According to cybersecurity firm Securonix, the campaign is notable for the way its infrastructure and toolkit are used. The firm has named the campaign DB#JAMMER.
"Some of these tools include enumeration software, RAT payloads, exploitation and credential stealing software, and finally ransomware payloads[…]The ransomware payload of choice appears to be a newer variant of Mimic ransomware called FreeWorld," says security researchers Den Iuzvyk, Tim Peck, and Oleg Kolesnikov in a technical breakdown of the activity.
The attackers first gain access to the victim host by brute-forcing the MS SQL server, enumerating the database, and exploiting the xp_cmdshell configuration option to execute shell commands and conduct reconnaissance.
Next, they take certain steps to disable system firewall in order to develop persistence and install malicious software like Cobalt Strike by connecting to a remote SMB share to transfer files to and from the targeted system.
This in turn opens the door for the eventual dissemination of the FreeWorld ransomware through the AnyDesk software distribution, but not before performing a lateral movement phase. Additionally, it is claimed that the unidentified attackers tried in vain to use Ngrok to establish RDP persistence.
The researchers concluded, "The attack initially succeeded as a result of a brute force attack against a MS SQL server[…]It's important to emphasize the importance of strong passwords, especially on publicly exposed services"
According to figures released by Coveware in July 2023, the year has seen a record-breaking increase in ransomware assaults following a calm in 2022, even if the proportion of instances that ended in the victim paying has decreased to a record-low of 34%.
The reports also noted that on an average, the in hand amount paid as ransom in a ransomware has hit a whopping $740,144, 126% from Q1 2023.
Moreover, fluctuations in monetization rates have synchronized well with the developments in extortion tradecraft executed by ransomware threat actors, disclosing specifics of their attack methods to demonstrate why the victims are ineligible for a cyber insurance claim.
"Snatch claims they will release details of how attacks against non-paying victims succeeded in the hope that insurers will decide that the incidents should not be covered by insurance ransomware," Emsisoft security researcher Brett Callow said in a post shared on X (formerly Twitter) last month.
The Threat Response Unit (TRU) of eSentire has been monitoring one of the most effective and covert malware families, Golden Chickens, for the past 16 months. The malware of choice for FIN6 and Cobalt, two of the most established and prosperous online crime organizations in Russia, who have collectively stolen an estimated $1.5 billion US, is Golden Chickens.
The creator of a comprehensive toolkit that includes SKID, VenomKit, and Taurus Loader is Golden Chickens, widely known as VENOM SPIDER. Since at least 2012, the adversary has participated actively in Russian underground forums under the alias 'badbullzvenom,' where they have developed tools for exploiting vulnerabilities as well as for getting and retaining access to victim machines and ticketing services.
Experts from cybersecurity firm eSentire found that the attack infrastructure used in recent Cisco hack was also used in targeting a top Workforce management corporation in April 2022.
They also observed that the attack was executed by a threat actor called as mx1r, who is an alleged member of the Evil Corp affiliate cluster called UNC2165.
The UNC2165 is in action since 2019, it was known for using the FAKEUPDATES infection chain (aka UNC1543) to get access to victims' networks.
Experts observed that FAKEUPDATES was also used as the initial infection vector for DRIDEX infections which were used to execute BITPAYMER or DOPPELPAYMER in the final stage of the attack.
Earlier, the UNC2165 actors also used the HADES ransomware. As per eSentire, the hackers accessed the workforce management corporation's IT network via stolen Virtual Private Network (VPN) credentials.
The experts found various underground forum posts, from April 2022, where mx1r was looking for VPN credentials for high-profile organizations.
They also found posts on a Dark Web access broker auction site where a threat actor was buying VPN credentials for big U.S companies.
The researchers also discovered the attackers attempting to move laterally in the network via a set of red team tools, this includes Cobalt strike, network scanners, and Active Domain crawlers.
The attackers used Cobalt Strike and were able to have initial foothold and hands-on-actions were quick and swift from the time of initial access to when the attacker could enlist their own Virtual Machine on the target VPN network.
eSentire researchers also noticed the attacker trying to launch a Kerberoasting attack (cracking passwords in Windows Active Directory via the Kerberos authentication protocol) which is also in line with the TTPs of the Evil Corp affiliate/UNC2165.
TTPs of the attack that attacked the workforce management corporation are similar with Evil Corp, while the attack infrastructure used matches that of a Conti ransomware affiliate, who has been found using Hive and Yanlukwang ransomware. eSentire traces this infrastructure cluster as HiveStrike.
"It seems unlikely – but not impossible – that Conti would lend its infrastructure to Evil Corp. Given that Mandiant has interpreted UNC2165´s pivot to LockBit, as an intention to distance itself from the core Evil Corp group, it is more plausible that the Evil Corp affiliate/UNC2165 may be working with one of Conti’s new subsidiaries. Conti’s subsidiaries provide a similar outcome – to avoid sanctions by diffusing their resources into other established brands as they retire the Conti brand,” eSentire report concludes. “It’s also possible that initial access was brokered by an Evil Corp affiliate but ultimately sold off to Hive operators and its affiliates.”