularly notable after internal Google communications surfaced during litigation.

In one email, Google Chief Marketing Officer Lorraine Twohill told CEO Sundar Pichai that the company should make Incognito "truly private." She also warned that Google could not market the feature too strongly because it was "not truly private," requiring what she described as "fuzzy, hedging language."

Other internal communications were even more critical of the feature. According to material cited in the litigation, Google employees described Incognito as "misleading" and "effectively a lie," while another employee argued that Google should stop using the Incognito name and its spy-themed icon because users could misunderstand the protection it provided. Another recommendation suggested replacing the messaging with a warning that users were not protected from Google.

These discussions mattered because the lawsuit was not simply about whether Incognito stored browsing history locally. It questioned whether users were being given a sufficiently accurate understanding of what happened to their data after it left the browser.

Google disputed the allegations and maintained that the limitations of Incognito had been communicated to users. A Google spokesperson said the company believed the lawsuit was without merit and argued that Incognito was intended to provide a private browsing experience, rather than prevent websites and services from collecting information.


What Incognito actually does

Chrome's Incognito mode does provide a real privacy function, but that function is primarily local.

When a user opens an Incognito window, Chrome starts a separate browsing session. Once all Incognito windows are closed, Chrome does not retain the browsing history, cookies and site data, or information entered into forms from that session in the normal browser profile. Third-party cookies are also blocked by default in current versions of Chrome, although users can temporarily allow them for particular sites.

This makes Incognito useful in situations where the concern is another person accessing the same device.

Someone using a shared computer, for example, can browse for a gift without leaving the visited pages in Chrome's ordinary history. It can also provide a separate browsing session when a user does not want existing cookies and account sessions to carry over.

But there is an important limitation.

Incognito does not erase everything created during a session. Downloads remain on the device, and bookmarks saved during the session remain available after Incognito is closed. Signing into a website can also allow that service to associate activity with the account being used.

The key distinction is therefore simple: Incognito primarily limits what Chrome stores locally. It does not turn the internet connection into a private tunnel.


Your ISP and network administrator can still see activity

Opening an Incognito window does not prevent an internet service provider from observing network activity.

Google's own documentation states that organizations managing a network, including schools, employers and internet service providers, may be able to observe activity while a user is browsing in Incognito. Incognito also does not hide activity or location from the websites being visited.

This is an important distinction from encryption.

Chrome's HTTPS protections can encrypt traffic between a browser and an HTTPS-enabled website, helping prevent someone monitoring the connection from reading the contents of that traffic. Chrome also warns users when they are about to load sites without HTTPS, while Secure DNS can encrypt DNS lookups in supported configurations.

But HTTPS does not make the user anonymous.

The network still has visibility into connection metadata, while the destination website receives the request and can process information available to it.

In other words, Incognito and HTTPS solve different problems. Incognito reduces local traces. HTTPS protects communications in transit. Neither one, by itself, is an anonymity system.


Websites can still identify and track users

The privacy boundary becomes even clearer once a user reaches a website.

Google's current Chrome documentation explicitly states that Incognito does not change how websites collect data or how the services those websites use collect information. Sites can continue gathering information even when a user is not signed in.

Websites can also use first-party technologies and other mechanisms to understand activity within a session. Third-party cookies are only one part of the tracking ecosystem. Google itself notes that websites can use different mechanisms to personalize content and advertising and learn about activity across sites.

This is also where the distinction between an IP address and browser history matters.

Incognito can prevent a local Chrome profile from retaining the list of pages a user visited. It does not automatically conceal the network address from the websites receiving the connections.

And if a person voluntarily signs into a service while using Incognito, the service has an obvious account-level identifier with which to associate the activity. Google's own documentation warns that signing into a Google service or another website during an Incognito session can allow that site to remember the activity.


The lawsuit forced changes to Incognito

The settlement went further than simply changing a warning message.

According to the court filing, Google agreed to delete or remediate billions of records reflecting class members' private browsing activities. The company also agreed to continue blocking third-party cookies in Incognito for five years.

The filing provides an unusually detailed picture of why the cookie change mattered.

Google had historically collected its own third-party cookies when users visited non-Google websites. After the lawsuit was filed, Google implemented third-party-cookie blocking for Incognito users. Under the settlement, that protection had to remain in place for five years. The plaintiffs' filing said blocking data associated with Google's third-party cookies in Incognito could reduce Google's global annual revenue by nearly $500 million.

Google also agreed to remove four identified private-browsing detection signals. According to the plaintiffs' filing, those signals could reveal that a user had chosen private browsing and were then used to label the resulting data as private. The settlement required Google to delete those signals and agree not to use such detection mechanisms to identify or track private browsing.

The class covered an estimated 136 million users, according to court-related filings.


Google eventually changed the warning

The dispute also changed the language presented to Chrome users.

Chrome's current Incognito documentation now makes the limitation explicit. It says that Incognito does not change how data is collected by websites users visit and the services those websites use, including Google. Google also says that websites, network administrators and ISPs may still be able to observe activity during an Incognito session.

That clarification is arguably more important than the Incognito icon itself.

The familiar private-browsing interface can create an intuitive association between the words "Incognito" and anonymity. Technically, however, the feature is much narrower. Chromium describes Incognito as a window-level mode in which pages are not persisted to browsing history and a temporary cookie store is used for the session.

That is a local privacy mechanism, not an invisibility cloak.


So, is Incognito worth using?

Yes, if the objective is local privacy.

If you share a computer with other people, do not want a particular browsing session stored in your ordinary history, or want a temporary browser session separated from your normal cookies, Incognito remains useful.

It is also useful for testing how a website behaves without the cookies and account state associated with a normal session.

But users should not treat the Incognito icon as a guarantee that their online activity is hidden.

It does not prevent an ISP or network administrator from observing activity. It does not stop websites from collecting information. It does not automatically hide an IP address. It does not prevent a user from being identified after signing into an account. And it does not protect files downloaded to the device after the session ends.

Users seeking stronger privacy need to think in layers rather than relying on a single browser setting.

A privacy-focused browser can reduce tracking at the browser level. Tracker and content blockers can limit third-party collection. A properly configured VPN can conceal the user's IP address from the websites they visit and hide destination traffic from the ISP, although the VPN provider itself becomes part of the trust model. Keeping the browser, operating system and extensions updated remains essential because privacy controls cannot compensate for an unpatched security vulnerability.

Chrome itself should also not be treated as static. Google continues to modify its privacy and security architecture. Third-party-cookie protections in Incognito are already part of the browser's privacy model, while Google has also explored additional protections for IP addresses in Incognito.

The larger lesson from the Incognito lawsuit is therefore not that private browsing is useless.

It is that privacy has layers, and the word "private" can mean very different things depending on where the data is stored, who controls the network and which services receive the user's requests.

Incognito can hide your browsing history from someone checking the same device.

It cannot make you disappear from the internet.

Microsoft and Google Remove ModHeader After Finding Dormant Collector


ModHeader is a famous header-editing extension with over 1.6 million installs across Microsoft’s Edge and Google’ Chrome browser. 

Google and Microsoft remove the collector

Experts discovered a secret browsing-history collector built into its official store variant, and have withdrawn the ModHeader from Google and Microsoft.

An empty allow-list kept the collector switched off and it was dormant, and no proof has surfaced that it retrieved or sent even one browsing domain.

About the discovery

Stripe OLT, a UK cybersecurity organization analyzed the code against Google’s Web Store signature and verified the collector shipped within the authentic extension, not a fake one.

Stripe OLT’s study covers the Chrome build and its 900,000 users (an estimate); and Edge and its 700,000 users. Microsoft removed  the listing on July 3rd whereas Google pulled the Chrome listing a week after, on July 10th.

Attack tactic

Variant 7.0.18 still edits HTTP headers as shown. The same minimized background also consists of another system. On the first attempt, it makes a device fingerprint and deploys a hardcoded encryption key. As the user browses, it takes the domain from each page that user opens, encodes it, and gathers it locally, up to 1000 different domains.

Scheduler and other things

A scheduler combines your fingerprint with the encrypted list, uploads it to api.stanfordstudies[.]com, and deletes the local copy once a day. If the collector were turned on, browsers using it wouldn't all beacon at once because the upload time is offset per install. The same pipeline is described in separate teardowns by researcher Yunus Aydin on version 7.0.17 and HackIndex on version 7.0.18.

How does collector function

The collector functions only if your browser matches an entry on an internal allow-list, but the list ships empty. Every time, the check fails, and the pipeline stops before it gathers even a single domain. 

The small change is populating the list, without any click and no new permissions from the users, sent as a routine update. The endpoint URL, the scheduler, the storage logic, and the hardcoded key are all on the same device.

But not everything was silent. The extension pinged extensions-hub[.]com with the product, version, and browser when it was installed, updated, and uninstalled. 

Additionally, it was evident that the piece had been running because a script that runs on every page had already recorded actual request metadata in plain text to local storage. 

Malicious AI Chrome Extensions Steal Users Emails and Passwords


30 malicious Chrome extensions used by over 300,000 users are pretending to be AI assistants to steal credentials, browsing information, and email content. Few extensions are still active in the Chrome Web Store and have been downloaded by tens of thousands of users. 

Experts at browser security platform LayerX found the malicious extension campaign and labelled it AiFrame. They discovered that all studied extensions are part of the same malicious attack as they interact with infrastructure under a single domain, tapnetic[.]pro. 

Experts said that the most famous extension in the AiFrame operation had 80,000 users and was termed Gemini AI Sidebar (fppbiomdkfbhgjjdmojlogeceejinadg), but it isn't available in the Chrome Web Store. 

According to BleepingComputer, other extensions with over thousand users are still active on Google's repository for Chrome extensions. The names might be different, but the classification is the same. 

LayerX discovered that all 30 extensions have the same Javascript logic, permissions, internal structure, and backend infrastructure. 

The infected browser add-ons do not apply AI functionality locally. 

This can be risky because publishers can modify the extensions' logic without any update, similar to the Microsoft Office Add-ins. This helps them escape the new review. 

Besides this, the extension takes out page content from the sites that users visit. This includes verification pages via Mozilla's Readability library. 

According to LayerX, a group of 15 extensions exclusively target Gmail data by injecting UI components with a content script that executes at "document_start" on "mail.google.com." The script repeatedly retrieves email thread text using ".textContent" after reading visible email content straight from the DOM. Even email drafts can be recorded, according to the researchers. According to a report released today by LayerX, "the extracted email content is passed into the extension's logic and transmitted to third-party backend infrastructure controlled by the extension operator when Gmail-related features like AI-assisted replies or summaries are invoked."

Additionally, the extensions have a way for remotely triggering speech recognition and transcript creation that uses the "Web Speech API" to provide operators with the results. The extensions may potentially intercept chats from the victim's surroundings, depending on the permissions that are provided. Google has not responded to BleepingComputer's request for comment on LayerX results by the time of publication. For the full list of malicious extensions, it is advised to consult LayerX's list of indicators of compromise. Users should reset the passwords for all accounts if the intrusion is verified.

Best Google Chrome Alternatives for Android: Privacy-Focused, Customizable, and Feature-Rich Browsers to Try

 

Google Chrome is the default browser on nearly every Android smartphone, but it quietly conceals several useful tools, such as NotebookLM’s option to transform webpages into AI-powered podcasts. While Chrome is generally dependable, it doesn’t appeal to everyone. The browser can be heavy on system resources and offers limited customization, which may frustrate users who like more control over their browsing experience.

Privacy is another major concern. Chrome is known for extensive data collection, which may not sit well with users who take online privacy seriously. If you’re planning to move away from Chrome, Android offers no shortage of strong alternatives, many of which focus on privacy, flexibility, or unique features.

Depending on what you value most, you can opt for browsers like Mozilla Firefox, a long-standing open-source favorite, or Brave, which is popular for its built-in ad-blocking tools. Several other Android browsers also stand out for their individual strengths. These options were selected after evaluating their ecosystem integration, features, privacy standards, customization options, and ongoing developer support.

Mozilla Firefox
Firefox is among the most capable browsers available on Android. Developed by Mozilla, this open-source browser emphasizes user privacy and security while still offering advanced tools like extension support — a rarity on mobile browsers. Its Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) blocks common trackers automatically, helping reduce online monitoring. Firefox also runs on its own GeckoView engine rather than a third-party engine, giving Mozilla greater control over performance and privacy.

Additional features include a reliable private browsing mode, a built-in password manager, and extensive customization options. Users can sync bookmarks, passwords, tabs, and browsing history across devices, including desktop systems. Firefox Relay, available as an extension, lets users generate email aliases to protect their real email address while stripping trackers from incoming messages. The trade-off is that Firefox may feel slightly heavier than Chrome due to its broad feature set.

Microsoft Edge
Microsoft Edge is well-suited for users already invested in the Microsoft ecosystem. It offers built-in access to Copilot AI, which can summarize articles, webpages, and even videos. Edge runs on the same Chromium engine as Chrome and includes essential features such as private browsing, password management, reader mode, and cross-device syncing.

Alongside Firefox, Edge is one of the few Android browsers that supports extensions, although its add-on library is currently smaller. A standout feature is Drop, which allows secure sharing of links, files, and notes between Edge on Android and desktop. Edge can also alert users if their saved credentials appear in known data breaches. However, its Android integration isn’t as deep as Chrome’s due to its reliance on Microsoft services.

Brave
Brave is a strong Chrome replacement for users who prioritize privacy and security. Its built-in Brave Shields system automatically blocks ads, trackers, cross-site cookies, and intrusive scripts, eliminating the need for extra extensions. The browser also includes an integrated VPN and a privacy-focused search engine that avoids tracking user activity.

While Brave Search offers solid results, it may fall short of Google for local searches since it relies on its own index. Brave is built on the Chromium engine, ensuring fast performance, and supports syncing across devices. Additional tools include a password manager, crypto wallet, and a private AI assistant called Leo, all bundled into the app.

DuckDuckGo
DuckDuckGo provides a fast, minimal Android browser designed with privacy at its core. The interface is clean and responsive, and its default search engine avoids tracking or profiling users. While AI tools are included, they are optional and do not use personal data for training.

Privacy features extend to blocking third-party trackers, preventing fingerprinting, and offering email aliasing to protect real inboxes. The browser’s Fire button allows users to clear tabs and browsing data instantly. DuckDuckGo Sync enables secure sharing of bookmarks and passwords across devices, and its app-tracking protection feature blocks hidden trackers in other apps. The minimalist design does mean fewer productivity features, such as reading lists or collections.

Vivaldi
For users who love deep customization, Vivaldi is an excellent Android browser choice. Built on Chromium by former Opera developers, Vivaldi allows extensive personalization from the first setup. Users can choose the placement of address bars and tabs, select interface colors, customize menus, and configure toolbar shortcuts.

Vivaldi includes built-in ad and tracker blocking, private browsing, password management, and sync support. Extra tools like a notes feature, privacy-focused translation, and full-page or partial webpage screenshots add to its appeal. The main drawback is a slower update schedule, with longer gaps between new versions compared to other browsers.

How These Browsers Were Selected

The browsers highlighted here are actively maintained and developed by trusted companies, an important factor given the sensitive data browsers can access. Each option offers at least one feature not typically found in Chrome, such as extension support, enhanced privacy controls, built-in ad blocking, or advanced customization.

Every browser was tested to ensure its features matched developer claims, and user feedback from the Google Play Store and community platforms like Reddit was reviewed to identify common issues. Each recommendation delivers core browsing essentials while catering to different user priorities.

Brave Experiments With Automated AI Browsing Under Tight Security Checks

 



Brave has started testing a new feature that allows its built-in assistant, Leo, to carry out browsing activities on behalf of the user. The capability is still experimental and is available only in the Nightly edition of the browser, which serves as Brave’s testing environment for early features. Users must turn on the option manually through Brave’s internal settings page before they can try it.

The feature introduces what Brave calls agentic AI browsing. In simple terms, it allows Leo to move through websites, gather information, and complete multi-step tasks without constant user input. Brave says the tool is meant to simplify activities such as researching information across many sites, comparing products online, locating discount codes, and creating summaries of current news. The company describes this trial as its initial effort to merge active AI support with everyday browsing.

Brave has stated openly that this technology comes with serious security concerns. Agentic systems can be manipulated by malicious websites through a method known as prompt injection, which attempts to make the AI behave in unsafe or unintended ways. The company warns that users should not rely on this mode for important decisions or any activity involving sensitive information, especially while it remains in early testing.

To limit these risks, Brave has placed the agent in its own isolated browser profile. This means the AI does not share cookies, saved logins, or browsing data from the user’s main profile. The agent is also blocked from areas that could create additional vulnerabilities. It cannot open the browser’s settings page, visit sites that do not use HTTPS, interact with the Chrome Web Store, or load pages that Brave’s safety system identifies as dangerous. Whenever the agent attempts a task that might expose the user to risk, the browser will display a warning and request the user’s confirmation.

Brave has added further oversight through what it calls an alignment checker. This is a separate monitoring system that evaluates whether the AI’s actions match what the user intended. Since the checker operates independently, it is less exposed to manipulation that may affect the main agent. Brave also plans to use policy-based restrictions and models trained to resist prompt-injection attempts to strengthen the system’s defenses. According to the company, these protections are designed so that the introduction of AI does not undermine Brave’s existing privacy promises, including its no-logs policy and its blocking of ads and trackers.

Users interested in testing the feature can enable it by installing Brave Nightly and turning on the “Brave’s AI browsing” option from the experimental flags page. Once activated, a new button appears inside Leo’s chat interface that allows users to launch the agentic mode. Brave has asked testers to share feedback and has temporarily increased payments on its HackerOne bug bounty program for security issues connected to AI browsing.


Your Phone Is Being Tracked in Ways You Can’t See: One Click Shows the Truth

 



Many people believe they are safe online once they disable cookies, switch on private browsing, or limit app permissions. Yet these steps do not prevent one of the most persistent tracking techniques used today. Modern devices reveal enough technical information for websites to recognise them with surprising accuracy, and users can see this for themselves with a single click using publicly available testing tools.

This practice is known as device fingerprinting. It collects many small and unrelated pieces of information from your phone or computer, such as the type of browser you use, your display size, system settings, language preferences, installed components, and how your device handles certain functions. None of these details identify you directly, but when a large number of them are combined, they create a pattern that is specific to your device. This allows trackers to follow your activity across different sites, even when you try to browse discreetly.

The risk is not just about being observed. Once a fingerprint becomes associated with a single real-world action, such as logging into an account or visiting a page tied to your identity, that unique pattern can then be connected back to you. From that point onward, any online activity linked to that fingerprint can be tied to the same person. This makes fingerprinting an effective tool for profiling behaviour over long periods of time.

Growing concerns around online anonymity are making this issue more visible. Recent public debates about identity checks, age verification rules, and expanded monitoring of online behaviour have already placed digital privacy under pressure. Fingerprinting adds an additional layer of background tracking that does not rely on traditional cookies and cannot be easily switched off.

This method has also spread far beyond web browsers. Many internet-connected devices, including smart televisions and gaming systems, can reveal similar sets of technical signals that help build a recognisable device profile. As more home electronics become connected, these identifiers grow even harder for users to avoid.

Users can test their own exposure through tools such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s browser evaluation page. By selecting the option to analyse your browser, you will either receive a notice that your setup looks common or that it appears unique compared to others tested. A unique result means your device stands out strongly among the sample and can likely be recognised again. Another testing platform demonstrates just how many technical signals a website can collect within seconds, listing dozens of attributes that contribute to a fingerprint.

Some browsers attempt to make fingerprinting more difficult by randomising certain data points or limiting access to high-risk identifiers. These protections reduce the accuracy of device recognition, although they cannot completely prevent it. A virtual private network can hide your network address, but it cannot block the internal characteristics that form a fingerprint.

Tracking also happens through mobile apps and background services. Many applications collect usage and technical data, and privacy labels do not always make this clear to users. Studies have shown that complex privacy settings and permission structures often leave people unaware of how much information their devices share.

Users should also be aware of design features that shift them out of protected environments. For example, when performing a search through a mobile browser, some pages include prompts that encourage the user to open a separate application instead of continuing in the browser. These buttons are typically placed near navigation controls, making accidental taps more likely. Moving into a dedicated search app places users in a different data-collection environment, where protections offered by the browser may no longer apply.

While there is no complete way to avoid fingerprinting, users can limit their exposure by choosing browsers with built-in privacy protections, reviewing app permissions frequently, and avoiding unnecessary redirections into external applications. Ultimately, the choice depends on how much value an individual places on privacy, but understanding how this technology works is the first step toward reducing risk.

ChatGPT Atlas Surfaces Privacy Debate: How OpenAI’s New Browser Handles Your Data

 




OpenAI has officially entered the web-browsing market with ChatGPT Atlas, a new browser built on Chromium: the same open-source base that powers Google Chrome. At first glance, Atlas looks and feels almost identical to Chrome or Safari. The key difference is its built-in ChatGPT assistant, which allows users to interact with web pages directly. For example, you can ask ChatGPT to summarize a site, book tickets, or perform online actions automatically, all from within the browser interface.

While this innovation promises faster and more efficient browsing, privacy experts are increasingly worried about how much personal data the browser collects and retains.


How ChatGPT Atlas Uses “Memories”

Atlas introduces a feature called “memories”, which allows the system to remember users’ activity and preferences over time. This builds on ChatGPT’s existing memory function, which stores details about users’ interests, writing styles, and previous interactions to personalize future responses.

In Atlas, these memories could include which websites you visit, what products you search for, or what tasks you complete online. This helps the browser predict what you might need next, such as recalling the airline you often book with or your preferred online stores. OpenAI claims that this data collection aims to enhance user experience, not exploit it.

However, this personalization comes with serious privacy implications. Once stored, these memories can gradually form a comprehensive digital profile of an individual’s habits, preferences, and online behavior.


OpenAI’s Stance on Early Privacy Concerns

OpenAI has stated that Atlas will not retain critical information such as government-issued IDs, banking credentials, medical or financial records, or any activity related to adult content. Users can also manage their data manually: deleting, archiving, or disabling memories entirely, and can browse in incognito mode to prevent the saving of activity.

Despite these safeguards, recent findings suggest that some sensitive data may still slip through. According to The Washington Post, an investigation by a technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) revealed that Atlas had unintentionally stored private information, including references to sexual and reproductive health services and even a doctor’s real name. These findings raise questions about the reliability of OpenAI’s data filters and whether user privacy is being adequately protected.


Broader Implications for AI Browsers

OpenAI is not alone in this race. Other companies, including Perplexity with its upcoming browser Comet, have also faced criticism for extensive data collection practices. Perplexity’s CEO openly admitted that collecting browser-level data helps the company understand user behavior beyond the AI app itself, particularly for tailoring ads and content.

The rise of AI-integrated browsers marks a turning point in internet use, combining automation and personalization at an unprecedented scale. However, cybersecurity experts warn that AI agents operating within browsers hold immense control — they can take actions, make purchases, and interact with websites autonomously. This power introduces substantial risks if systems malfunction, are exploited, or process data inaccurately.


What Users Can Do

For those concerned about privacy, experts recommend taking proactive steps:

• Opt out of the memory feature or regularly delete saved data.

• Use incognito mode for sensitive browsing.

• Review data-sharing and model-training permissions before enabling them.


AI browsers like ChatGPT Atlas may redefine digital interaction, but they also test the boundaries of data ethics and security. As this technology evolves, maintaining user trust will depend on transparency, accountability, and strict privacy protection.



Chrome vs Comet: Security Concerns Rise as AI Browsers Face Major Vulnerability Reports

 

The era of AI browsers is inevitable — the question is not if, but when everyone will use one. While Chrome continues to dominate across desktops and mobiles, the emerging AI-powered browser Comet has been making waves. However, growing concerns about privacy and cybersecurity have placed these new AI browsers under intense scrutiny. 

A recent report from SquareX has raised serious alarms, revealing vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to exploit AI browsers to steal data, distribute malware, and gain unauthorized access to enterprise systems. According to the findings, Comet was particularly affected, falling victim to an OAuth-based attack that granted hackers full access to users’ Gmail and Google Drive accounts. Sensitive files and shared documents could be exfiltrated without the user’s knowledge. 

The report further revealed that Comet’s automation features, which allow the AI to complete tasks within a user’s inbox, were exploited to distribute malicious links through calendar invites. These findings echo an earlier warning from LayerX, which stated that even a single malicious URL could compromise an AI browser like Comet, exposing sensitive user data with minimal effort.  
Experts agree that AI browsers are still in their infancy and must significantly strengthen their defenses. SquareX CEO Vivek Ramachandran emphasized that autonomous AI agents operating with full user privileges lack human judgment and can unknowingly execute harmful actions. This raises new security challenges for enterprises relying on AI for productivity. 

Meanwhile, adoption of AI browsers continues to grow. Venn CEO David Matalon noted a 14% year-over-year increase in the use of non-traditional browsers among remote employees and contractors, driven by the appeal of AI-enhanced performance. However, Menlo Security’s Pejman Roshan cautioned that browsers remain one of the most critical points of vulnerability in modern computing — making the switch to AI browsers a risk that must be carefully weighed. 

The debate between Chrome and Comet reflects a broader shift. Traditional browsers like Chrome are beginning to integrate AI features to stay competitive, blurring the line between old and new. As LayerX CEO Or Eshed put it, AI browsers are poised to become the primary interface for interacting with AI, even as they grapple with foundational security issues. 

Responding to the report, Perplexity’s Kyle Polley argued that the vulnerabilities described stem from human error rather than AI flaws. He explained that the attack relied on users instructing the AI to perform risky actions — an age-old phishing problem repackaged for a new generation of technology. 

As the competition between Chrome and Comet intensifies, one thing is clear: the AI browser revolution is coming fast, but it must first earn users’ trust in security and privacy.

Incognito Mode Is Not Private, Use These Instead


Incognito (private mode) is a famous privacy feature in web browsers. Users may think that using Incognito mode ensures privacy while surfing the web, allowing them to browse without restrictions, and that everything disappears when the tab is closed. 

With no sign of browsing history in Incognito mode, you may believe you are safe. However, this is not entirely accurate, as Incognito has its drawbacks and doesn’t guarantee private browsing. But this doesn’t mean that the feature is useless. 

What Incognito mode does

Private browsing mode is made to keep your local browsing history secret. When a user opens an incognito window, their browser starts a different session and temporarily saves browsing in the session, such as history and cookies. Once the private session is closed, the temporary information is self-deleted and is not visible in your browsing history. 

What Incognito mode can’t do

Incognito mode helps to keep your browsing data safe from other users who use your device

A common misconception among users is that it makes them invisible on the internet and hides everything they browse online. But that is not true.

Why Incognito mode doesn't guarantee privacy

1. It doesn’t hide user activity from the Internet Service Provider (ISP)

Every request you send travels via the ISP network (encrypted DNS providers are an exception). Your ISPs can track user activity on their networks, and can monitor your activity and all the domains you visit, and even your unencrypted traffic. If you are on a corporate Wi-Fi network, your network admin can see the visited websites. 

2. Incognito mode doesn’t stop websites from tracking users

When you are using Incognito, cookies are deleted, but websites can still track your online activity via device and browser fingerprinting. Sites create user profiles based on unique device characteristics such as resolution, installed extensions, and screen size.

3. Incognito mode doesn’t hide your IP address

If you are blocked from a website, using Incognito mode won’t make it accessible. It can’t change your I address.

Should you use Incognito mode?

It may give a false sense of benefits, but Incognito mode doesn’t ensure privacy. It is only helpful for shared devices.

What can you use?

There are other options to protect your online privacy, such as:

  1. Using a virtual private network (VPN)
  2. Privacy-focused browsers: Browsers such as Tor are by default designed to block trackers, ads, and fingerprinting.
  3. Using private search engines: Instead of Google and Bing, you can use private search engines such as DuckDuckGo and Startpage.

Passkeys under threat: How a clever clickjack attack can bypass your secure login

 


At DEF CON 33, independent security researcher Marek Tóth revealed a new class of attack called DOM-based extension clickjacking that can manipulate browser-based password managers and, in limited scenarios, hijack passkey authentication flows. This is not a failure of cryptography itself, but a breakdown in the layers surrounding it.


What is being attacked, and how?

Clickjacking is not new. In its classic form, an attacker overlays a transparent frame or control on a visible page so that a user thinks they are clicking one thing but actually triggers another. 

What Tóth’s technique adds is the targeting of browser extensions’ UI elements specifically, the autofill prompts that password managers inject into web pages. The attacker’s script controls the page’s Document Object Model (DOM) and applies CSS tricks (such as setting opacity to zero or overlaying fake elements) so that a user’s genuine click (for example, “Accept cookies”) also activates that hidden autofill element. The result: the extension may populate fields transparently, then the attacker reads the filled data. 

In many of Tóth’s tests, a single click was sufficient to trigger data leakage credentials, TOTP codes (2FA), credit card information, or personal data. In some setups, passkey workflows could also be subverted using “signed assertion hijacking,” if the server did not enforce session-bound challenges. 


How serious is the exposure?

Tóth examined 11 popular password-manager extensions (such as Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords). All were vulnerable under default settings to at least one variant of the attack. 

Among the risks:

Credential theft: Usernames, passwords and even stored TOTP codes could be auto-populated and exfiltrated. 

Credit card data: Autofill of payment fields (card number, expiration, CVV) was exposed in several tests. 

Passkey hijack: If the relying server does not bind the challenge to a session, an attacker controlling a page could co-opt a passkey login request. 

Some vendors have already released patches. For example, Enpass addressed clickjacking in browser extensions in version 6.11.6. Other tools remain at risk under certain configurations. 


Why this doesn’t mean cryptographic failure

It is critical to clarify: the underlying passkey standards (WebAuthn / FIDO protocols) were not broken. Instead, the attack targets the implementation and environment around them namely, the browser’s extension UI interaction. The exploit is possible only when the extension injects visible elements into the page DOM, and when an attacker can manipulate those elements. 

In other words, passkeys are strong in theory. But every layer above — browser, extension, site must preserve integrity or risk defeat.


What must users and organizations do

Users should:

1. Update your browser and your password-manager extensions immediately; enable auto-update.

2. Disable inline autofill where possible; prefer manual copy-paste or invoke filling only through the extension’s menu.

3. On Chromium-based browsers, set extension site access to “on click,” not “all sites.”

4. Remove or disable unused extensions.

5. For high-value accounts, prefer platform-native passkey or hardware-backed authenticators rather than extension-based credentials.


Organizations should:

• Audit extension policies and restrict or whitelist extensions.

• Enforce secure best practices on web apps (e.g., session­-bound challenges with passkeys).

• Encourage or mandate the use of vetted and updated password-management tools.


This disclosure emphasizes that security is a chain, and your cryptographic strength is only as strong as its weakest link. Passkeys are an important evolution beyond passwords, but until all layers: browser, extensions, applications are hardened, risk remains. Act now before attackers exploit complacency.


Beyond Google: The Rise of Privacy-Focused Search Engines

 

For years, the search engine market has been viewed as a two-player arena dominated by Google, with Microsoft’s Bing as the backup. But a quieter movement is reshaping how people explore the web: privacy-first search engines that promise not to turn users into products. 

DuckDuckGo has become the most recognisable name in this space. Its interface looks and feels much like Google, yet it refuses to track users, log searches, or build behavioural profiles. Instead, every query stands alone, delivering neutral results primarily sourced from Bing and other partners. 

While this means fewer personalised suggestions, it also ensures a cleaner, unbiased search experience. Startpage, on the other hand, positions itself as a privacy shield for Google. Acting as a middleman, it fetches Google’s results without passing on users’ IP addresses or histories. 

This gives people access to Google’s powerful index while keeping their identities hidden. For those seeking an extra layer of anonymity, Startpage even offers a built-in proxy to browse sites discreetly. 

Mojeek is one of the rare engines to build its own independent index. By crawling the web directly, it offers results shaped by its own algorithms rather than those of industry giants. While sometimes rougher around the edges, Mojeek’s independence appeals to users tired of mainstream filters and echo chambers. 

SearXNG takes yet another approach. As an open-source meta-search engine, it aggregates results from dozens of sources, from Google and Bing to Wikipedia. Crucially, it does this without sharing personal data. Users can even host their own SearXNG instance, tailoring the sources and ranking systems to their preferences, an unmatched level of control, though the experience varies by setup. Finally, Swisscows distinguishes itself with both privacy and family-friendly results. 

It blocks tracking, filters explicit content, and now runs on a subscription model of around $4.4 per month. While no longer free, its positioning makes it attractive for parents and classrooms seeking a safe and secure search option. 

Taken together, these alternatives highlight that Google is not the only gateway to the internet. From DuckDuckGo’s simplicity to SearXNG’s transparency and Mojeek’s independence, privacy-first search engines prove that it’s possible to browse the web without surrendering personal data.

Password Managers Face Clickjacking Flaw, Millions of Users at Risk



For years, password managers have been promoted as one of the safest ways to store and manage login details. They keep everything in one place, help generate strong credentials, and protect against weak or reused passwords. But new research has uncovered a weakness in several widely used browser extensions that could expose sensitive information for millions of people.


Details about the flows

Security researchers recently found that 11 different password manager extensions share a vulnerability linked to the way they rely on the Document Object Model (DOM). The DOM is part of how web pages are structured, and in this case, it opens a door to a technique known as “clickjacking.”

Clickjacking works by tricking users into clicking on invisible or disguised elements of a web page. For example, a malicious site may look legitimate but contain hidden layers. A single misplaced click can unintentionally activate the password manager’s autofill function. Once that happens, the manager may begin entering saved credentials directly into the attacker’s page.

The danger lies in how quietly this happens. Users often close the site without realizing that their passwords or even stored credit card information and personal details like addresses or phone numbers may already have been copied by attackers.


The scale of the issue

The affected list includes some of the most recognized password managers in the industry. An estimated 40 million users worldwide could be impacted. While some companies have already addressed the issue through updates, not all providers have released fixes yet. For example, RoboForm has patched its extension, and Bitwarden has rolled out a new version. However, others remain in the process of responding.


Protecting yourself

There is no universal fix for clickjacking, but users can take important steps to reduce risk:

1. Be cautious with links: Avoid clicking on unfamiliar or suspicious links, even if they appear genuine. It is always safer to type the website address directly or use trusted bookmarks.

2. Update your tools: Make sure your password manager extension is up to date. Updates often contain security fixes that block known vulnerabilities.

3. Change autofill settings: If you use a Chromium-based browser, switch your password manager’s autofill to “on-click.” This ensures that details are only filled in when you actively choose to do so.

4. Disable unnecessary autofill: Consider turning off automatic completion for personal information like email addresses in your browser settings.


The bottom line

Password managers are still an essential tool for safe online habits, but like any technology, they are not immune to flaws. Staying alert, practicing careful browsing, and keeping your software updated can substantially lower the risk. Until every provider has addressed the vulnerability, users should take extra precautions to keep their digital identities secure.



Cybercriminals Escalate Client-Side Attacks Targeting Mobile Browsers

 

Cybercriminals are increasingly turning to client-side attacks as a way to bypass traditional server-side defenses, with mobile browsers emerging as a prime target. According to the latest “Client-Side Attack Report Q2 2025” by security researchers c/side, these attacks are becoming more sophisticated, exploiting the weaker security controls and higher trust levels associated with mobile browsing. 

Client-side attacks occur directly on the user’s device — typically within their browser or mobile application — instead of on a server. C/side’s research, which analyzed compromised domains, autonomous crawling data, AI-powered script analysis, and behavioral tracking of third-party JavaScript dependencies, revealed a worrying trend. Cybercriminals are injecting malicious code into service workers and the Progressive Web App (PWA) logic embedded in popular WordPress themes. 

When a mobile user visits an infected site, attackers hijack the browser viewport using a full-screen iframe. Victims are then prompted to install a fake PWA, often disguised as adult content APKs or cryptocurrency apps, hosted on constantly changing subdomains to evade takedowns. These malicious apps are designed to remain on the device long after the browser session ends, serving as a persistent backdoor for attackers. 

Beyond persistence, these apps can harvest login credentials by spoofing legitimate login pages, intercept cryptocurrency wallet transactions, and drain assets through injected malicious scripts. Some variants can also capture session tokens, enabling long-term account access without detection. 

To avoid exposure, attackers employ fingerprinting and cloaking tactics that prevent the malicious payload from triggering in sandboxed environments or automated security scans. This makes detection particularly challenging. 

Mobile browsers are a favored target because their sandboxing is weaker compared to desktop environments, and runtime visibility is limited. Users are also more likely to trust full-screen prompts and install recommended apps without questioning their authenticity, giving cybercriminals an easy entry point. 

To combat these threats, c/side advises developers and website operators to monitor and secure third-party scripts, a common delivery channel for malicious code. Real-time visibility into browser-executed scripts is essential, as relying solely on server-side protections leaves significant gaps. 

End-users should remain vigilant when installing PWAs, especially those from unfamiliar sources, and treat unexpected login flows — particularly those appearing to come from trusted providers like Google — with skepticism. As client-side attacks continue to evolve, proactive measures on both the developer and user fronts are critical to safeguarding mobile security.

Mozilla Alerts Extension Developers About Phishing Scam on Add-ons Platform

 



Mozilla has issued a warning to developers who publish browser extensions on its official platform, addons.mozilla.org (AMO), about a new phishing campaign targeting their accounts. The attackers are reportedly sending emails that falsely claim to be from the Mozilla team, attempting to trick developers into giving away their login credentials.

AMO is the central hub for Firefox browser extensions, hosting more than 60,000 add-ons and over 500,000 visual themes. These are used by millions of Firefox users across the world, making the platform a valuable target for cybercriminals.

In its advisory, Mozilla stated that the scam emails are disguised to look like official communication from its staff. The messages often claim that the developer’s account needs to be updated in order to continue using certain features. This tactic is meant to create urgency and increase the chances of the developer clicking on a malicious link.

Mozilla urged developers to be extra cautious and double-check any email they receive related to their add-on accounts. Specifically, it advised checking if the message came from a genuine Mozilla domain such as mozilla.org, mozilla.com, or firefox.com. In addition, developers should make sure that the email passes technical checks like SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, which are designed to verify the sender's identity.

To avoid falling victim, Mozilla recommends that developers avoid clicking on any links in suspicious emails. Instead, they should go directly to Mozilla’s official website using a browser and log in only through trusted web addresses.

While Mozilla has not yet confirmed how many developers were affected or whether any accounts were compromised, at least one developer has come forward saying they fell for the scam. Mozilla has promised to share more details as its investigation progresses.

This warning comes just weeks after Mozilla introduced new security features aimed at protecting users from malicious extensions. The company’s Add-ons Operations team has recently removed hundreds of suspicious add-ons, including some designed to steal cryptocurrency.

Andreas Wagner, who oversees security efforts on the platform, noted that while not all harmful extensions are easy to detect, cybercriminals stole nearly $500 million in crypto last year through fake wallet extensions and similar scams.

Mozilla’s latest alert serves as a reminder for all developers and users to stay careful when it comes to online threats, especially those targeting widely used platforms.

Shuyal Malware Targets 19 Browsers with Advanced Data Theft and Evasion Capabilities

 

A newly discovered infostealing malware named “Shuyal” has entered the cyber threat landscape, posing a serious risk to users by targeting a wide range of web browsers and deploying sophisticated evasion methods. Identified by researchers at Hybrid Analysis, Shuyal is capable of stealing credentials and sensitive information from 19 different browsers, including lesser-known privacy-focused options like Tor and Brave. 

The malware is named after identifiers found in its code path and represents a new generation of data stealers with expanded surveillance capabilities. Unlike traditional malware that only focuses on login credentials, Shuyal goes deeper—harvesting system-level information, capturing screenshots, monitoring clipboard activity, and sending all of it to cybercriminals using a Telegram bot-controlled infrastructure. 

In his analysis, Vlad Pasca from Hybrid Analysis highlighted that Shuyal performs extensive system reconnaissance. Once it infects a device, it disables the Windows Task Manager to prevent users from detecting or ending the malware’s process. It also hides its tracks by removing evidence of its activities through self-deleting mechanisms, including batch scripts that erase runtime files once the data has been exfiltrated. 

Among the browsers targeted by Shuyal are mainstream options such as Chrome and Edge, but it also compromises more obscure browsers like Waterfox, OperaGx, Comodo, Falko, and others often marketed as safer alternatives. This wide reach makes it particularly concerning for users who believe they are using secure platforms. 

Shuyal collects technical details about the system, including hard drive specifications, connected input devices like keyboards and mice, and display configurations. It compresses all collected data using PowerShell into a temporary folder before transmitting it to the attackers. This organized method of data collection and transfer demonstrates the malware’s highly stealthy design. 

The malware also ensures it remains active on compromised machines by copying itself into the Startup folder, allowing it to launch each time the system is rebooted. 

Although researchers have not yet pinpointed the exact methods attackers use to distribute Shuyal, common delivery vectors for similar malware include phishing emails, malicious social media posts, and deceptive captcha pages. Experts caution that infostealers like Shuyal often serve as precursors to more serious threats, including ransomware attacks and business email compromises. 

Hybrid Analysis encourages cybersecurity professionals to study the published indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Shuyal to strengthen their defense strategies. As cyber threats evolve, early detection and proactive protection remain essential.

OpenAI Launching AI-Powered Web Browser to Rival Chrome, Drive ChatGPT Integration

 

OpenAI is reportedly developing its own web browser, integrating artificial intelligence to offer users a new way to explore the internet. According to sources cited by Reuters, the tool is expected to be unveiled in the coming weeks, although an official release date has not yet been announced. With this move, OpenAI seems to be stepping into the competitive browser space with the goal of challenging Google Chrome’s dominance, while also gaining access to valuable user data that could enhance its AI models and advertising potential. 

The browser is expected to serve as more than just a window to the web—it will likely come packed with AI features, offering users the ability to interact with tools like ChatGPT directly within their browsing sessions. This integration could mean that AI-generated responses, intelligent page summaries, and voice-based search capabilities are no longer separate from web activity but built into the browsing experience itself. Users may be able to complete tasks, ask questions, and retrieve information all within a single, unified interface. 

A major incentive for OpenAI is the access to first-party data. Currently, most of the data that fuels targeted advertising and search engine algorithms is captured by Google through Chrome. By creating its own browser, OpenAI could tap into a similar stream of data—helping to both improve its large language models and create new revenue opportunities through ad placements or subscription services. While details on privacy controls are unclear, such deep integration with AI may raise concerns about data protection and user consent. 

Despite the potential, OpenAI faces stiff competition. Chrome currently holds a dominant share of the global browser market, with nearly 70% of users relying on it for daily web access. OpenAI would need to provide compelling reasons for people to switch—whether through better performance, advanced AI tools, or stronger privacy options. Meanwhile, other companies are racing to enter the same space. Perplexity AI, for instance, recently launched a browser named Comet, giving early adopters a glimpse into what AI-first browsing might look like. 

Ultimately, OpenAI’s browser could mark a turning point in how artificial intelligence intersects with the internet. If it succeeds, users might soon navigate the web in ways that are faster, more intuitive, and increasingly guided by AI. But for now, whether this approach will truly transform online experiences—or simply add another player to the browser wars—remains to be seen.

Malicious Firefox Extension Steals Verification Tokens: Update to stay safe


Credential theft and browser security were commonly found in Google Chrome browsers due to its wide popularity and usage. Recently, however, cyber criminals have started targeting Mozilla Firefox users. A recent report disclosed a total of eight malicious Firefox extensions that could spy on users and even steal verification tokens.

About the malicious extension

Regardless of the web browser we use, criminals are always on the hunt. Threat actors generally prefer malicious extensions or add-ons; therefore, browser vendors like Mozilla offer background protections and public support to minimize these threats as much as possible. Despite such a measure, on July 4th, the Socket Threat Research Team's report revealed that threat actors are still targeting Firefox users. 

According to Kush Pandya, security engineer at Socket Threat Research Team, said that while the “investigation focuses on Firefox extensions, these threats span the entire browser ecosystem.” However, the particular Firefox investigation revealed a total of eight potentially harmful extensions, including user session hijacking to earn commissions on websites, redirection to scam sites, surveillance via an invisible iframe tracking method, and the most serious: authentication theft.

How to mitigate the Firefox attack threat

Users are advised to read the technical details of the extensions. According to Forbes, Mozilla is taking positive action to protect Firefox users from such threats. The company has taken care of the extensions mentioned in the report. According to Mozilla, the malicious extension impacted a very small number of users; some of the extensions have been shut down. 

“We help users customize their browsing experience by featuring a variety of add-ons, manually reviewed by our Firefox Add-ons team, on our Recommended Extensions page,” said a Firefox spokesperson. To protect the users, Mozilla has disabled “extensions that compromise their safety or privacy, or violate its policies, and continuously works to improve its malicious add-on detection tools and processes.”

How to stay safe?

To protect against these threats, Mozilla has advised users to Firefox users to take further steps, cautioning that such extensions are made by third parties. Users should check the extension rating and reviews, and be extra careful of extensions that need excessive permissions that are not compatible with what the extension claims to do. If any extension seems to be malicious, “users should report it for review,” a Firefox spokesperson said.