Metabase revealed the attacks last week and warned that its Metabase Cloud SaaS platform was hacked via an earlier unknown bug impacting variants 1.58 and above. Metabase warned that self-hosted deployments may also be vulnerable.
In a blogpost, Metabase CEO, Sameer Al-Sakran said that, “"We recently identified that Metabase Cloud was attacked by someone utilizing an unknown ("0-day") security vulnerability in versions 1.58 and above."
Metabase stopped the endpoints used for the attack and released a fix for the flaw.
"The vulnerability is an unauthenticated SQL injection flaw in Metabase that can ultimately give a remote attacker administrator access to a customer's instance."
Although Metabase has not given the flaw a CVE identifier, its security advisor labels it as Critical with CVSS score of 10.0 and acknowledges that it has been actively exploited.
"This is a CRITICAL vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary SQL into the Metabase application database, which can give them administrator access to the instance,” said a GitHub security advisory.
"From there, the attacker could change the application configuration, steal stored credentials for the connected databases, read any data accessible through those connections, and export data. Metabase has confirmed active exploitation of this vulnerability.
Metabase is available both as Metabase Cloud, the organization’s managed SaaS offering, and as software that companies can host themselves.
According to Metabase, its Cloud consumers have already been patched and upgraded while businesses running flawed self-hosted deployments should update manually.
Metabase has recommended self-hosted customers to immediately upgrade, review API keys and administrator accounts for illegal changes, remove all active user sessions, check logs and query history for any compromise, and rotate credentials for linked databases.
Framework, a laptop maker company has confirmed data theft after hackers breached its Metabase instance. The hackers stole customer information, such as names, login IP addresses, email addresses, company names, contacts, shipping and billing addresses.
For Framework, stolen information of Business customers may include contacts, VAT, company names, billing email address, and EIN.
Tally also informed its users that its Metabase analytics environment was hacked on August 3.
Atlassian's Rovo AI assistant has been exposed to two independent attack techniques that could cause it to retrieve Jira and Confluence data accessible to an authenticated user and transmit the information to an attacker-controlled server.
AI security firm PromptArmor and Varonis Threat Labs identified the techniques through different attack paths. Varonis' RovoBlast vulnerability has been fixed by Atlassian, while PromptArmor said its separate content-based attack remained exploitable when it published its findings on August 5, 2026.
Neither finding demonstrated a direct bypass of Jira or Confluence permissions. Instead, both attacks abused the legitimate access available to a victim's Rovo session.
Malicious content can manipulate Rovo
PromptArmor demonstrated an indirect prompt-injection attack in which attacker-controlled instructions were embedded inside content processed by Rovo.
In its example, a user uploaded a malicious document and asked Rovo to organize Jira tickets. The concealed instructions directed the assistant to search Jira and Confluence, collect information available to the user and place the results into an attacker-controlled URL request.
The attacker could then recover the stolen ticket and page contents through server logs.
PromptArmor said the victim would later see the expected ticket suggestions without an obvious indication that information had also been transmitted externally. The attack was not entirely zero-click, as the victim still had to expose Rovo to the malicious content and initiate a normal request. However, the subsequent exfiltration did not require a separate human approval step.
The firm also reported that disabling Rovo's web-search capability did not prevent its demonstrated attack because the exfiltration relied on a separate URL-retrieval capability.
PromptArmor identified the lack of a control preventing Rovo from opening a URL constructed by the model as a root cause. It also noted that Rovo can render Markdown images from model output, which could provide another potential route for data leakage, although the firm did not demonstrate a complete Rovo attack through that mechanism.
PromptArmor said it disclosed the issue to Atlassian on May 23, followed up on June 4 and July 29, and published after reporting no further communication. Its disclosure did not establish whether the content-based attack was remediated after publication.
RovoBlast used a malicious link
Varonis discovered a separate vulnerability involving Rovo's "rovoChatPrompt" URL parameter.
An attacker could place instructions directly into a specially crafted Rovo Chat link. When an authenticated user clicked the link, Rovo would load the attacker-controlled prompt and execute it using the user's existing permissions.
Varonis demonstrated the technique by instructing Rovo to retrieve sensitive information, place it into an attacker-controlled image URL and fetch the resource, thereby sending the data to the attacker.
The researchers successfully exfiltrated a private API key stored in Confluence. They also tested the technique against Jira information and data accessible through SharePoint and Outlook connectors.
The vulnerability, dubbed RovoBlast, was reported through Bugcrowd, received a P2 priority rating and earned a $6,000 bounty. Bugcrowd records Atlassian as deploying a server-side fix on July 8, 2026, after which the researcher validated the remediation and the report was marked resolved.
Enterprise permissions remain central to the risk
Rovo operates across Atlassian products and can incorporate information from connected third-party applications. Atlassian says Rovo access follows the permissions available to the user, meaning the demonstrations did not provide attackers with unrestricted tenant access.
However, the findings expose a different problem: an attacker can attempt to make the AI assistant use a victim's legitimate permissions for an unintended purpose.
Atlassian provides administrators with controls to restrict Rovo by application and, for Enterprise customers, by user group. Rovo is available on Standard, Premium and Enterprise Cloud plans, while disabling Rovo for one Jira-family application may not remove shared Rovo Search, Chat and Create capabilities if another Jira application on the same site still has Rovo enabled.
Neither disclosure reported confirmed exploitation against a real organization, and neither issue has a CVE or entry in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of August 8.
The immediate status is therefore split: Atlassian has confirmed the RovoBlast link vulnerability is closed, while the post-publication status of PromptArmor's separate content-borne attack remains unconfirmed.
Organizations using Rovo should review which applications, user groups and third-party connectors have access, tighten underlying data permissions and avoid treating the web-search setting alone as a complete defense against AI-assisted data exfiltration.
Experts found a live campaign that abused spoofed customer-side safe sender exclusions and RingCentral emails to escape email gateway checks and send phishing traps attacking Microsoft 365 accounts.
"Greatness supports AiTM [adversary-in-the-middle] credential and token theft, device code phishing, and OAuth consent abuse, all from the same operator panel and shared backend infrastructure," ZeroBec, who discovered the campaign, said in a report.
"The platform now supports AiTM token theft, device code phishing, OAuth consent abuse, and multiple target platforms, including iCloud, Yahoo, and Google Workspace. This evolution reflects the broader trend of PhaaS platforms expanding from simple credential harvesting to integrated attack ecosystems."
The phishing platform was first found by Cisco Talos in May 2023, showing how hackers are including it in their campaigns to attack Microsoft 365 business users since May 2022.
Built to ease cybercrime, access to Greatness is given through a subscription available on Telegram channel called @GreatnessPage having over 3,250 subscribers and works as a central hub for feature updates and announcements. Hackers can get a subscription at $289 per month, rising from $120 per month from January 2024. The subscription offers access to an operator that consists of a dashboard with CAPTCHA selection, domain configuration, campaign statistics, and more than 11 downloadable trap templates including QR codes, voicemail, and document sharing.
The operators of Telegram channel in November 2025 said that Greatness keeps stolen cookies secure through one-way hash protection and the information can be taken out only by the customers via their Telegram account two factor authentication code.
Threat actors that buy a subscription by giving their bot API token and Telegram chat ID can use the panel via an “O365 Panel” login page that needs a 9-character license key and a user ID. Once registered, customers are shown a dashboard and an operator-particular domain.
The dashboard is a standard place that provides campaign statistics such as heat map of victims and captured cookies. "Observed templates include: AudioLogin, ChatAssistance, WindowsExplorer, Voicemail, OneDrive, QR, VideoPlayer, and additional variants. "Each template contains pre-built HTML, PDF redirectors, SVGs, and letter templates, lowering the barrier to entry so operators do not need to build lures from scratch."
A former ransomware negotiator who was hired to help organizations respond to cyber extortion incidents has been sentenced to 70 months in federal prison after admitting he secretly worked with BlackCat ransomware affiliates, using confidential client information to increase ransom payments while participating in additional ransomware attacks.
The U.S. Department of Justice said Angelo Martino, 41, abused his position at incident response firm DigitalMint by sharing privileged information obtained during ransomware negotiations with BlackCat, also tracked as ALPHV. Prosecutors said the information allowed the ransomware group to negotiate from a stronger position while victims remained unaware that details intended to protect them had been disclosed to the attackers.
As part of his role, Martino managed active ransomware cases for organizations seeking assistance after cyberattacks. His work gave him access to confidential information that companies typically share only with trusted negotiators, including cyber insurance policy limits, internal assessments of how much they were prepared to pay, and negotiation strategies developed during incident response.
According to court documents, Martino began providing that information to BlackCat operators in April 2023. Prosecutors said he communicated with the group through multiple channels connected to BlackCat's extortion platform. While one conversation took place through the standard negotiation interface used during ransomware incidents, he also relied on an intermediary chat feature within the group's panel and the encrypted messaging application Tox to exchange information directly with the attackers outside the victims' view.
Federal prosecutors said those private communications were intended to help BlackCat maximize ransom demands. In exchange for sharing confidential information, including insurance coverage limits and the negotiating positions of victim organizations, Martino received a portion of the cryptocurrency paid by ransomware victims.
The Justice Department said five organizations whose cases were handled by Martino collectively paid more than $75 million to BlackCat affiliates between April and September 2023. Prosecutors argued that access to confidential negotiation data enabled the attackers to demand higher payments than they otherwise might have secured. The affected organizations operated in the financial services, healthcare, retail, hospitality, and nonprofit sectors, with several experiencing operational disruption alongside the financial losses associated with the attacks.
Investigators also determined that Martino later became an active participant in BlackCat's ransomware operation. In May 2023, he obtained affiliate access to the ransomware-as-a-service platform, permissions generally granted to trusted partners responsible for compromising victim networks and deploying the malware.
Court filings state that Martino shared those affiliate credentials with Kevin Martin and Ryan Goldberg, both cybersecurity professionals. The three men subsequently carried out additional ransomware attacks and agreed to divide ransom proceeds among themselves while paying 20% of each payment to BlackCat's administrators in exchange for continued access to the group's malware and extortion infrastructure.
One attack targeted a medical device manufacturer that ultimately paid approximately $1.2 million in ransom. Other organizations refused to pay but still incurred costs associated with business interruption, system recovery, and incident response following the attacks.
Prosecutors said Martino received millions of dollars in cryptocurrency through the conspiracy. Federal investigators recovered and seized more than $10 million in assets connected to the case, although authorities said some proceeds had already been used to purchase residential properties, vehicles, and a boat. As part of his sentence, Martino must forfeit assets linked to the criminal activity and pay 10% of his future income following his release from prison.
Before sentencing, Martino requested a reduced 24-month prison term, citing his cooperation with investigators during the prosecution of his co-conspirators. Martin and Goldberg were each sentenced to four years in prison earlier this year after pleading guilty for their involvement in the BlackCat attacks.
"Angelo Martino sold out the very victims he was hired to represent, handing their confidential negotiating positions to BlackCat actors to drive up ransoms and enrich himself," FBI Cyber Division Assistant Director Brett Leatherman said following the sentencing.
BlackCat operates as a ransomware-as-a-service platform, providing malware and extortion infrastructure to affiliates that compromise organizations and share a percentage of ransom payments with the group's administrators. The FBI has linked the operation to more than 1,000 victims and at least $300 million in ransom payments through September 2023. Although law enforcement disrupted parts of the group's infrastructure and previously released a decryptor for some victims, affiliates continued launching attacks after those actions.
DigitalMint said it was unaware of Martino's conduct until it was contacted by the Department of Justice and described itself as another victim of the scheme. The company said the employees involved were terminated immediately after the allegations came to light and that it fully cooperated with investigators throughout the criminal investigation.
The company also said Martino deliberately bypassed internal safeguards by communicating with threat actors through unauthorized channels that were not visible within its monitoring systems. According to DigitalMint, its security controls aligned with industry practices, but the unauthorized communications were intentionally concealed from the company's oversight mechanisms.
Ransomware groups claimed responsibility for 2,279 attacks worldwide during the second quarter of 2026, marking a 7% increase from the previous quarter and a 43% jump compared with the same period last year, according to GuidePoint Security's latest quarterly ransomware report. Researchers also recorded the highest number of active ransomware groups seen in a single quarter, reflecting an ecosystem that continues to attract new threat actors even as attacks remain concentrated among a relatively small number of established operations.
Despite the growing number of ransomware groups, a handful of operators continue to dominate victim claims. GuidePoint found that the five most active groups were collectively responsible for more than 40% of all publicly reported ransomware incidents during the quarter, suggesting that while new groups continue to emerge, only a few have achieved sustained operational scale.
Qilin remained the most active ransomware operation during Q2, accounting for approximately 13% of all recorded victim claims. It was closely followed by The Gentlemen, a comparatively new group that has expanded rapidly in recent months. Together with Akira and DragonForce, the two groups make up what GuidePoint describes as a "four-headed monster," representing the most prolific ransomware operations currently shaping the threat landscape.
Rather than relying on a single dominant ransomware syndicate, today's ransomware ecosystem is distributed across several highly active groups capable of absorbing affiliates from disrupted operations. Researchers noted that this structure could reduce the long-term impact of law enforcement takedowns, as affiliates displaced from one ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform may quickly transition to another established operation without substantially disrupting attack activity.
The United States remained the country most frequently targeted by ransomware groups during the quarter, accounting for 40% of publicly claimed victims. Germany ranked second with 32%. However, GuidePoint observed a noticeable shift in targeting patterns, with the U.S. accounting for a smaller proportion of victims than in previous quarters, when roughly half of all reported incidents involved American organizations.
Researchers linked this broader geographic distribution to increased activity from groups including Qilin, The Gentlemen and LockBit, each of which claimed a larger share of victims outside the United States during Q2. The findings suggest that ransomware affiliates are expanding their operations across a wider range of regions instead of concentrating primarily on U.S.-based organizations.
Alongside changes in victim targeting, the report examined how artificial intelligence is being incorporated into ransomware operations. While concerns have grown around the possibility of AI creating entirely new forms of cyberattacks, GuidePoint found little evidence to support that scenario. Instead, threat actors are primarily using large language models (LLMs) to accelerate tasks that previously required significant manual effort, allowing them to improve efficiency without fundamentally changing their attack methods.
One case study highlighted in the report involved the data extortion group FulcrumSec. After obtaining a large volume of stolen information, the group reportedly used an LLM to examine complex databases and identify individuals appearing across multiple datasets. According to researchers, completing this level of analysis manually would have required either extensive knowledge of the victim's database architecture or a substantial investment of time by human operators.
The information extracted from the stolen data was then paired with AI-generated negotiation messages written in English. By demonstrating a detailed understanding of the compromised information, FulcrumSec strengthened its position during ransom negotiations, providing victims with evidence of the data in its possession while using those findings to justify its ransom demands.
GuidePoint also documented DragonForce's use of large language models during extortion negotiations. Researchers said the group generated convincing messages that sought to increase pressure on victims, including claims that it had legal counsel available to advise its operations. Although the report describes that assertion as almost certainly false, it illustrates how AI can help cybercriminals produce persuasive communications intended to exploit concerns around regulatory obligations, legal consequences and reputational damage.
According to the researchers, the effectiveness of these messages does not necessarily depend on their accuracy. Instead, their value lies in presenting information in a manner that appears credible enough to influence decision-making during negotiations. Large language models, which are capable of generating fluent and convincing text within seconds, are increasingly being used to support these psychological tactics.
Taken together, the findings indicate that AI is currently serving as an operational force multiplier rather than introducing an entirely new category of ransomware attacks. Tasks such as analyzing stolen data, organizing information, preparing victim communications and drafting negotiation messages can now be completed more quickly, enabling threat actors to devote more time to other stages of their operations.
At the same time, the continued concentration of attacks among a small group of highly active ransomware operations suggests that scale, organization and affiliate networks remain key drivers of today's ransomware economy. While new groups continue to enter the ecosystem, a limited number of established operators continue to account for a disproportionate share of publicly claimed attacks, reinforcing their influence across the global ransomware ecosystem.