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US Disrupts North Korean Crypto-Theft Campaign

 

The United States has disrupted FaceStealer, a North Korean cyber campaign that allegedly stole more than $400 million in cryptocurrency through deepfakes, hijacked messaging accounts, and fake technical “fixes.” The operation targeted crypto and Web3 professionals as well as open-source developers, showing how social engineering can be as damaging as a conventional software exploit. 

According to the FBI, attackers hijacked accounts on Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, and Discord and used them to invite victims to video meetings. During those calls, they displayed recordings of people the targets knew—including people who had already been compromised—to create a convincing sense of trust and urgency. While a victim waited for a meeting to begin, the hackers secretly recorded webcam footage. Those recordings could then be reused in later meetings, sometimes alongside footage of multiple familiar people, making the deception increasingly difficult for the next target to recognize. 

After building trust, the attacker claimed that a technical problem had occurred and displayed a fake error message. The victim was then directed to a link offering a supposed update, installer, or repair—effectively a ClickFix-style lure designed to make running malicious code seem routine. The malware stole cryptocurrency-related data and credentials for video-meeting services such as Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams. 

It also exposed victims’ contact lists, social media accounts, communication applications, and webcam videos, giving attackers material to expand the campaign. Researchers attributed FaceStealer to the North Korean-linked BlueNoroff group. The campaign reportedly identified 677 targets across 58 countries, with a strong focus on founders and senior executives in the cryptocurrency and Web3 sectors. 

The attackers sometimes waited months, or even more than a year, before exploiting an initial compromise—likely allowing victims’ cryptocurrency holdings to grow. The FBI also highlighted attempted attacks against maintainers of widely used npm and Rust packages, underscoring the risk to the broader open-source supply chain. 

The U.S. government seized the cloud infrastructure supporting the campaign after it had operated for 18 months. Authorities also identified more than 900 secretly recorded webcam videos of technology workers, illustrating the scale of surveillance and social manipulation involved. In a related action, the U.S. Department of Justice said it froze more than $2.7 billion connected to a $6.4 billion Binance crypto heist, with court authorization to seize or restrain more than $1.2 billion of that amount. These actions show that disruption can involve both infrastructure takedowns and financial countermeasures. 

Users should join meetings only through official applications and invitation codes, independently verify unexpected meeting invitations, and keep webcams off unless they are genuinely needed. Most importantly, they should never run scripts, updates, or “fixes” prompted by an unexpected technical error during a call. FaceStealer demonstrates that cybercriminals no longer need to break through technical defenses first; they can exploit human trust, familiar faces, and urgency. For crypto holders, executives, and developers, verification before action is now a core security control.

MEXC Faces US Restrictions Over Alleged Sanctions Evasion and Cybercrime


US Treasury officials have blocked MEXC Global from the American financial system due to its alleged involvement in sanctions evasion, cybercrime-related payments, and other illicit financial activities. According to findings by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), between May 2021 and May 2026, the Seychelles-based exchange facilitates an estimated $16 billion in suspicious transactions. 

Based on Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, which was issued on November 6, 2026, MEXC was designated as a primary money laundering concern. In the event the order goes into effect, US financial institutions will be prohibited from processing fund transfers, including cryptocurrency transactions, to and from MEXC. Additionally, MEXC's subsidiaries and overseas operations will be restricted. 

A large part of the Treasury Department's Operation Economic Outcast initiative aims to disrupt financial channels used by Iran to circumvent international sanctions, and the actions form part of that initiative. 

While the MEXC order is based on allegations of the exchange's connection to Russian illicit finance, it is also based on FinCEN's finding that the platform processed approximately $1.5 billion in transactions related to Russian sanctions evasion over the past five years. This activity was reported to involve dealings with a sanctioned cryptocurrency exchange Garantex and its successor, Grinex, with transactions continuing until June 2026. 

Moreover, the agency identified approximately $200 million linked to the stablecoin A7A5, which has been associated with Russian sanctions evasion activities. In addition, substantial financial links were discovered involving Iranian entities as part of the investigation. MEXC reported processing over $1 billion in direct transactions with more than 40 Iranian cryptocurrency exchanges, according to FinCEN. Further transactions reportedly included payments related to sanctioned actors, as well as those involving the Iranian central bank and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Along with to sanctions-related activity, Treasury accused the exchange of processing funds related to ransomware operations, scams online, and darknet marketplaces. As a result of these findings, FinCEN has expressed concerns about the platform's anti-money laundering (AML) procedures and controls on customer identification. 

According to FinCEN, the alleged activity was caused by severe weaknesses in MEXC's compliance systems, which made it possible to conduct transactions involving high-risk entities. It was established in 2018 and operates in over 170 countries, providing access to thousands of cryptocurrencies and tokenized assets. 

As a result of its scale and involvement in illegal financial flows, the enforcement action has been regarded as an important step forward in the US government's efforts to combat cryptocurrency-based sanctions evasion. 

MEXC Says It Is Cooperating With US Regulators

Upon submitting a response to the enforcement action, MEXC confirmed that discussions have begun with US authorities in response to the allegations. On November 10, CEO Vugar Usi announced that the exchange had established a communication channel with FinCEN with the assistance of an international law firm.

According to reports, the regulator acknowledged receipt of MEXC's written request, while MEXC expressed its willingness to cooperate in the ongoing regulatory process. The exchange's services remain operational, and deposits, withdrawals, and cryptocurrency trading have not been disrupted, according to Usi. According to reports, the company has prepared a follow-up plan and intends to provide further updates in the event significant developments arise. 

MEXC had earlier indicated that its legal and compliance teams had begun an independent assessment of its anti-money laundering and sanctions controls, following the November 6 order. According to the exchange, user assets remain secure and the exchange intends to cooperate with FinCEN and other appropriate regulatory authorities as part of its ongoing efforts. 

In order to prevent US financial institutions from processing transfer involving the exchange, this enforcement action does not shut down MEXC's global operations or freeze customer accounts immediately. MEXC is expected to face wider difficulties beyond its direct US financial connections following the publication of the order in the Federal Register. The order is scheduled to take effect 30 days after publication. 

The Blockchain Investigator ZachXBT reported on November 10 that several other offshore centralized exchanges that are either limited or do not have a US presence have started prohibiting MEXC users from transferring assets. However, it was not revealed which exchanges and what the specific scope of these restrictions would be, however it has been suggested that the enforcement action could affect transaction routes outside of the US financial system. 

In addition, this case highlights the increased scrutiny of offshore cryptocurrency platforms that process transactions involving sanctioned entities and cybercriminals. A number of factors may contribute to digital asset exchanges becoming channels for illegal funds to flow across borders, including weak customer verification, inadequate transaction monitoring and limited screening of high-risk counterparties. 

The immediate challenge for MEXC is to address FinCEN compliance concerns while maintaining access to international financial services. It is anticipated that the platform will be able to address the allegations and limit further restrictions based on its engagement with US regulators and independent review of its compliance framework. 

Taking such action marks a significant step forward in efforts of the US government to restrict illicit financial networks operating through cryptocurrency exchange platforms. The extent to which MEXC cooperates with FinCEN and its ability to address the alleged compliance violations will determine the exchange's future access to the US financial market.

Bank Phishing Sites Fake Suspensions to Evade Takedowns

 

Cybercriminals operating a large-scale bank-phishing campaign have adopted a sophisticated method to evade takedown efforts: presenting malicious websites as inactive to security teams while continuing to target new victims. According to cybersecurity firm Kela, the campaign’s phishing infrastructure records each visitor’s IP address. First-time visitors are directed to convincing counterfeit bank login pages, whereas returning visitors from the same IP address are shown a fabricated “account suspended” notice. This technique creates the impression that the domain has already been shut down, allowing the operation to remain active while undermining verification processes. 

The campaign has been active since May and employs more than 300 fraudulent domains. Of these, 248 impersonate 189 financial institutions in the United States, with most domains registered between July and September 2026. As of October 25, 183 of the targeted organizations still had live look-alike websites. The operation primarily focuses on mid-sized regional banks and appears designed to obtain business-banking and treasury credentials rather than personal account credentials. Kela also identified 49 newly registered domains during the final week of October, indicating that the network remains active and expanding. 

The fraudulent domains follow recognizable naming conventions intended to increase their apparent legitimacy. Many incorporate terms such as “secure,” “disable,” “protect,” “cancel,” “authorize,” “terminate,” “credentials,” or “commercial,” followed by the name of the targeted bank. A smaller but growing group uses domains resembling help desks, live-support portals, treasury portals, and “primary device” pages. Examples include look-alike domains associated with JPMorgan, Citi, BMO, and Santander. These naming patterns are designed to make the links appear urgent, official, and relevant to customers concerned about account security or payment issues. 

When a first-time visitor accesses one of these pages, the site displays the targeted bank’s branding and requests a user ID and password. Some pages also include a reCAPTCHA to reinforce the appearance of legitimacy. The browser tab is titled “Attention required,” imitating Cloudflare’s challenge page, while embedded scripts attempt to prevent users from accessing browser developer tools. Upon a subsequent visit from the same IP address, however, the page displays a fake hosting-provider suspension notice. This cloaking technique is specifically intended to disrupt the standard security workflow, in which analysts verify a reported site and then recheck it to confirm that it has been removed. 

The infrastructure is difficult to dismantle because it incorporates several defensive measures: easily repeatable domain-naming conventions, Cloudflare services that obscure the actual hosting location, IP-based cloaking, and shared servers capable of hosting new phishing domains after individual sites are removed. Kela also identified alternative evasion methods, including blank pages, blocking notices, and redirects to Google, which prevent public scanning services from fully documenting the campaign. Although the firm has not determined how victims are initially directed to the phishing pages, it found that the operation also targets victims in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Users are advised to avoid links in unsolicited communications and to access banking services directly through official applications or saved bookmarks.

Russia Takes Down VasyGrek Cybercrime Network After Years of Phishing Attacks


Russian authorities have arrested three suspected members of the cybercrime group VasyGrek, also known as Fluffy Wolf, and dismantled the infrastructure used to carry out its operations. The arrests follow an investigation conducted with assistance from cybersecurity firm Kaspersky.

About VasyGrek

According to Russia's Interior Ministry, the group has been active since at least 2016 and primarily targeted Russian companies through phishing campaigns. The attackers used fraudulent emails to steal login credentials, gain access to corporate networks and deploy malicious software on victims' systems.

Attack tactic

The group operated an extensive network of phishing websites designed to impersonate financial institutions and accounting services. It also relied on servers hosted in foreign countries and purchased remote administration tools through dark web marketplaces. These tools allowed attackers to secretly access compromised computers and control them remotely.

One incident involved a company employee who received a phishing email in September 2025. The message appeared to come from a business partner and contained a malicious attachment disguised as a routine financial document. After the employee opened the attachment, the attackers allegedly gained remote access to the computer and the company's online banking system.

The cybercriminals transferred more than 660,000 rubles, approximately $8,000, from the company's bank account to accounts under their control, according to the Interior Ministry.

Phishing campaign goes beyond Russia

The investigation also revealed that the group's activities had expanded beyond Russia. In research published in November 2026, Kaspersky reported detecting more than 100 attempted attacks attributed to VasyGrek between January and September this year. The attacks targeted organisations in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

According to Kaspersky, the group primarily focused on metallurgical companies, wholesale suppliers of raw materials and industrial products, and government organisations. Other targeted sectors included healthcare, oil and gas, energy, finance and agriculture.

Kasppersky described VasyGrek as a financially motivated cybercrime operation that relied heavily on targeted phishing emails and malware capable of providing remote access to compromised systems.

About the investigation

After the investigation, Russian police searched the suspects' homes and offices, seizing computers, communication devices and other materials believed to be connected to the group's activities.

The alleged leader of the group has been placed under house arrest, while two other suspects have been released under travel restrictions, according to Interior Ministry spokesperson Irina Volk.

The Russian Interior Ministry said the group's infrastructure had been dismantled. However, it remains unclear whether the arrests will completely stop its operations or prevent other members from continuing similar attacks.

Europol Dismantles Global Investment Scam, Seizes 100+ Servers

 

A major international operation has disrupted an investment-fraud network that may have targeted victims in at least 50 countries. Coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, the action led to the seizure of more than 100 servers and the arrest of seven suspects. The investigation was led by Germany’s Itzehoe Public Prosecutor’s Office and involved authorities from Albania, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Israel, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Investigators estimate that victims lost more than EUR 4 million through fake online trading platforms. 

The scam followed a familiar but highly effective pattern. Fraudsters used misleading advertisements promising fast and substantial returns from cryptocurrency, foreign exchange, and stock trading. Victims were directed to websites that appeared to be legitimate investment platforms, where they were encouraged to make an initial deposit. Once money was transferred, the platform displayed fictitious profits to build trust and persuade victims to invest larger amounts. 

The deception became clear when victims attempted to withdraw their funds. Instead of receiving their money, they faced delays, excuses, and eventually a complete loss of contact from the supposed brokers. The scheme reportedly relied on a “crime-as-a-service” model: a company allegedly based in Cyprus and Israel supplied fraudulent trading websites to criminal groups, which then operated call centres to pressure victims into handing over their savings. 

The latest operation followed more than four years of investigation. It began in 2022 after a German couple reported that they could not withdraw money they had invested through an online trading platform. Early action that year resulted in two arrests and the seizure of evidence, while further interventions in 2025 helped investigators identify the infrastructure provider and suspected call-centre operators in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. 

During the coordinated action, police searched 17 locations, including a call centre in Kosovo, and seized servers, digital evidence, assets, and other materials. Seven suspects were arrested and are expected to face surrender or extradition proceedings to Germany. The case demonstrates how online investment fraud can operate across borders, combining fake websites, stolen personal data, and call-centre pressure tactics. Authorities’ message is clear: guaranteed high returns, urgent deposit requests, and difficulty withdrawing funds are major warning signs of investment fraud.

Dutch Police Arrest Two Over $400,000 NFC Relay Bank Fraud

 

Dutch police have arrested two men suspected of operating a sophisticated bank-fraud scheme that used NFC relay attacks to steal more than €380,000, approximately $425,600, from 170 victims. The suspects allegedly combined AI-generated robocalls, fake bank employees, and malicious mobile applications to trick people into exposing their contactless debit-card data. The arrests highlight how criminals are adapting near-field communication technology, which is designed for convenient tap-to-pay transactions, into a tool for remote account theft. 

According to Dutch authorities, the scam began with automated calls that used AI-generated audio to impersonate banks, companies, or other trusted organizations. Victims were told that suspicious activity had been detected on their accounts and were asked to press “1” if they were not responsible. Once the victim responded, the call was transferred to a suspect posing as a bank employee, who claimed that the person’s debit card had been blocked and needed verification. 

The fraudsters then instructed victims to download an application and hold their debit card against their phone. Rather than simply verifying the card, the app extracted data from the card’s NFC chip, which supports contactless payments. That information was relayed in real time to an accomplice waiting at an ATM, who used it to withdraw money from the victim’s bank account. This technique is known as an NFC relay attack because it effectively extends the card’s contactless signal across a distance. 

Police arrested a 23-year-old man from Vaassen and a 25-year-old man from Ede on October 6. Investigators believe the younger suspect likely built the technical infrastructure behind the operation and orchestrated the attacks, while the second suspect played a coordinating role. Authorities also took the criminals’ servers offline and seized them, along with phones and laptops believed to be connected to the scheme. Both men remain in custody while the investigation continues. 

The case is a warning that a phone call claiming to be from a bank should never be treated as proof of identity. Genuine banks generally do not ask customers to install unknown apps, scan their cards against a phone, or share one-time codes. Consumers can reduce their risk by hanging up and calling their bank using the number on the official website or card, avoiding app downloads from unsolicited calls, and treating any request to tap a payment card on a phone as a major red flag.

Ransomware Affiliates Built an AI-Powered Attack Platform That Logged Its Own Crimes

 



An operational security slip by affiliates of two ransomware groups left a server exposed long enough for researchers to pull 8,257 AI-generated messages documenting how the operators ran intrusions, negotiated ransoms, and managed their victim pipeline. The logs, recovered from a directory at IP address 45.227.254.43, form one of the most detailed windows into how criminal groups are now deploying artificial intelligence to execute attacks at scale.

The research, published by SOCRadar, links the activity to affiliates of INC ransomware and The Gentlemen, a data extortion group. Analysts assess the operators are Russian-speaking and function both as an intrusion team and as an infrastructure provider, leasing out their toolkit to other ransomware partners.


The Framework Behind the Operation

At the center of the operation sits a custom platform called Phantom, described in its own documentation as an "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework." The tool ships with 18 skill modules, a routing engine, an autopilot orchestrator, and agents written in Python and Go. It connects to OpenCode, which lets the AI select attack techniques and assign tasks to remote agents. On victim machines, those agents masquerade as Windows Update components and phone home to a domain linked to the operation.

To run the AI components, operators routed prompts through OpenRouter, a commercial model aggregator, using legitimate AI models including Anthropic's claude-opus-4.6 and Moonshot AI's Kimi-K3. When models declined to help with a specific task, operators did not switch tools. They reframed the request as an "Authorized Red Team Assessment Request" and resubmitted it. That workaround appears frequently across the 133 recorded sessions.

Alongside Phantom, the group built WormGPT-MCP, a layer of 32 Model Context Protocol servers that tie the AI to purpose-built tools covering everything from reconnaissance to ransom negotiation. A partner guide found on a second server advertised "55+ tools" and access to more than 9,000 proof-of-concept exploits. The name WormGPT refers to a persona prompt layered over commercial models, not a separate AI system.

For persistence and communication, the group used Ghost C2, a family of three generations of polymorphic implants that route traffic through Cloudflare, Telegram, or DNS to avoid network-level detection.


How They Got In

The operation targeted exposed edge devices and widely used IT management software. Three vulnerabilities drove confirmed access: CVE-2024-57727, a path traversal flaw in SimpleHelp, gave the group admin passwords from 427 servers after scanning nearly 5,000; CVE-2026-35616, an authentication bypass in FortiClient EMS, allowed operators to create backdoor admin accounts across more than 4,000 managed endpoints; and CVE-2026-41940, an authentication bypass in cPanel and WHM, was used to reach small hosting providers and their clients' email servers.

Credential reuse turned single points of access into full-network compromises. In at least one documented case, a single reused password opened the door to a VPN, several servers, a remote management platform, backup infrastructure, and the organization's security management tools. To suppress endpoint detection tools, operators deployed a driver-based EDR killer that abused a vulnerable Zemana driver, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver.


The Victim Picture

Researchers identified 62 named organizations in the operational logs, with 36 located in the United States. Industrial, manufacturing, and energy firms made up the largest share of targets at roughly 16 percent. Healthcare and pharmaceuticals came in second at about 14.5 percent. Most targeted companies were smaller businesses, with 27 of 35 classifiable organizations reporting revenue below $250 million. Some were reached indirectly through a managed service provider whose admin credentials had been stolen.

Four organizations ended up listed on public leak sites. The operation's timeline runs from mid-July 2026 through a live encryption event on September 30, 2026.


Extortion by the Numbers

The playbook prioritized data theft over encryption. Operators sifted through stolen financial records to gauge what a victim could pay, then opened contact with a text-only email carrying no ransom figure. Pressure escalated through scripted vishing calls, threats to notify customers and regulators, and hard deadlines of 24 to 72 hours before publication. Payment was planned in Monero, though researchers found no wallet or confirmed transaction records.

Demand figures from recovered case files show the range of the operation. A EUR 15 million demand sent to a company called Aidon was later revised down to EUR 4 million after the operators realized they had compromised the wrong parent company. A healthcare network in Australia received demands between AUD 3 million and AUD 8 million. The Gentlemen's communications to Leo Schachter Diamonds included a four-message sequence and a vishing plan. For Trulite Glass and Aluminum, the group set up a look-alike domain, trulitesupport[.]com, to warn the company's own customers about the breach.

Total spending on the operation's infrastructure is estimated at just under $24,000.



Africa-Wide Cybercrime Operation Recovers More Than $105 Million


During an international cybercrime operation coordinated across 21 countries, INTERPOL has arrested 1,462 suspects and disrupted 10,909 malicious networks. Operation Serengeti III also resulted in the recovery of more than $105 million in illicit funds. 

During the crackdown, which took place between June 29 and August 31, 2026, ransomware, online scams, business email compromises, digital extortion and other cyber-enabled financial crimes were targeted. An investigation conducted by INTERPOL identified 65,929 victims connected to criminal networks. Financial investigations indicated that an amount of $385 million was lost as a result of the activity. 

Law enforcement agencies from Nigeria, Uganda, Angola, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were involved in the operation along with the United States and other participating nations. 

The private sector also contributed intelligence on threat intelligence and criminal infrastructure, and Group-IB, one of the participating private-sector partners, provided information about phishing kits, botnets and malicious resources that were hosted in Africa or targeted at the region. This information provided investigators with information about infrastructure supporting cyberattacks and the individuals responsible for operating them.

Fraud Networks and Illegal Crypto Mining Targeted

Authorities in Uganda detained 365 foreign nationals suspected of being connected to two transnational fraud networks, which was one of the largest arrest figures in the operation. A number of online investment schemes and pension scams targeting Asia were linked to these groups.

Investigators discovered schemes which involved call centres, fraudulent websites, and fake trading platforms, attempting to persuade victims to invest in unreal projects. Several illegal cryptocurrency mining facilities in Angola have been dismantled and nine suspects have been arrested. 

Investigators have seized over 2,000 cryptocurrency mining devices and six illegal power transformation stations. Approximately $1 million was spent on electrical equipment, which underscores the substantial infrastructure and resources involved in these illegal mining operations. The investigation also included Nigeria, where authorities arrested a suspect allegedly implicated in an extensive phishing and business email compromise operation. 

According to the report, the activity involved the collection of software credentials as well as approximately 2.1 million email addresses. A separate case involved the arrest of another Nigerian suspect related to international investment fraud schemes promoted using messaging applications. The investigation identified a total of more than $2.4 million in suspected criminal proceeds, of which a substantial portion was reportedly laundered by cryptocurrency exchanges. 

INTERPOL Warns of Rising AI-Enabled Cybercrime in Africa

An increase in concerns over the changing cyber threat landscape across Africa has led to this operation. According to Interpol's African Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2026, artificial intelligence is increasingly being used in cybercrime as well as the number of financial losses resulting from digital crimes continues to rise.

In advance of Operation Serengeti III, investigators from 20 African countries and the United States received information regarding suspicious domains, IP addresses, and command-and-control infrastructure associated with criminal activity. In addition to identifying malicious resources, tracing connections between criminal networks, and targeting suspected perpetrators, these details also helped authorities identify suspicious individuals. 

A number of private-sector companies were involved in the operation, including Group-IB, Kaspersky, Fortinet, TrendAI, Team Cymru, Uppsala Security and Meta, which provided threat intelligence, technical analysis and investigative expertise. Additionally, the initiative was supported by the Global Anti-Scam Alliance, Cybercrime Atlas and Zimbabwe’s Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. 

The Director of Cybercrime for INTERPOL, Neal Jetton, noted that international cooperation is imperative as criminal organizations continue to operate across international borders and use technology to target victims in greater numbers. By conducting coordinated investigations, we were able to disrupt these networks, recover criminal assets, and reduce the damage caused by cybercrime. 

A number of investigations associated with the crackdown remain ongoing. Authorities continue to investigate digital evidence seized, trace suspected criminal proceeds, and identify additional individuals associated with these networks. During the previous phases of Serengeti III in September and October 2024, as well as June and August 2025, more than 2,000 arrests were made. 

Further highlighting the importance of cross-border intelligence sharing and cooperation between law enforcement agencies and cybersecurity firms, the latest operation demonstrates how organized crime can be combatted through cross-border intelligence sharing and cooperation.

Nigerian Hacker Sentenced To Eight Years For Fraud And Identity Theft

 

A Nigerian man has been sentenced to eight years in a U.S. prison for his role in wide-ranging hacking, tax fraud, identity theft, and investment fraud schemes. Chukwuemeka Victor Amachukwu, also known as “Chukwuemeka Victor Eletuo” and “So Kwan Leung,” pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The sentence was announced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York on October 19, 2026. 

According to U.S. prosecutors, Amachukwu and Nigeria-based co-conspirators began targeting U.S. tax preparation businesses around 2019. They used spearphishing emails to gain access to the companies’ electronic systems, then stole tax and identity information belonging to at least about 800 customers. The affected businesses were located in New York, Texas, and other U.S. states. 

The stolen data was allegedly used to file fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and state tax authorities. Prosecutors said the group sought fraudulent refunds of at least approximately $8.4 million and successfully obtained at least $2.5 million. The conspirators also used stolen identities to submit fraudulent claims under the Small Business Administration’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, receiving about $819,000 in additional payouts. 

Amachukwu was also accused of participating in a separate investment fraud scheme. Prosecutors said he posed as a wealthy overseas financier to persuade U.S. victims to invest in purportedly valuable standby letters of credit. The investments did not exist, and Amachukwu and his co-conspirators allegedly pocketed more than $7 million in fraudulent proceeds. 

In addition to the eight-year prison term, the 40-year-old was sentenced to one year of supervised release. He was ordered to pay $3,647,629.39 in restitution and forfeit $10,846,634.39. U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald said the case demonstrated that offenders cannot assume they can operate safely from abroad, while the FBI was credited for its investigative work.

Compromised ConnectWise OAuth App Exposes Over 170 Microsoft 365 Tenants in Supply Chain Attack

 




A compromised credential tied to a ConnectWise cloud backup application has allowed threat actors to access more than 170 Microsoft 365 environments managed by the company's partners and customers, with security researchers and Microsoft all tracking what they describe as an active supply chain attack.

The affected application, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, was formerly known as SkyKick before ConnectWise acquired it. The tool is designed for managed service providers (MSPs) and handles backup duties across Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace environments, covering mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams chats, and directory data for every tenant where it is installed. That built-in breadth of access is precisely what made the compromise so damaging.

Security firm Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants. Researchers traced the suspicious activity to a single IP address, 144.172.64.128, which obtained tokens on October 15, 2026, between 6:13 and 8:34 UTC. The movement across tenants was methodical: the actor worked through environments in sorted GUID order, hitting each one a few seconds apart, a pattern consistent with an automated script running through a pre-built target list. Before that, the same IP address was used to password-spray four law firm tenants on October 13 and 14, though no successful user sign-ins were logged during that activity.

The attack went further than reconnaissance. In at least one partner tenant, a separate ConnectWise application called Cloud Management for Teams elevated itself to the Global Administrator role. From there, the actor added client secrets to an MSP management app and to Huntress's own app, using a Python-urllib/3.12 user agent. That kind of credential insertion is a classic backdoor move, designed to maintain persistent access even after the initial intrusion is addressed.

Huntress also noted that some of the access, particularly directory reads through Microsoft Graph, does not generate an audit trail, which complicates the task of establishing the full scope of what was seen or copied.

Security company Todyl, which also investigated the activity, pointed out that the inherited consent model made the damage difficult to contain quickly. Because the Cloud Backup application had been granted permission by tenant administrators, it could read and write to mail via Exchange Web Services, access OneDrive and SharePoint files, and reach Teams chats, including restoration capabilities. Revoking user sessions had no effect on the attack, since the access did not depend on user sign-ins. Disabling the application entirely stops new tokens from being issued, but tokens already in circulation remain valid for up to 90 minutes.

Microsoft confirmed it is tracking the campaign as an active supply chain attack, identifying it by the Cloud Backup application's OAuth App ID (506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). The company said the actor likely abused Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions granted by customers, and observed follow-on activity including Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add credentials to service principals as a persistence mechanism.

ConnectWise responded by shutting off Cloud Backup application access entirely and stated it found no evidence that partner backup data stored within the platform was copied or exfiltrated.

For organizations trying to determine whether they were affected, the key step is checking service principal sign-in logs in the Entra Admin Center, filtered by the Cloud Backup App ID. The default User sign-ins tab will not show this activity. Administrators should flag any sign-ins originating from IP addresses outside expected Microsoft or Azure ranges, since the application's normal outbound traffic uses Azure private IPv6. A full audit of any credentials added to applications since October 13 is also recommended, along with a review of Entra audit logs for any ConnectWise or SkyKick apps that added themselves to directory roles.

The ConnectWise incident surfaced alongside a separate supply chain campaign reported by Google Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group, and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab. That operation, attributed to a previously undocumented threat cluster called UNC7017, repeatedly tampered with update servers belonging to backup software maker AOMEI. Between April and July 2026, attackers redirected downloads to malicious ZIP packages during short five-to-ten-minute windows. The payloads included a downloader called CROSSROAD and a modular backdoor named SHINYROAD, deployed through DLL sideloading. The campaign hit organizations in IT services, telecommunications, and higher education across roughly 11 countries, including the United States, Brazil, India, and Spain.

Together, the two incidents reinforce a pattern security researchers have flagged for years: backup tools and management platforms carry privileged access across dozens or hundreds of environments simultaneously, making them attractive targets for attackers looking to move laterally at scale without touching endpoint defenses.



FBI and North Macedonia Arrest Alleged OLVX Market Operator

 

Authorities in North Macedonia have arrested and charged the alleged administrator of OLVX, an underground cybercrime marketplace accused of selling stolen personal data, login credentials, and tools used in cyberattacks. The operation was conducted jointly by North Macedonia’s Ministry of Interior and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), marking what officials describe as the first coordinated cyber operation between the two countries. The suspect, identified only by the initials E.A., is a 20-year-old man from Golema Rečica near Tetovo. 

According to investigators, OLVX operated from 2023 to 2025 and became a popular platform for criminals seeking access to compromised accounts and digital identities. The marketplace allegedly allowed more than 1,500 seller accounts to offer victims’ personally identifiable information and login credentials. Officials said the site also facilitated the sale of phishing kits, remote desktop access, stolen data, and other resources used to launch cybercrimes. 

The investigation began after the FBI supplied intelligence to North Macedonian authorities. Police later raided the suspect’s home and seized devices for forensic examination. Earlier action against the platform reportedly uncovered a server database containing more than 2,600 customer accounts, while illicit sales were estimated to have exceeded $500,000. The charges against E.A. include computer fraud, misuse of personal data, and the production and distribution of child sexual abuse material.

Authorities also linked the suspect to ONEMILI, a Telegram group allegedly used to advertise software and services for cybercrime, including fraudulent refund schemes. The FBI said the marketplace directly endangered the digital security of thousands of people in the United States by making stolen account credentials and personal information available to criminals. The case underscores how underground platforms can connect data thieves, fraudsters, and attackers across borders. 

The arrest sends a strong signal that international law enforcement is increasingly targeting the infrastructure behind cybercrime rather than only individual attacks. It also highlights the importance of strong account security: users should enable multi-factor authentication, use unique passwords, avoid reusing credentials, and monitor accounts for unauthorized activity. While the charges remain allegations until tested in court, the takedown of OLVX represents a significant blow to a marketplace that allegedly enabled large-scale identity theft and fraud.

Company Accused of Making $60 Million by Exploiting Sextortion Victims


A US-based digital forensics company is facing allegations that it collected at least $60 million from people seeking help with sextortion threats but failed to provide the assistance it promised. 

According to a complaint filed by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Digital Forensics Corporation (DFC), its owner Dmitry Belkin, and associated businesses allegedly misled victims who were already experiencing fear, emotional distress, and threats of having private images exposed.

Scam details

According to the FTC complaint, DFC collected at least $60 million between February 2023 and July 2026. The company allegedly charged customers between $1,499 and $20,000 for services advertised as helping identify blackmailers, stop threats, and support investigations.

The complaint claims that the company misrepresented its investigative capabilities and the results it could achieve. Among the allegations is that DFC used fabricated investigative chat transcripts to make customers believe its investigators were actively communicating with suspected criminals.

The FTC also alleges that the company reused location information to create the impression that it had successfully tracked down perpetrators. Such tactic could lead customers to believe that meaningful investigative work was being conducted when the evidence presented to them did not support those claims.

Besides this, the complaint argues that customers were pressured into purchasing extra services. The company reportedly used positive reviews that were not genuine to strengthen its reputation and made obtaining refunds difficult for dissatisfied customers. 

“Instead of communicating with the sextortionist through the victim's account, defendants routinely change the victim's account settings simply to block the sextortionist's communications. Instead of obtaining investigative information, defendants fabricate chat transcripts,” the complaint said.

FTC’s response

According to the complaint, “Defendants falsely portray themselves as digital forensics experts, claiming they can track and identify sextortionists, prevent the spread of explicit material and coordinate with law enforcement to bring criminals to justice."

The FTC filed a lawsuit against DFC, Belkin, and several affiliated companies, accusing violations of consumer protection laws. A federal court temporarily halted the company's operations while the legal case proceeds. The agency is seeking action against the alleged deceptive practices.

The FTC also reported that the company advertised its services through search engines, video-sharing websites, and social media platforms, potentially reaching people actively searching for urgent help. 

OpenAI Employee Arrested Over Hidden Recorder Allegations


In connection with the arrest and prosecution of an employee of OpenAI, it has been claimed that a recording device was allegedly placed in an executive conference room at the company's San Francisco headquarters. This device was reportedly intended to record confidential discussions regarding the company's artificial intelligence research and strategic plans. 

As a result of the arrest of Abdulrahman Alfozan, a 35-year-old Saudi national, on October 9, 2026, his position has been terminated. A federal charge has been filed against him by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) for using or attempting to use an electronic or mechanical device to intercept oral communications. He joined OpenAI in July 2025 and worked on its product team. 

In the executive conference room, OpenAI personnel discovered a hidden audio recording device connected to a USB port behind a television on September 30, causing an alarm to sound. During the period of September 28 to December 31, the device was installed and wrapped in toilet paper to conceal it, according to the complaint.

The room was regularly used to hold executive meetings related to highly confidential technical, commercial, and strategic matters. This information included proprietary research, product development plans, business opportunities, government engagements, and information concerning the company's artificial intelligence progress. The investigation also included review of office surveillance footage that showed Alfozan near the conference room several times before the device was discovered.

According to the complaint, he did not play any part in the meetings in which the device was discovered. As a result of the investigation, the investigation has also allege that later he returned to the room and observed the recording device behind the television. Furthermore, Alfozan is accused of using a workplace productivity tool to gather information about OpenAI's offices, conference rooms, meeting schedules, and room capacity before the device was installed, according to the FBI complaint. 

The searches reportedly included information about leadership meetings as well as sessions involving external partners, raising questions regarding potential attempts to identify opportunities for recording confidential conversations. As part of the investigation, investigators examined prompts submitted via an account associated with Alfozan's spouse's chatbot.

According to the account, between September 24 and 30, it was allegedly used to obtain information about building and configuring audio recorders, setting up Wi-Fi, enabling live audio monitoring, encrypting stored data, and remote access to the device. According to the complaint, the chatbot account shares identifiers and other attributes with Alfozan's own account. 

A second recording device was allegedly discovered on October 5, when OpenAI's security personnel inspected an unattended bag left in another room of the company's building. Among the items in the bag are Alfozan's wallet and identification as well as a device similar to that found in the executive conference room. 

A surveillance video was also allegedly captured by investigators capturing him checking behind the television, where the first device had been placed. OpenAI reported that the recording device had encryption capabilities, audio monitoring capabilities, and an encrypted data transfer mechanism for avoiding detection. 

Following the analysis of the device by internal AI models and the identification of the employee who allegedly perpetrated it, the company referred the case to the FBI. Even though the allegations were somewhat serious, OpenAI stated that there was no evidence that Alfozan improperly accessed or removed model weights, source code, or customer data. Security measures provided by the company were intended to address threats ranging from insider threats to cybercriminals and nation-state actors. 

As a result of his arrest, Alfozan appeared in federal court and is facing the possibility of five years in prison, a $250,000 fine, and a three-year probation period. Unauthorized recording of confidential technical developments and business strategies can expose confidential information even without direct access to the digital systems, as outlined in the investigation of the risks posed by insider threats at organizations engaged in sensitive AI research. 

Those organizations developing advanced artificial intelligence technologies should take precautions against insider threats, maintain workplace security controls, and protect confidential information. This case is currently being investigated, and the allegations have not yet been proven in court.

Ukrainian-Russian Dual National Behind 15,000-Mule Money Laundering Ring Pleads Guilty in North Carolina




A Ukrainian-Russian dual national who spent years overseeing one of the most operationally sophisticated money laundering rings in recent cybercrime history pleaded guilty last Thursday in a federal court in North Carolina, admitting to routing stolen funds through tens of thousands of ordinary Americans before shipping the cash to criminal operatives in Eastern Europe.

Oleg Korniev, 42, was a principal at Your Mule Cashout, or YMCO, a criminal outfit that ran from September 2007 through 2014 and maintained a network of more than 15,000 money mules across the United States. The plea came roughly a decade after a grand jury first indicted him, and about 10 months after U.S. authorities caught up with him and arrested him in North Carolina in December 2025.


Not a side player

Federal prosecutors did not describe Korniev as a peripheral figure. He managed YMCO's daily operations, hired and fired staff, and handed out rewards or penalties depending on performance. He also helped design the procedural framework that kept the organization functioning across multiple countries simultaneously.

YMCO's approach was simple in concept but deliberately layered in practice. The group posed as legitimate staffing or payment-processing companies and sent spam emails to Americans advertising open positions. What followed was a carefully staged recruitment process built to look real: job applicants went through an employment test, reviewed a contract, and were walked through what appeared to be standard company policy. They were then asked to upload their bank details to a fictitious company website and told their job was to receive payments into their personal accounts and wire the money to company accounts overseas.

The money they were receiving was stolen. Hackers had broken into U.S. bank accounts using malware, funneling the proceeds into the mules' accounts and relying on those individuals to move the funds out of the country before anything flagged.


How the cash moved

From the mules' accounts, the money traveled through Western Union and MoneyGram to what YMCO called "cash-out contractors" in Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Latvia. These operators received a cut of each transfer for their role and passed the remainder back to the organization. Running stolen money through a human relay network like this put distance between the hackers and the funds, making the trail harder to reconstruct.

According to court documents, YMCO processed more than $10 million drained from over 750 U.S. bank accounts across more than 35 financial institutions. The group also ran parallel schemes in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Korniev's plea agreement put total actual and intended losses to confirmed victims at more than $14.7 million. He personally admitted to laundering at least $7 million of the $9.7 million he received from cybercriminals as payment for YMCO's services.


A decade-long chase

Korniev was originally indicted alongside Serghei Ivanovich Tomuz, a Moldovan national who allegedly ran YMCO's cash-out operation inside his home country. Tomuz was reportedly detained at a Romanian border crossing in May 2022 and spent years fighting extradition to the United States. His case was ultimately terminated in U.S. federal court this past May.

Four other Ukrainians tied to YMCO were arrested abroad years earlier, extradited to the Western District of North Carolina, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Sentenced in 2018, they received prison terms ranging from 37 to 63 months and were each ordered to pay more than $9.1 million in restitution to American victims.

Korniev now faces a minimum sentence of two years and a maximum of 50 years after pleading guilty to money laundering, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, and conspiracy to commit access device theft. His plea agreement includes a commitment to fully repay confirmed victims for their documented losses.


What prosecutors want criminals to understand

Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva made the department's position on mule networks clear. "Money mules play crucial roles in cybercrime, so the Justice Department pursues mules and their recruiters wherever they operate and however long it takes," Duva said.

The case puts into focus how money mule operations function as the financial plumbing beneath large-scale cybercrime. Without them, proceeds from bank fraud and account takeovers would be far harder to extract without triggering detection.

That infrastructure is a recurring target for law enforcement. Five years ago, Europol announced that authorities from 27 countries had arrested 1,803 money mules out of 18,351 identified as part of a coordinated crackdown called the European Money Mule Action, or EMMA. Europol has consistently flagged that criminal groups recruit mules from vulnerable populations, specifically students, immigrants, and people facing economic pressure, using job ads on social media and employment sites that look entirely legitimate.

Many mules sign up without understanding what they are walking into. Others are coerced. In either scenario, courts have made clear that receiving and wiring stolen money is not a protected form of ignorance.



Engineer Jailed Over Insider Cyber Extortion Plot Against Industrial Firm


The former infrastructure engineer was sentenced to 32 months in federal prison for sabotage of his employer's computer network and for demanding a ransom of $750,000 in Bitcoin from his employer. 

According to the US Department of Justice (DOJ), Daniel Rhyne, 59, was convicted of extortion involving threats to damage protected computers and intentional damage to protected computers. Rhyne was previously employed as a core infrastructure engineer with a Somerset County, New Jersey industrial company. 

Providing services across various sectors, the company specializes in manufacturing, healthcare, biopharmaceuticals, electronics, energy and industrial processing. Rhyne is alleged to have prepared a coordinated disruption in November 2023 by using his privileged access and knowledge of the company's network. 

An alternative to conventional ransomware was used in this attack, which involved scheduled tasks that removed administrator accounts and changed passwords across the entire organization's systems and could have prevented employees from accessing critical information. 

Attack Disrupted Administrative Access

A court document indicates that Rhyne set up scheduled tasks on the domain controller to delete 13 domain administrator accounts and change the passwords of 301 domain users. Two additional tasks were also performed on November 25, 2023, to target two local administrator accounts related to 254 servers and two others affecting 3,284 workstations. 

Among the changes was a security threat that threatened the availability of a large number of devices across the network, as well as the locking of administrators and other employees out of company systems and data. Select employees received an email extortion request from an external address with the subject line "Your Network has been breached" approximately one hour after scheduled tasks had been executed. 

According to the message, administrator accounts were revoked, backups were removed, and administrator accounts had been deleted or locked out. Rhyne also threatened to shut down 40 servers randomly each day for ten days if the company did not meet its ransom demand. In this email, Rhyne demanded 20 Bitcoin, which was approximately $750,000 at the time. This incident demonstrated that access to administrative systems can be abused to disrupt an organization without the use of traditional file-encrypting malicious code. 

Due to the attacks targeting accounts, passwords, and server access, the company was unable to manage its own IT environment and maintain normal business operations as a result of the attacks. 

Investigation Leads to Arrest and Prison Sentence

In response to the discovery of suspicious network activity, the company launched an internal forensic investigation. Investigators analyzed system logs and compared them with physical access records in order to determine the source of the changes. As a result of the FBI investigation, the activity was traced to the residential IP address of Rhyne in Warren County, New Jersey, which was associated with Rhyne. 

A criminal complaint was filed on August 8, 2024 by FBI Special Agent Timothy Lee in response to the findings. Rhyne was arrested on August 27, 2024, in Kansas City, Missouri, following his relocation to the area. He pleaded guilty to the charges on April 1, 2026, in federal court in Trenton, New Jersey, before US District Judge Michael A. 

On September 28, 2026, Shipp delivered the 32-month prison sentence. An employee with extensive administrative privileges poses substantial security risks. While outsider attacks tend to exploit software vulnerabilities or steal credentials from external users, insider attacks are capable of exploiting legitimate access to disrupt a wide range of systems. 

Security teams may struggle to regain control of critical systems when mass password changes and administrator account deletions occur. By restricting access to privileged accounts, monitoring unusual account activity, and maintaining backups that are protected from production network access, similar incidents may be reduced. 

It is also crucial to review and revoke access as soon as your employment responsibilities change to minimize the risk of deliberate misuse. This case illustrates the risks associated with insider threats and improper use of privilege. A strong access control system, continuous monitoring, as well as secure backups are essential to safeguarding critical business systems from intentional attacks.

California Court Dismisses El Faro Journalists' Pegasus Spyware Lawsuit Against NSO Group for Second Time

 



A California federal judge has once again dismissed a lawsuit brought by journalists from Salvadoran investigative outlet El Faro against NSO Group, the Israeli company behind the Pegasus spyware allegedly used to surveil their phones for nearly two years. The ruling, issued Wednesday, marks the second time the case has been thrown out on jurisdictional grounds, though the journalists' legal team at the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University has said it intends to appeal.

The case, Dada v. NSO Group, was the first lawsuit against NSO filed in any U.S. court when the Knight Institute took it on in November 2022 on behalf of 18 current and former El Faro journalists and staff. Between June 2020 and November 2021, Pegasus spyware was deployed against the outlet's employees at least 226 times, according to the Institute. Digital forensic analysis eventually confirmed that 22 members of El Faro's staff had their phones infected. The attacks were not random. Surveillance peaked during significant political moments and in the run-up to major investigations, including reporting on the Bukele administration's secret negotiations with criminal gangs, the theft of pandemic food relief, back-channel Bitcoin dealings, and the financial holdings of government officials.

The lead plaintiff, Carlos Dada, is the co-founder and director of El Faro, one of Central America's most prominent independent news organizations. El Faro was founded in El Salvador in 1998 and has built a reputation for independent investigative reporting. The outlet has paid a steep price for that journalism. Beyond the spyware attacks, El Faro says it has faced physical surveillance, advertiser harassment, and public defamation from government officials and ruling-party legislators. In 2023, the newsroom relocated its administrative and legal operations out of El Salvador entirely.

The core question before the court was whether Northern California was the right place to try this dispute. Dada and the plaintiffs argued it was, pointing to compromised U.S.-based infrastructure that was used as part of the attack chain. The judge was not persuaded. The court noted that there was no allegation Apple's California servers were actually exploited in delivering the Pegasus infections, even where the plaintiffs alleged the attacks moved through Apple's iMessage or iCloud systems. The same argument had failed once before: in March 2024, a California federal judge threw out the same lawsuit, saying the case was "entirely foreign" and that the journalists had no standing to sue in the U.S.

That first dismissal did not hold. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the March 2024 ruling in July 2025 and sent the case back to the Northern District of California, finding that the lower court erred in its analysis. The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the district judge failed to properly account for allegations that NSO created Apple ID accounts and engaged with California-based servers as part of the attack infrastructure. One factor that also came into play was a recent acquisition of NSO Group by a group of American investors, which El Faro's lawyers cited as further reason for trying the case on U.S. soil. After the Ninth Circuit's reversal, Dada called the outcome "good news." That window has now closed again.

The journalists had wanted specific remedies from the court. They asked the court to require NSO Group to identify, return, and delete all information obtained through the attacks, to prohibit the company from deploying Pegasus against them again, and to name the government client that commissioned the surveillance. That last demand was perhaps the most politically charged. NSO has never publicly identified its clients. The company maintains it sells Pegasus exclusively to government agencies for use against criminals and terrorists, subject to Israeli government authorization. El Salvador's government has repeatedly denied being an NSO client or playing any role in the surveillance.

With Apple having dropped its own case against NSO in September 2024, and WhatsApp having won a $167 million judgment against the company earlier in 2025, the El Faro lawsuit had become the last active case against NSO Group in U.S. courts. That distinction is now moot, at least temporarily.

The Knight First Amendment Institute plans to appeal. El Faro's director Carlos Dada said when the original lawsuit was filed that the outlet turned to the U.S. court system because justice in El Salvador was not possible. With the case now dismissed a second time and the appeal road still open, that search for accountability continues.

NSO Group did not respond to a request for comment.



ShinyHunters Hacker Reportedly Detained as FBI Seeks Cooperation


The FBI has reportedly detained a suspected ShinyHunters member known online as “Rey” and is cooperating with the government. Jordanian authorities captured a suspect identified as Saif al-Din Khader this week. According to two sources cited by Reuters, Khader is helping U.S. and international investigators identify other members of the hacking group. 


It is believed that Khader's cooperation will provide investigators with information regarding the group's activities and alleged co-conspirators, according to a source. He has shown investigators his electronic devices and digital communication to help locate other suspected members. The FBI has not responded to Khader's reported detention specifically, however it has stated that it is continuing to investigate the recent cyber incident allegedly involving ShinyHunters and is collaborating with international partners to resolve the matter. 

A series of law enforcement actions targeting individuals affiliated with ShinyHunters has led to this reported detention. Dutch authorities arrested a 24-year-old man in connection with an investigation into the group in September. Following the arrest, the FBI issued a warning encouraging other suspected members to surrender while they continued to investigate the matter. 

The developments are following the claim by ShinyHunters that a job portal breach had taken place. As claimed by the group, it obtained a significant amount of sensitive information from FBI systems. Particularly, it claimed to have acquired employee information, though the extent of the alleged theft has yet to be independently verified. During Khader's reported detention, the group's online activity was also disrupted. 

In addition to the disappearance of the group's data leak website, an account previously used to communicate with journalists no longer responded. Later, another ShinyHunters leak site appeared, indicating the group may continue to conduct activities. Moreover, Khader's reported cooperation strengthens the investigation, which has already been conducted by several individuals associated with the ShinyHunters network in general. 

Khader's identity was previously associated with the group until the latest detention was made. It has been reported that Brian Krebs identified Khader as a member of the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters umbrella operation in 2025, which is affiliated with ShinyHunters, Lapsus$, and Scattered Spider. Aside from being linked to the HellCat leak site and BreachForums hacking forum, Khader had previously asserted that he was cooperating with law enforcement and had ceased all data theft and extortion activities. Those claims were not independently verified. 

While this was the case, ShinyHunters continued to conduct attacks in 2026, including attacks on Rockstar Games as well as Canvas, which disrupted schools across the country. Despite this, the group has continued to engage in data theft and extortion operations. ShinyHunters has recently begun targeting cloud-based services as well as third-party providers, resulting in incidents that are linked to organizations such as Google, Cisco, and Pornhub.

ShinyHunters has also been linked to the May 2026 breach involving Instructure Canvas, while previous investigations have resulted in arrests related to Snowflake-related attacks, PowerSchool and Breached hacking forums. It may be possible for investigators to gain a better understanding of how this loosely organized network operates and who remains active within it through the recent arrests. 

It has been reported that FBI agents have indicated that information obtained from arrests and seized infrastructure may be useful for identifying additional participants. However, the appearance of a new ShinyHunters leak site following the earlier closure indicates that the organization has not been completely dismantled. Furthermore, the case illustrates the difficulty of disrupting cybercrime groups that are built upon informal networks rather than a rigid organizational structure. 

According to Reuters, investigations and prosecutions can become complicated by the young age of some suspects, the fluid nature of related groups, and the limited cooperation of victims. While ShinyHunters' continued online activity suggests that law enforcement efforts are ongoing, the reported detention and cooperation may provide investigators with valuable insight into ShinyHunters' wider network.

Bitget Hack Climbs to $387.5 Million as Exchange Launches Recovery Bounty and Points to North Korea

 



Crypto exchange Bitget confirmed on September 25 that hackers stole approximately $387.5 million from its hot and warm wallets a day earlier, revising an initial estimate upward as investigators traced funds across multiple blockchains and accounting for assets on Zcash and TRON that were missed in the first tally. The exchange has since launched a structured bounty program for anyone who helps freeze or recover stolen funds, and has brought in independent cybersecurity firms Mandiant and SlowMist to assist with the investigation.

Bitget's security systems first flagged the unauthorized transfers at 18:31 UTC on September 24. By the time the exchange confirmed the breach publicly, the damage figure had already reached $351.6 million. The revised total of $387.5 million reflects a more complete accounting of transfers that occurred during the incident, adding affected assets on Zcash and TRON not captured in the initial estimate. The exchange confirmed no further unauthorized transfers occurred after the incident was contained.


How the Attack Worked

Bitget CEO Gracy Chen clarified that attackers did not steal private keys or forge user withdrawal requests. Instead, they broke into a backend system inside Bitget's wallet infrastructure and used it to spoof transaction data, tricking the exchange's own authorization process into approving payouts that looked routine.

The mechanics were methodical. The attacker's first transfer was a small 0.84 ETH test payment to a fresh address, after which Bitget's main Ethereum hot wallet made roughly 380 transactions during the attack. Every time the hot wallets refilled from the warm wallet layer, the attacker drained them again. The warm wallet, which normally only pays the exchange's own hot wallets, sent 13,966 ETH worth approximately $37 million to an address less than an hour old, with no approved list check and no secondary authorization on a wallet holding over $40 million.

The single largest piece of the haul was roughly 103 million XRP, valued at approximately $157 million at the time of the theft. About $75 million of the stolen funds were held in stablecoins including USDT and USDC.

Some of that ETH moved quickly into mixers: on-chain analysis shows around 6,300 ETH, close to $19 million, funneled through Tornado Cash within hours of the breach.

The confirmed affected assets span XRP, ETH, USDT, ZEC, USDC, USDT0, XAUt, BNB, AVAX and TRX, spread across Ethereum and several EVM-compatible networks, the XRP Ledger, Zcash, and TRON.


User Funds and the Protection Fund

Bitget operates a three-tier wallet architecture, and the breach touched only portions of the hot and warm wallet layers. Cold wallets remained fully secure throughout the attack. Bitget's User Protection Fund, which holds more than $464 million, will cover the full loss, meaning customer account balances stay intact even though the funds themselves were taken. The protection fund was set aside in 2023 specifically to cover hacks and theft so users would not absorb the impact.


North Korea in the Frame

During a three-hour livestream on X, CEO Gracy Chen said Bitget suspects North Korean attackers exploited the backend authentication system, making fraudulent withdrawals appear legitimate. Chen added that she has personally been targeted by the same group before, losing about $80,000 from a personal wallet unconnected to Bitget. North Korea's Lazarus Group, also tracked under the codename TraderTraitor, has been blamed for the industry's biggest thefts, including Bybit's $1.4 billion hack in February 2025, which the FBI confirmed weeks later was North Korean work.


The Recovery Bounty

Bitget has launched a Recovery Bounty Program covering eligible voluntary actions that have already resulted in affected funds being frozen, as well as future actions that directly contribute to freezing or recovering funds. The structure is straightforward: 5% of successfully frozen funds goes to the eligible person or entity whose efforts directly caused the freeze, and 5% of successfully recovered funds is available on the same terms. Bitget will also use Bybit's LazarusBounty initiative as a core channel for the effort.

To support the hunt, Bitget published a real-time fund tracing dashboard at trace.bgblockchain.xyz, an API tracking attacker-controlled addresses updated continuously, and a submission portal for anyone with freezing or recovery information. Exchanges, stablecoin issuers, bridges, custodians, and other infrastructure providers have been encouraged to monitor the flagged addresses and report relevant information through the recovery portal.

The attack is the largest cryptocurrency breach of the year to date and lands in an already turbulent stretch for the industry. Earlier in September, Liquid Network suffered a $319 million security breach, and in late July, hardware wallet maker Coldcard was hit in a separate incident that drained around $116 million in Bitcoin.

Bitget said it will publish a full incident report including root-cause analysis once technical teams complete remediation. Withdrawal restoration was expected to be announced by September 26, 4:00 AM UTC.