An operational security slip by affiliates of two ransomware groups left a server exposed long enough for researchers to pull 8,257 AI-generated messages documenting how the operators ran intrusions, negotiated ransoms, and managed their victim pipeline. The logs, recovered from a directory at IP address 45.227.254.43, form one of the most detailed windows into how criminal groups are now deploying artificial intelligence to execute attacks at scale.
The research, published by SOCRadar, links the activity to affiliates of INC ransomware and The Gentlemen, a data extortion group. Analysts assess the operators are Russian-speaking and function both as an intrusion team and as an infrastructure provider, leasing out their toolkit to other ransomware partners.
The Framework Behind the Operation
At the center of the operation sits a custom platform called Phantom, described in its own documentation as an "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework." The tool ships with 18 skill modules, a routing engine, an autopilot orchestrator, and agents written in Python and Go. It connects to OpenCode, which lets the AI select attack techniques and assign tasks to remote agents. On victim machines, those agents masquerade as Windows Update components and phone home to a domain linked to the operation.
To run the AI components, operators routed prompts through OpenRouter, a commercial model aggregator, using legitimate AI models including Anthropic's claude-opus-4.6 and Moonshot AI's Kimi-K3. When models declined to help with a specific task, operators did not switch tools. They reframed the request as an "Authorized Red Team Assessment Request" and resubmitted it. That workaround appears frequently across the 133 recorded sessions.
Alongside Phantom, the group built WormGPT-MCP, a layer of 32 Model Context Protocol servers that tie the AI to purpose-built tools covering everything from reconnaissance to ransom negotiation. A partner guide found on a second server advertised "55+ tools" and access to more than 9,000 proof-of-concept exploits. The name WormGPT refers to a persona prompt layered over commercial models, not a separate AI system.
For persistence and communication, the group used Ghost C2, a family of three generations of polymorphic implants that route traffic through Cloudflare, Telegram, or DNS to avoid network-level detection.
How They Got In
The operation targeted exposed edge devices and widely used IT management software. Three vulnerabilities drove confirmed access: CVE-2024-57727, a path traversal flaw in SimpleHelp, gave the group admin passwords from 427 servers after scanning nearly 5,000; CVE-2026-35616, an authentication bypass in FortiClient EMS, allowed operators to create backdoor admin accounts across more than 4,000 managed endpoints; and CVE-2026-41940, an authentication bypass in cPanel and WHM, was used to reach small hosting providers and their clients' email servers.
Credential reuse turned single points of access into full-network compromises. In at least one documented case, a single reused password opened the door to a VPN, several servers, a remote management platform, backup infrastructure, and the organization's security management tools. To suppress endpoint detection tools, operators deployed a driver-based EDR killer that abused a vulnerable Zemana driver, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver.
The Victim Picture
Researchers identified 62 named organizations in the operational logs, with 36 located in the United States. Industrial, manufacturing, and energy firms made up the largest share of targets at roughly 16 percent. Healthcare and pharmaceuticals came in second at about 14.5 percent. Most targeted companies were smaller businesses, with 27 of 35 classifiable organizations reporting revenue below $250 million. Some were reached indirectly through a managed service provider whose admin credentials had been stolen.
Four organizations ended up listed on public leak sites. The operation's timeline runs from mid-July 2026 through a live encryption event on September 30, 2026.
Extortion by the Numbers
The playbook prioritized data theft over encryption. Operators sifted through stolen financial records to gauge what a victim could pay, then opened contact with a text-only email carrying no ransom figure. Pressure escalated through scripted vishing calls, threats to notify customers and regulators, and hard deadlines of 24 to 72 hours before publication. Payment was planned in Monero, though researchers found no wallet or confirmed transaction records.
Demand figures from recovered case files show the range of the operation. A EUR 15 million demand sent to a company called Aidon was later revised down to EUR 4 million after the operators realized they had compromised the wrong parent company. A healthcare network in Australia received demands between AUD 3 million and AUD 8 million. The Gentlemen's communications to Leo Schachter Diamonds included a four-message sequence and a vishing plan. For Trulite Glass and Aluminum, the group set up a look-alike domain, trulitesupport[.]com, to warn the company's own customers about the breach.
Total spending on the operation's infrastructure is estimated at just under $24,000.
During an international cybercrime operation coordinated across 21 countries, INTERPOL has arrested 1,462 suspects and disrupted 10,909 malicious networks. Operation Serengeti III also resulted in the recovery of more than $105 million in illicit funds.
During the crackdown, which took place between June 29 and August 31, 2026, ransomware, online scams, business email compromises, digital extortion and other cyber-enabled financial crimes were targeted. An investigation conducted by INTERPOL identified 65,929 victims connected to criminal networks. Financial investigations indicated that an amount of $385 million was lost as a result of the activity.
Law enforcement agencies from Nigeria, Uganda, Angola, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were involved in the operation along with the United States and other participating nations.
The private sector also contributed intelligence on threat intelligence and criminal infrastructure, and Group-IB, one of the participating private-sector partners, provided information about phishing kits, botnets and malicious resources that were hosted in Africa or targeted at the region. This information provided investigators with information about infrastructure supporting cyberattacks and the individuals responsible for operating them.
Fraud Networks and Illegal Crypto Mining Targeted
Authorities in Uganda detained 365 foreign nationals suspected of being connected to two transnational fraud networks, which was one of the largest arrest figures in the operation. A number of online investment schemes and pension scams targeting Asia were linked to these groups.
Investigators discovered schemes which involved call centres, fraudulent websites, and fake trading platforms, attempting to persuade victims to invest in unreal projects. Several illegal cryptocurrency mining facilities in Angola have been dismantled and nine suspects have been arrested.
Investigators have seized over 2,000 cryptocurrency mining devices and six illegal power transformation stations. Approximately $1 million was spent on electrical equipment, which underscores the substantial infrastructure and resources involved in these illegal mining operations. The investigation also included Nigeria, where authorities arrested a suspect allegedly implicated in an extensive phishing and business email compromise operation.
According to the report, the activity involved the collection of software credentials as well as approximately 2.1 million email addresses. A separate case involved the arrest of another Nigerian suspect related to international investment fraud schemes promoted using messaging applications. The investigation identified a total of more than $2.4 million in suspected criminal proceeds, of which a substantial portion was reportedly laundered by cryptocurrency exchanges.
INTERPOL Warns of Rising AI-Enabled Cybercrime in Africa
An increase in concerns over the changing cyber threat landscape across Africa has led to this operation. According to Interpol's African Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2026, artificial intelligence is increasingly being used in cybercrime as well as the number of financial losses resulting from digital crimes continues to rise.
In advance of Operation Serengeti III, investigators from 20 African countries and the United States received information regarding suspicious domains, IP addresses, and command-and-control infrastructure associated with criminal activity. In addition to identifying malicious resources, tracing connections between criminal networks, and targeting suspected perpetrators, these details also helped authorities identify suspicious individuals.
A number of private-sector companies were involved in the operation, including Group-IB, Kaspersky, Fortinet, TrendAI, Team Cymru, Uppsala Security and Meta, which provided threat intelligence, technical analysis and investigative expertise. Additionally, the initiative was supported by the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, Cybercrime Atlas and Zimbabwe’s Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
The Director of Cybercrime for INTERPOL, Neal Jetton, noted that international cooperation is imperative as criminal organizations continue to operate across international borders and use technology to target victims in greater numbers. By conducting coordinated investigations, we were able to disrupt these networks, recover criminal assets, and reduce the damage caused by cybercrime.
A number of investigations associated with the crackdown remain ongoing. Authorities continue to investigate digital evidence seized, trace suspected criminal proceeds, and identify additional individuals associated with these networks. During the previous phases of Serengeti III in September and October 2024, as well as June and August 2025, more than 2,000 arrests were made.
Further highlighting the importance of cross-border intelligence sharing and cooperation between law enforcement agencies and cybersecurity firms, the latest operation demonstrates how organized crime can be combatted through cross-border intelligence sharing and cooperation.
A compromised credential tied to a ConnectWise cloud backup application has allowed threat actors to access more than 170 Microsoft 365 environments managed by the company's partners and customers, with security researchers and Microsoft all tracking what they describe as an active supply chain attack.
The affected application, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, was formerly known as SkyKick before ConnectWise acquired it. The tool is designed for managed service providers (MSPs) and handles backup duties across Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace environments, covering mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams chats, and directory data for every tenant where it is installed. That built-in breadth of access is precisely what made the compromise so damaging.
Security firm Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants. Researchers traced the suspicious activity to a single IP address, 144.172.64.128, which obtained tokens on October 15, 2026, between 6:13 and 8:34 UTC. The movement across tenants was methodical: the actor worked through environments in sorted GUID order, hitting each one a few seconds apart, a pattern consistent with an automated script running through a pre-built target list. Before that, the same IP address was used to password-spray four law firm tenants on October 13 and 14, though no successful user sign-ins were logged during that activity.
The attack went further than reconnaissance. In at least one partner tenant, a separate ConnectWise application called Cloud Management for Teams elevated itself to the Global Administrator role. From there, the actor added client secrets to an MSP management app and to Huntress's own app, using a Python-urllib/3.12 user agent. That kind of credential insertion is a classic backdoor move, designed to maintain persistent access even after the initial intrusion is addressed.
Huntress also noted that some of the access, particularly directory reads through Microsoft Graph, does not generate an audit trail, which complicates the task of establishing the full scope of what was seen or copied.
Security company Todyl, which also investigated the activity, pointed out that the inherited consent model made the damage difficult to contain quickly. Because the Cloud Backup application had been granted permission by tenant administrators, it could read and write to mail via Exchange Web Services, access OneDrive and SharePoint files, and reach Teams chats, including restoration capabilities. Revoking user sessions had no effect on the attack, since the access did not depend on user sign-ins. Disabling the application entirely stops new tokens from being issued, but tokens already in circulation remain valid for up to 90 minutes.
Microsoft confirmed it is tracking the campaign as an active supply chain attack, identifying it by the Cloud Backup application's OAuth App ID (506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). The company said the actor likely abused Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions granted by customers, and observed follow-on activity including Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add credentials to service principals as a persistence mechanism.
ConnectWise responded by shutting off Cloud Backup application access entirely and stated it found no evidence that partner backup data stored within the platform was copied or exfiltrated.
For organizations trying to determine whether they were affected, the key step is checking service principal sign-in logs in the Entra Admin Center, filtered by the Cloud Backup App ID. The default User sign-ins tab will not show this activity. Administrators should flag any sign-ins originating from IP addresses outside expected Microsoft or Azure ranges, since the application's normal outbound traffic uses Azure private IPv6. A full audit of any credentials added to applications since October 13 is also recommended, along with a review of Entra audit logs for any ConnectWise or SkyKick apps that added themselves to directory roles.
The ConnectWise incident surfaced alongside a separate supply chain campaign reported by Google Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group, and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab. That operation, attributed to a previously undocumented threat cluster called UNC7017, repeatedly tampered with update servers belonging to backup software maker AOMEI. Between April and July 2026, attackers redirected downloads to malicious ZIP packages during short five-to-ten-minute windows. The payloads included a downloader called CROSSROAD and a modular backdoor named SHINYROAD, deployed through DLL sideloading. The campaign hit organizations in IT services, telecommunications, and higher education across roughly 11 countries, including the United States, Brazil, India, and Spain.
Together, the two incidents reinforce a pattern security researchers have flagged for years: backup tools and management platforms carry privileged access across dozens or hundreds of environments simultaneously, making them attractive targets for attackers looking to move laterally at scale without touching endpoint defenses.
According to a complaint filed by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Digital Forensics Corporation (DFC), its owner Dmitry Belkin, and associated businesses allegedly misled victims who were already experiencing fear, emotional distress, and threats of having private images exposed.
According to the FTC complaint, DFC collected at least $60 million between February 2023 and July 2026. The company allegedly charged customers between $1,499 and $20,000 for services advertised as helping identify blackmailers, stop threats, and support investigations.
The complaint claims that the company misrepresented its investigative capabilities and the results it could achieve. Among the allegations is that DFC used fabricated investigative chat transcripts to make customers believe its investigators were actively communicating with suspected criminals.
The FTC also alleges that the company reused location information to create the impression that it had successfully tracked down perpetrators. Such tactic could lead customers to believe that meaningful investigative work was being conducted when the evidence presented to them did not support those claims.
Besides this, the complaint argues that customers were pressured into purchasing extra services. The company reportedly used positive reviews that were not genuine to strengthen its reputation and made obtaining refunds difficult for dissatisfied customers.
“Instead of communicating with the sextortionist through the victim's account, defendants routinely change the victim's account settings simply to block the sextortionist's communications. Instead of obtaining investigative information, defendants fabricate chat transcripts,” the complaint said.
According to the complaint, “Defendants falsely portray themselves as digital forensics experts, claiming they can track and identify sextortionists, prevent the spread of explicit material and coordinate with law enforcement to bring criminals to justice."
The FTC filed a lawsuit against DFC, Belkin, and several affiliated companies, accusing violations of consumer protection laws. A federal court temporarily halted the company's operations while the legal case proceeds. The agency is seeking action against the alleged deceptive practices.
The FTC also reported that the company advertised its services through search engines, video-sharing websites, and social media platforms, potentially reaching people actively searching for urgent help.
A Ukrainian-Russian dual national who spent years overseeing one of the most operationally sophisticated money laundering rings in recent cybercrime history pleaded guilty last Thursday in a federal court in North Carolina, admitting to routing stolen funds through tens of thousands of ordinary Americans before shipping the cash to criminal operatives in Eastern Europe.
Oleg Korniev, 42, was a principal at Your Mule Cashout, or YMCO, a criminal outfit that ran from September 2007 through 2014 and maintained a network of more than 15,000 money mules across the United States. The plea came roughly a decade after a grand jury first indicted him, and about 10 months after U.S. authorities caught up with him and arrested him in North Carolina in December 2025.
Not a side player
Federal prosecutors did not describe Korniev as a peripheral figure. He managed YMCO's daily operations, hired and fired staff, and handed out rewards or penalties depending on performance. He also helped design the procedural framework that kept the organization functioning across multiple countries simultaneously.
YMCO's approach was simple in concept but deliberately layered in practice. The group posed as legitimate staffing or payment-processing companies and sent spam emails to Americans advertising open positions. What followed was a carefully staged recruitment process built to look real: job applicants went through an employment test, reviewed a contract, and were walked through what appeared to be standard company policy. They were then asked to upload their bank details to a fictitious company website and told their job was to receive payments into their personal accounts and wire the money to company accounts overseas.
The money they were receiving was stolen. Hackers had broken into U.S. bank accounts using malware, funneling the proceeds into the mules' accounts and relying on those individuals to move the funds out of the country before anything flagged.
How the cash moved
From the mules' accounts, the money traveled through Western Union and MoneyGram to what YMCO called "cash-out contractors" in Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Latvia. These operators received a cut of each transfer for their role and passed the remainder back to the organization. Running stolen money through a human relay network like this put distance between the hackers and the funds, making the trail harder to reconstruct.
According to court documents, YMCO processed more than $10 million drained from over 750 U.S. bank accounts across more than 35 financial institutions. The group also ran parallel schemes in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Korniev's plea agreement put total actual and intended losses to confirmed victims at more than $14.7 million. He personally admitted to laundering at least $7 million of the $9.7 million he received from cybercriminals as payment for YMCO's services.
A decade-long chase
Korniev was originally indicted alongside Serghei Ivanovich Tomuz, a Moldovan national who allegedly ran YMCO's cash-out operation inside his home country. Tomuz was reportedly detained at a Romanian border crossing in May 2022 and spent years fighting extradition to the United States. His case was ultimately terminated in U.S. federal court this past May.
Four other Ukrainians tied to YMCO were arrested abroad years earlier, extradited to the Western District of North Carolina, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Sentenced in 2018, they received prison terms ranging from 37 to 63 months and were each ordered to pay more than $9.1 million in restitution to American victims.
Korniev now faces a minimum sentence of two years and a maximum of 50 years after pleading guilty to money laundering, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, and conspiracy to commit access device theft. His plea agreement includes a commitment to fully repay confirmed victims for their documented losses.
What prosecutors want criminals to understand
Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva made the department's position on mule networks clear. "Money mules play crucial roles in cybercrime, so the Justice Department pursues mules and their recruiters wherever they operate and however long it takes," Duva said.
The case puts into focus how money mule operations function as the financial plumbing beneath large-scale cybercrime. Without them, proceeds from bank fraud and account takeovers would be far harder to extract without triggering detection.
That infrastructure is a recurring target for law enforcement. Five years ago, Europol announced that authorities from 27 countries had arrested 1,803 money mules out of 18,351 identified as part of a coordinated crackdown called the European Money Mule Action, or EMMA. Europol has consistently flagged that criminal groups recruit mules from vulnerable populations, specifically students, immigrants, and people facing economic pressure, using job ads on social media and employment sites that look entirely legitimate.
Many mules sign up without understanding what they are walking into. Others are coerced. In either scenario, courts have made clear that receiving and wiring stolen money is not a protected form of ignorance.
The former infrastructure engineer was sentenced to 32 months in federal prison for sabotage of his employer's computer network and for demanding a ransom of $750,000 in Bitcoin from his employer.
According to the US Department of Justice (DOJ), Daniel Rhyne, 59, was convicted of extortion involving threats to damage protected computers and intentional damage to protected computers. Rhyne was previously employed as a core infrastructure engineer with a Somerset County, New Jersey industrial company.
Providing services across various sectors, the company specializes in manufacturing, healthcare, biopharmaceuticals, electronics, energy and industrial processing. Rhyne is alleged to have prepared a coordinated disruption in November 2023 by using his privileged access and knowledge of the company's network.
An alternative to conventional ransomware was used in this attack, which involved scheduled tasks that removed administrator accounts and changed passwords across the entire organization's systems and could have prevented employees from accessing critical information.
Attack Disrupted Administrative Access
A court document indicates that Rhyne set up scheduled tasks on the domain controller to delete 13 domain administrator accounts and change the passwords of 301 domain users. Two additional tasks were also performed on November 25, 2023, to target two local administrator accounts related to 254 servers and two others affecting 3,284 workstations.
Among the changes was a security threat that threatened the availability of a large number of devices across the network, as well as the locking of administrators and other employees out of company systems and data. Select employees received an email extortion request from an external address with the subject line "Your Network has been breached" approximately one hour after scheduled tasks had been executed.
According to the message, administrator accounts were revoked, backups were removed, and administrator accounts had been deleted or locked out. Rhyne also threatened to shut down 40 servers randomly each day for ten days if the company did not meet its ransom demand. In this email, Rhyne demanded 20 Bitcoin, which was approximately $750,000 at the time. This incident demonstrated that access to administrative systems can be abused to disrupt an organization without the use of traditional file-encrypting malicious code.
Due to the attacks targeting accounts, passwords, and server access, the company was unable to manage its own IT environment and maintain normal business operations as a result of the attacks.
Investigation Leads to Arrest and Prison Sentence
In response to the discovery of suspicious network activity, the company launched an internal forensic investigation. Investigators analyzed system logs and compared them with physical access records in order to determine the source of the changes. As a result of the FBI investigation, the activity was traced to the residential IP address of Rhyne in Warren County, New Jersey, which was associated with Rhyne.
A criminal complaint was filed on August 8, 2024 by FBI Special Agent Timothy Lee in response to the findings. Rhyne was arrested on August 27, 2024, in Kansas City, Missouri, following his relocation to the area. He pleaded guilty to the charges on April 1, 2026, in federal court in Trenton, New Jersey, before US District Judge Michael A.
On September 28, 2026, Shipp delivered the 32-month prison sentence. An employee with extensive administrative privileges poses substantial security risks. While outsider attacks tend to exploit software vulnerabilities or steal credentials from external users, insider attacks are capable of exploiting legitimate access to disrupt a wide range of systems.
Security teams may struggle to regain control of critical systems when mass password changes and administrator account deletions occur. By restricting access to privileged accounts, monitoring unusual account activity, and maintaining backups that are protected from production network access, similar incidents may be reduced.
It is also crucial to review and revoke access as soon as your employment responsibilities change to minimize the risk of deliberate misuse. This case illustrates the risks associated with insider threats and improper use of privilege. A strong access control system, continuous monitoring, as well as secure backups are essential to safeguarding critical business systems from intentional attacks.
A California federal judge has once again dismissed a lawsuit brought by journalists from Salvadoran investigative outlet El Faro against NSO Group, the Israeli company behind the Pegasus spyware allegedly used to surveil their phones for nearly two years. The ruling, issued Wednesday, marks the second time the case has been thrown out on jurisdictional grounds, though the journalists' legal team at the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University has said it intends to appeal.
The case, Dada v. NSO Group, was the first lawsuit against NSO filed in any U.S. court when the Knight Institute took it on in November 2022 on behalf of 18 current and former El Faro journalists and staff. Between June 2020 and November 2021, Pegasus spyware was deployed against the outlet's employees at least 226 times, according to the Institute. Digital forensic analysis eventually confirmed that 22 members of El Faro's staff had their phones infected. The attacks were not random. Surveillance peaked during significant political moments and in the run-up to major investigations, including reporting on the Bukele administration's secret negotiations with criminal gangs, the theft of pandemic food relief, back-channel Bitcoin dealings, and the financial holdings of government officials.
The lead plaintiff, Carlos Dada, is the co-founder and director of El Faro, one of Central America's most prominent independent news organizations. El Faro was founded in El Salvador in 1998 and has built a reputation for independent investigative reporting. The outlet has paid a steep price for that journalism. Beyond the spyware attacks, El Faro says it has faced physical surveillance, advertiser harassment, and public defamation from government officials and ruling-party legislators. In 2023, the newsroom relocated its administrative and legal operations out of El Salvador entirely.
The core question before the court was whether Northern California was the right place to try this dispute. Dada and the plaintiffs argued it was, pointing to compromised U.S.-based infrastructure that was used as part of the attack chain. The judge was not persuaded. The court noted that there was no allegation Apple's California servers were actually exploited in delivering the Pegasus infections, even where the plaintiffs alleged the attacks moved through Apple's iMessage or iCloud systems. The same argument had failed once before: in March 2024, a California federal judge threw out the same lawsuit, saying the case was "entirely foreign" and that the journalists had no standing to sue in the U.S.
That first dismissal did not hold. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the March 2024 ruling in July 2025 and sent the case back to the Northern District of California, finding that the lower court erred in its analysis. The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the district judge failed to properly account for allegations that NSO created Apple ID accounts and engaged with California-based servers as part of the attack infrastructure. One factor that also came into play was a recent acquisition of NSO Group by a group of American investors, which El Faro's lawyers cited as further reason for trying the case on U.S. soil. After the Ninth Circuit's reversal, Dada called the outcome "good news." That window has now closed again.
The journalists had wanted specific remedies from the court. They asked the court to require NSO Group to identify, return, and delete all information obtained through the attacks, to prohibit the company from deploying Pegasus against them again, and to name the government client that commissioned the surveillance. That last demand was perhaps the most politically charged. NSO has never publicly identified its clients. The company maintains it sells Pegasus exclusively to government agencies for use against criminals and terrorists, subject to Israeli government authorization. El Salvador's government has repeatedly denied being an NSO client or playing any role in the surveillance.
With Apple having dropped its own case against NSO in September 2024, and WhatsApp having won a $167 million judgment against the company earlier in 2025, the El Faro lawsuit had become the last active case against NSO Group in U.S. courts. That distinction is now moot, at least temporarily.
The Knight First Amendment Institute plans to appeal. El Faro's director Carlos Dada said when the original lawsuit was filed that the outlet turned to the U.S. court system because justice in El Salvador was not possible. With the case now dismissed a second time and the appeal road still open, that search for accountability continues.
NSO Group did not respond to a request for comment.
Crypto exchange Bitget confirmed on September 25 that hackers stole approximately $387.5 million from its hot and warm wallets a day earlier, revising an initial estimate upward as investigators traced funds across multiple blockchains and accounting for assets on Zcash and TRON that were missed in the first tally. The exchange has since launched a structured bounty program for anyone who helps freeze or recover stolen funds, and has brought in independent cybersecurity firms Mandiant and SlowMist to assist with the investigation.
Bitget's security systems first flagged the unauthorized transfers at 18:31 UTC on September 24. By the time the exchange confirmed the breach publicly, the damage figure had already reached $351.6 million. The revised total of $387.5 million reflects a more complete accounting of transfers that occurred during the incident, adding affected assets on Zcash and TRON not captured in the initial estimate. The exchange confirmed no further unauthorized transfers occurred after the incident was contained.
How the Attack Worked
Bitget CEO Gracy Chen clarified that attackers did not steal private keys or forge user withdrawal requests. Instead, they broke into a backend system inside Bitget's wallet infrastructure and used it to spoof transaction data, tricking the exchange's own authorization process into approving payouts that looked routine.
The mechanics were methodical. The attacker's first transfer was a small 0.84 ETH test payment to a fresh address, after which Bitget's main Ethereum hot wallet made roughly 380 transactions during the attack. Every time the hot wallets refilled from the warm wallet layer, the attacker drained them again. The warm wallet, which normally only pays the exchange's own hot wallets, sent 13,966 ETH worth approximately $37 million to an address less than an hour old, with no approved list check and no secondary authorization on a wallet holding over $40 million.
The single largest piece of the haul was roughly 103 million XRP, valued at approximately $157 million at the time of the theft. About $75 million of the stolen funds were held in stablecoins including USDT and USDC.
Some of that ETH moved quickly into mixers: on-chain analysis shows around 6,300 ETH, close to $19 million, funneled through Tornado Cash within hours of the breach.
The confirmed affected assets span XRP, ETH, USDT, ZEC, USDC, USDT0, XAUt, BNB, AVAX and TRX, spread across Ethereum and several EVM-compatible networks, the XRP Ledger, Zcash, and TRON.
User Funds and the Protection Fund
Bitget operates a three-tier wallet architecture, and the breach touched only portions of the hot and warm wallet layers. Cold wallets remained fully secure throughout the attack. Bitget's User Protection Fund, which holds more than $464 million, will cover the full loss, meaning customer account balances stay intact even though the funds themselves were taken. The protection fund was set aside in 2023 specifically to cover hacks and theft so users would not absorb the impact.
North Korea in the Frame
During a three-hour livestream on X, CEO Gracy Chen said Bitget suspects North Korean attackers exploited the backend authentication system, making fraudulent withdrawals appear legitimate. Chen added that she has personally been targeted by the same group before, losing about $80,000 from a personal wallet unconnected to Bitget. North Korea's Lazarus Group, also tracked under the codename TraderTraitor, has been blamed for the industry's biggest thefts, including Bybit's $1.4 billion hack in February 2025, which the FBI confirmed weeks later was North Korean work.
The Recovery Bounty
Bitget has launched a Recovery Bounty Program covering eligible voluntary actions that have already resulted in affected funds being frozen, as well as future actions that directly contribute to freezing or recovering funds. The structure is straightforward: 5% of successfully frozen funds goes to the eligible person or entity whose efforts directly caused the freeze, and 5% of successfully recovered funds is available on the same terms. Bitget will also use Bybit's LazarusBounty initiative as a core channel for the effort.
To support the hunt, Bitget published a real-time fund tracing dashboard at trace.bgblockchain.xyz, an API tracking attacker-controlled addresses updated continuously, and a submission portal for anyone with freezing or recovery information. Exchanges, stablecoin issuers, bridges, custodians, and other infrastructure providers have been encouraged to monitor the flagged addresses and report relevant information through the recovery portal.
The attack is the largest cryptocurrency breach of the year to date and lands in an already turbulent stretch for the industry. Earlier in September, Liquid Network suffered a $319 million security breach, and in late July, hardware wallet maker Coldcard was hit in a separate incident that drained around $116 million in Bitcoin.
Bitget said it will publish a full incident report including root-cause analysis once technical teams complete remediation. Withdrawal restoration was expected to be announced by September 26, 4:00 AM UTC.
The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) launched and alert to the financial industry besides a detailed study of over 33,000 cyber fraud cases reported between September 2023 and December 2025. According to the report, around $12.7 billion was stolen in a cryptocurrency investment scam from American victims in the US.
As per Treasury Department official Gene Lange, “The transnational criminal organizations behind these scams exploit both emerging technologies and human vulnerabilities, resulting in devastating financial losses for innocent American victims.”
The report is prepared on the basis of reports given by around 1,300 financial organizations and is linked to a 2023 alert from the Treasury about pig butchering scams. FinCen discovered that the rate of scam operations is rising as the schemes go beyond centers in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.
Scammers use distinct profiles, from financial adviser to romantic partner, and force people into sending money, either via cryptocurrency or with traditional bank transfers.
Significant reports were received from cryptocurrency firms, which found around $5.5 billion in suspicious scam activity.
Traditional banks reported around $6.4 billion in possible friends, saying they “often detected schemes when a victim sent funds to an [financial institution] in the digital asset sector to purchase digital assets, or when a customer sent a wire transfer to a scam-affiliated beneficiary, frequently referencing digital asset investments.”
The report finds that few victims sent applications for second mortgages and loans as part of their involvement in a scam.
More financial institutions note thousands of incidents where targets liquidated their investment accounts to try wiring transfers or fund digital assess to scammer-related accounts. According to the report, “[A financial institution] involved in the digital assets sector reported an older adult victim transferred nearly $640,000 from her retirement fund to send to a suspected scammer in connection with an apparent digital asset investment scheme.”
“The victim stated she met an individual over social media who instructed her to invest in an apparently fictitious digital asset-related company.”
Another victim took out around $150,000 from his retirement account, withdrew credit on his home, and withdrew a personal loan to send the money to a scammer who pretended to be his digital romantic partner, and wanted to invest the money in a venture.
The filings noted the use of coins like USD Coin (USDC), Ethereum, and Tether (USDT), but 18 more coins were found in the reports.