According to a report by SecurityWeek, the suspect is a 28-year-old Russian national who was arrested in Osaka, Japan, in May 2026. German authorities accuse him of playing a role in the Qilin ransomware operation, which has targeted organizations in several countries.
The suspect was extradited to Germany on October 2, 2026, following legal proceedings in Japan. German investigators allege that he was involved in an attack against a logistics company in September 2024.
Investigators say the targeted logistics company had its computer systems encrypted during the attack. The attackers allegedly demanded more than $160,000 in cryptocurrency in exchange for restoring access to the affected systems.
The incident is believed to have been connected to the Qilin ransomware operation, also known as Agenda. Qilin emerged as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation in 2022. Under this model, ransomware developers provide malware and infrastructure to affiliates, who conduct attacks against victims and share the proceeds with the operators.
This business model has allowed ransomware groups to expand their operations without every attacker needing to develop their own malware or infrastructure.
Qilin has become one of the more active ransomware groups in recent years. It has targeted organizations across different industries, including healthcare, manufacturing, professional services and other critical sectors.
The group attracted international attention after attacks linked to it disrupted healthcare services in the United Kingdom. It was associated with the 2024 attack against Synnovis, a medical services provider whose systems were used by several London hospitals. The incident caused significant disruption to healthcare operations.
Qilin has also been linked to attacks against major companies in other countries, demonstrating the international reach of the ransomware operation.
Experts have continued to track the group's activities and techniques. In 2026, Qilin was also reported to have exploited a critical vulnerability affecting Check Point security products as part of its attack activity.
The incidents were disclosed on October 4 and reveal the risks organizations face when attackers gain access to legitimate employee accounts. Nikkei has not attributed either incident to a specific hacking group or confirmed whether the two attacks were connected.
The more recent incident involved an employee's Microsoft 365 account. According to Nikkei, attackers gained unauthorized access to the account and used it on September 30 to send approximately 9,000 emails.
The messages were sent to people both inside and outside the company. Some recipients were journalistic sources and other individuals who had previously communicated with Nikkei employees.
The emails contained links leading to malicious websites. Because the messages were sent from a legitimate Nikkei employee account, recipients could have been more likely to trust them. This type of account compromise can allow attackers to use an organization's existing relationships to distribute phishing messages.
Nikkei said the incident may have exposed recipients' names and email addresses, along with the contents of some emails. The company is still investigating the number of people whose personal information may have been affected. According to Nikkei, “There may be an increase in emails impersonating Nikkei employees or our group companies,”
Nikkei also disclosed a separate incident involving an employee's Google Workspace account. The account was accessed without authorization beginning in late July.
The company discovered the intrusion in early August after receiving an alert from Google. Nikkei then changed the account's password and said it has not detected any further unauthorized access.
The incident may have exposed information belonging to 1,646 employees and business partners. The potentially affected information included names and email addresses.
Nikkei said the exposed information did not include data related to its readers or journalistic sources. The company also said it has found no evidence that the information was misused.
After the Microsoft 365 incident, Nikkei changed the affected password and contacted recipients of the phishing emails, asking them to delete the messages. The company warned that additional emails impersonating Nikkei employees or its group companies could appear.
Nikkei has also reported the incidents to Japan's data protection authority. Investigations into the scope of the Microsoft 365 compromise and the information potentially exposed are continuing.
Nikkei has experienced other cybersecurity incidents in recent years. In November 2025, the company disclosed a malware-related credential theft incident that potentially exposed information connected to more than 17,000 employees and business partners.
The campaign has targeted organizations in Taiwan, India, the Philippines, Cambodia, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar and Syria. By July 2026, Talos had identified at least 16 affected or targeted institutional environments and approximately 350 compromised endpoints.
The campaign's lure theme and targeting provide additional contextual support. Its lures and observed targets include Taiwanese political, legislative, civil defense, and policy research subjects, together with regional government, maritime, diplomatic, and security themes. This collection focus is consistent with China-nexus actor interests,” Talos said.
The most notable feature of Antino is its use of legitimate Microsoft 365 services as command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Instead of relying on a traditional attacker-controlled server, the malware communicates through Microsoft Outlook and OneDrive using Microsoft Graph.
Antino is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor capable of gathering information about infected systems, executing commands through Windows shell and PowerShell, transferring files, loading shellcode directly into memory and maintaining persistence.
The infection generally begins with a carefully prepared spear-phishing email. Attackers used government, diplomatic, maritime, legislative and foreign-policy themes designed to appear relevant to their intended victims.
In some cases, the attackers recreated Gmail’s attachment-preview interface inside the email. When victims interacted with the fake attachment, they were directed to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
The attack then proceeds through multiple stages involving HTA or WSF files, JavaScript and a .NET-based downloader before ultimately installing Antino. The malware has also been deployed through DLL sideloading, using a legitimate Microsoft-signed executable to load the malicious DLL.
Once installed, Antino uses Microsoft Graph to communicate with Microsoft 365. Outlook is used for receiving commands, while OneDrive handles heartbeat communications and file transfers. This allows malicious traffic to terminate at legitimate Microsoft infrastructure, potentially making conventional network-based detection more difficult.
A successful Antino infection can provide attackers with persistent access to a Windows system, allowing them to conduct reconnaissance, execute commands, run PowerShell, access files and transfer data.
The targeting of government agencies, diplomatic organizations, universities, think tanks and policy groups suggests that the campaign is focused primarily on intelligence gathering and espionage rather than ordinary financial cybercrime.
Cisco Talos assessed UAT-11587 as China-nexus with high confidence, citing technical, language, infrastructure and targeting indicators. However, researchers noted that attribution to a specific Chinese group remains more complicated.
On September 23, 2026, an attacker spent roughly five hours poisoning two packages belonging to MemTensor, the company behind the MemOS operating system for AI memory. By the time a researcher flagged the issue on GitHub at 4:17 AM UTC, malicious versions were already sitting at the top of the npm and PyPI registries, ready to install for any developer who ran a plain `npm install` or `pip install MemoryOS` that morning.
The packages hit were `@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin` on npm and `MemoryOS` on PyPI. Security firm SafeDep, which flagged the incident through its threat intelligence monitoring, found that three npm versions, `0.1.21`, `0.1.23`, and `0.1.25`, and one PyPI version, `2.0.34`, all contained the same Go binary: a credential-harvesting implant the attacker internally called `sckit`, built under the module path `supplychain.local/campaign`.
How the Attacker Got Inside the Pipeline
The attacker did not need a zero-day. Instead, they exploited a well-understood weakness in how GitHub Actions jobs share environment state.
The OpenClaw plugin publishes to npm through a GitHub Actions release workflow that reads its publish token from a repository secret. The attacker, operating through a GitHub account called `Memtensor-AI`, pushed a short-lived branch named `sc/release-0.1.21-20260922-cloud`, made a three-line change to a validation script that runs earlier in the same job, then deleted the branch. They repeated this process five times between 00:48 and 02:03 UTC.
The change was precise: it wrote a `BASH_ENV` entry into `$GITHUB_ENV`, which is GitHub's mechanism for passing environment variables between steps. Because Bash reads the file named in `BASH_ENV` before running any non-interactive script, this let the attacker's shell script execute silently before the real publish step. That script called `collectStageZero()` from within the package itself, passed the `NPM_TOKEN` to the `sckit` binary, then deleted itself and exited with a failure code. The publish step failed visibly, so nothing appeared on npm from that run. The token was already gone.
The PyPI compromise used the same `BASH_ENV` trick but through a different entry point. The attacker pushed an unsigned commit to the MemOS repository that replaced the standard build backend in `pyproject.toml` with a custom wrapper called `sckit_poetry_build`. On import, that wrapper injected its own bridge script into the CI environment. The bridge ran only inside the PyPI upload action's container, captured `INPUT_PASSWORD` (the PyPI token), sent it to a server at `10729e014d0e.skyleen[.]fr`, and then exited cleanly. Two hours later, a follow-up commit removed the capture code, and the next tag push uploaded the fully malicious wheel to PyPI using MemTensor's own legitimate credentials.
What the Package Does After Install
The implant activates at runtime, not at install time, so `--ignore-scripts` offers no protection. In the npm plugin, it fires when the OpenClaw gateway starts and again on every memory recall. In the Python library, it starts the first time `configure_logging()` runs, which happens on nearly every import path. The binary launches detached in the background with no output.
Once running, `sckit` scans the entire home directory for credentials. Its target list, visible in its strings and symbol names, covers `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, `.netrc`, SSH private keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and Microsoft MSAL token caches. Two compiled regular expressions recognize both secret-like variable names and token format patterns for AWS, GitHub, npm, PyPI, HuggingFace, Slack, and Stripe. Collected data goes to subdomains of `skyleen[.]fr`, the campaign's control infrastructure, over encrypted channels using X25519 key exchange and XChaCha20-Poly1305.
The binary also carries worm logic. Functions named `findRepositories`, `prepareRemoteNode`, `prepareRemotePython`, and `recursivePublish` describe how it uses stolen credentials to inject itself into other repositories. It plants a GitHub Actions workflow named `runtime-update.yml` and a `.sckit/` directory into reachable projects, turning each victim into a potential carrier. The campaign configuration encodes an expiry date of late October 2026, suggesting the attacker planned a defined window of operation.
Developers Need to Act Now
Anyone who ran an affected version should treat every credential in their home directory as stolen. That includes cloud CLI tokens, SSH keys, and any `.env` files. SafeDep recommends pinning to `0.1.20` for the npm plugin and `2.0.33` for `MemoryOS`, killing any running `sckit` process, deleting the state directories at `$HOME/.openclaw/.cache/runtime` and `$HOME/.memos/.cache/runtime`, and checking any repository with push access for the `runtime-update.yml` workflow file.
The attack sits inside a larger pattern. The first half of 2026 alone produced 37 supply chain attack campaigns and 497 indexed malicious packages, which is 4.5 times the package volume of the entire preceding year. What separates this incident is the operational sophistication: the attacker used the target project's own CI pipeline as the delivery mechanism, left no workflow run logs behind, and built self-propagation directly into the implant. For maintainers who publish from CI, PyPI's trusted publishing removes long-lived tokens from the job entirely. Required reviewers on release environments would have blocked the MemTensor runs before they started.