When Rubrik launched Project Hourglass at its FORWARD 2026 conference in Las Vegas back in June, the initiative set out to answer a question CISOs were already losing sleep over: what happens when an AI agent writing and deploying your code does something catastrophic and nobody can stop it in time?
On Thursday, at its GSI Summit in Goa, India, the cybersecurity firm announced the next step. Rubrik has expanded Project Hourglass to include a new tool called Rubrik Code Guardian, and has welcomed AHEAD, Trace3, and World Wide Technology (WWT) into the alliance, joining the six systems integrators that signed on at launch. The new capability is powered by Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 and extends the alliance's reach from securing AI agents during execution to proactively identifying vulnerabilities in software code before deployment.
The Problem Driving All of This
Rubrik Zero Labs surveyed more than 1,600 IT and security leaders for its State of the Agent report and found that 86 percent expect AI agents to outpace their security guardrails within a year, while only 23 percent report full visibility into agents operating in their environments. More than 80 percent said agents require more manual oversight than the efficiency they save.
A separate Rubrik and Economist Enterprise study found 88 percent of enterprises experienced an AI agent security breach in 2026. The picture those numbers paint is one of organizations racing to deploy autonomous systems while the controls meant to govern them are still catching up.
What Code Guardian Does
The original Project Hourglass, which launched with Cognizant, Deloitte, LTM, HCLTech, NTT DATA, and Wipro as founding partners, focused on protecting AI agents at runtime through Rubrik Agent Cloud. That platform operates across three layers: Runtime Agent Security for behavioral guardrails and blast-radius control, Agent Rewind for fast repository recovery, and AI Context Guard for prompt integrity and control-plane protection.
Code Guardian shifts the security lens earlier in the development cycle. Rather than running against live production environments, the system tests a cloned, air-gapped copy of customer repositories. Claude Mythos 5 operates inside Rubrik's security harness to evaluate code against sophisticated, multi-step threat scenarios.
Three core capabilities define the product: isolated red-team analysis inside the air-gapped environment; attack chain discovery that reasons across files, services, identity roles, and cloud perimeters to find chained vulnerabilities that conventional static tools miss; and business impact prioritization that filters findings by actual exploitability and business criticality to reduce alert fatigue.
Alok Agrawal, Chief Solutions Officer at Rubrik, put the challenge plainly. "Engineering teams are turning to AI models to accelerate software delivery, but speed cannot compromise security or architectural integrity. By incorporating Rubrik Code Guardian into Project Hourglass, we are ensuring engineering teams are able to conduct red-team analysis, prioritize business impact and reduce risk."
The New Partners
Each of the three incoming partners brings a different angle to the coalition.
AHEAD, which builds enterprise technology architectures for large clients, framed the problem as one of inherited risk. Steven Sorensen, Specialty Solutions Engineer for Cyber Resiliency at AHEAD, said the goal is to get code attacked, tested, and validated in a safe environment before it ships, so teams can move faster knowing Rubrik's recovery capabilities sit underneath them as a safety net.
WWT's Chris Konrad, Vice President of Global Cyber, pointed to the company's Advanced Technology Center, where isolated threat testing has long been part of how it validates security solutions before recommending them. He said Code Guardian integrates naturally with that process.
Trace3 brought a perspective the others did not: its own teams have been running Rubrik Agent Cloud internally to protect their own agentic AI work before recommending it to clients. Sandy Salty, Chief Marketing Officer at Trace3, said that experience as both a user and a partner gives the firm a clearer view of what actually makes agentic environments more resilient at scale.
Where Things Stand
Rubrik Code Guardian is currently in private preview and accepting select design partners. It is not yet generally available and may change or be discontinued. Rubrik Agent Cloud, the original platform at the center of Project Hourglass, remains available to enterprise clients.
Dev Rishi, GM of AI at Rubrik, has previously described the core problem in stark terms: with AI agents, there is the potential for ten times the damage in one-tenth the time. That framing captures why the urgency behind Project Hourglass is unlikely to ease. As the volume of AI-generated code increases across enterprise environments, the window between a vulnerability being introduced and it being found by someone with bad intentions keeps getting smaller.
Reported by TechRadar, the vulnerability could allow attackers who already have valid login credentials to increase their privileges within Exchange and access mailboxes belonging to other users. Microsoft released the fix on October 2, ahead of its originally intended schedule.
The security issue stems from a weakness in authorization controls, which determine what information a user can access. By exploiting the flaw over a network, an authenticated attacker could gain permissions beyond those assigned to their account.
Threat actors could first obtain credentials through phishing attacks or by purchasing stolen login details from underground online markets. Once inside an organization’s Exchange environment, they could exploit the vulnerability to read emails and attachments belonging to other employees.
However, the flaw does not provide unrestricted access across different customer environments, known as tenants. It also does not directly grant administrator-level or SYSTEM-level privileges on the underlying Windows server.
Successful exploitation could expose sensitive business information, including financial records, invoices, contracts, customer correspondence, internal discussions, and confidential documents.
Attackers could use the stolen information to support further cyberattacks. For example, they might impersonate company employees, send convincing fraudulent emails, or conduct business email compromise (BEC) scams to trick organizations into transferring money or disclosing additional information.
The vulnerability is particularly problematic because an ordinary employee’s compromised account could potentially provide an entry point for accessing information held in other employees’ mailboxes.
The vulnerability affects the following on-premises products:
Microsoft has confirmed that Exchange Online customers are protected by a server-side fix. Organizations running affected on-premises installations should install the appropriate security updates promptly.
Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 have reached the end of their standard support lifecycle. Eligible organizations must be enrolled in Microsoft’s Extended Security Update programme to receive the relevant updates for these versions. Microsoft recommends that organizations without the required coverage migrate to Exchange Server Subscription Edition.
Microsoft reported no evidence that the vulnerability was being actively exploited at the time of the report. However, the company assessed that exploitation was more likely, making timely patching important.
Administrators should run Microsoft’s Exchange Server Health Checker after installing the update to verify successful deployment and identify any additional actions required.
Researchers from Russian cybersecurity company Solar said they discovered the intrusion in December 2025. However, their investigation found evidence suggesting that the attackers had entered parts of the organization’s infrastructure as early as 2024.
The attack was attributed to the Belarusian Cyber Partisans, a group known for cyber operations against Belarusian and Russian government organizations and businesses.
Despite remaining inside the network for an extended period, the attackers did not appear to destroy systems or cause major disruption. Researchers believe maintaining access may have been more valuable to the attackers than immediately carrying out destructive activity.
Solar researchers identified several tools associated with the intrusion, including an updated version of the Vasilek Windows backdoor.
Vasilek was previously documented by Kaspersky as malware used by the Cyber Partisans. The backdoor can communicate with attackers through the Telegram Bot API and receive commands through a Telegram group. It can collect information from infected computers, execute Windows commands, transfer files, capture screenshots and record keystrokes.
Solar said the newer version found during its investigation was version 1.5.8. Researchers also identified techniques for maintaining persistence inside the victim’s environment. These included Windows services and the replacement of the vmtools.dll library associated with VMware Tools.
The attackers also used other communication and tunnelling tools, including DNS tunnels and proxy chains. This gave them alternative methods of communicating with compromised systems if one channel became unavailable.
Telegram restrictions in Russia affected Vasilek’s communications, but researchers said the attackers could use other methods to maintain their access.
The compromised organization was not publicly identified. However, researchers said it operated a large infrastructure connected to multiple other healthcare organizations.
This created a potential trusted-relationship attack risk. Once attackers gained control of one organization, its connections with other trusted healthcare entities could potentially provide opportunities to reach additional networks.
The researchers said the attackers accessed sensitive medical data but did not destroy the victim’s systems. The long period of access suggests that espionage, intelligence gathering and maintaining future access may have been more important than immediate disruption.
One of the most unusual features of the malware is its use of zero-width Unicode characters to hide information about a stolen password inside what appears to be a normal configuration file.
CloudSyncD is distributed through a malicious disk image designed to look like a legitimate Zoom installer. The installer includes instructions telling users to bypass macOS Gatekeeper by going to System Settings and manually allowing the application to run.
Once the fake installer is launched, the first-stage program, called app_installer, displays a fake authorization window asking for the user’s administrator password. It checks the entered password locally using macOS’s dscl command. If the password is incorrect, the malware can continue prompting the victim.
The stolen password is not immediately sent to the attackers. Instead, the malware stores it inside a file called data.json. The password is Base64-encoded and placed inside a larger string containing random characters.
The malware then uses U+200B ZERO WIDTH SPACE and U+200C ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER characters. These characters are invisible during normal viewing and encode the location and length of the hidden password. This technique allows malicious information to be concealed without obviously changing the appearance of the file.
The second stage is an embedded Mach-O executable capable of running on both Intel-based and Apple Silicon Macs. The malware attempts to execute the payload without initially writing it to disk. When that approach fails because of macOS security protections, it can create a temporary file and use the captured password with sudo to execute the backdoor with elevated privileges.
After execution, CloudSyncD collects information about the infected Mac, including hardware and operating-system details, account information and network-related data. It communicates with a command-and-control server and can periodically check for additional instructions.
Researchers observed check-ins occurring approximately every 8 to 16 seconds in analyzed samples. The backdoor can receive executable files or compressed archives, potentially allowing attackers to deploy additional malware on an infected system.

The issue was demonstrated by security researcher Patrick Wardle in a proof-of-concept published on September 21, which demonstrates how an attacker with code execution rights under the user logged into Muse can exploit a hidden configuration in Muse. Wardle has also emphasized that the vulnerability does not provide an initial entry point into a Mac, but rather becomes dangerous after a malicious program or attacker has already been installed on the device.
In addition, Wardle also warned that the attack may be delivered remotely via a ClickFix-style method, in which the victim is persuaded to execute a command without downloading or installing traditional malicious software. The Meta AI agent Muse was launched earlier this month as a personal AI agent capable of interacting with services and applications based on user permissions. Its capabilities include file sharing, email, messaging, calendars, shopping services, and smart-home applications. As a result of these permissions, the malicious process does not have to obtain the same access independently, making them particularly relevant to this attack.
There is a problem with an undocumented Muse preference named endo_voyager_dictation_endpoint that controls the location where voice dictation is processed. The setting can be modified by an application running under the same user account. No additional macOS permission is necessary to modify the setting so that Meta's legitimate endpoint is replaced with an attacker's endpoint.
A redirected endpoint can allow voice input intended for Muse to be sent to a service controlled by the attacker. Testing has demonstrated that both the audio and transcription can be intercepted. Once the input has been captured, the attacker can observe dictated prompts and influence Muse's instructions.
A further significant benefit of the redirected traffic is that the token associated with the user's Muse account can be accessed and used to interact directly with Muse. Wardle demonstrated that the token can be accessed and used directly to access the account's chat history. Thus, malicious code is no longer simply stealing information, but rather abusing the AI assistant itself in order to carry out actions based on the privileges that have already been assigned.
A secondary concern is how conventional endpoint security tools might interpret the activity. The Muse application is a legitimate, signed application, so actions initiated through it may appear to originate from a trusted process rather than directly from malware. Wardle's testing further revealed that access obtained through Muse tokens may extend beyond the compromised computer.
Using the token, the researcher was able to execute commands through Muse on another device since the same account can be used across multiple devices. In testing, the researcher was able to have the assistant on a smartphone report its location, scan for nearby Bluetooth devices, and identify smart home controls.
Meta Releases Hotfix for Muse Zero-Day
The vulnerability has been addressed by Meta with a hotfix for Muse on MacOS. According to David Singleton of Meta Superintelligence Labs, the issue involves a local privilege escalation rather than a remote vulnerability. Moreover, exploitation requires malicious software to have already been installed under the user's account.
By closing the configuration path that Wardle used in his proof-of-concept, the hotfix removes the ability to modify the dictation endpoint. As Meta stated, there was a limited practical risk associated with the attack since it requires the installation of local code. However, the requirement for local code execution does not necessarily exclude realistic attack scenarios. Wardle cited ClickFix-style attacks, in which victims are tricked into executing commands on their own computers.
By employing such a method, one might be able to gain a foothold without having to install conventional malware in order to exploit the Muse vulnerability. A broader concern with artificial intelligence agents that operate with extensive permissions has been highlighted by the vulnerability. As a result of Muse accessing a wide range of system resources and connected services, it may be possible for attackers to use those existing permissions once they have obtained control of the agent, rather than requiring separate access to each protected resource.
In Wardle's testing, he demonstrated that the vulnerability can be exploited for a variety of purposes beyond the theft of dictated information. As part of the proof-of-concept activity, the user was able to take images and create documents on the Mac using Muse, in some cases without being made aware of.
In addition, the research demonstrated that attackers controlling Muse sessions may interact with connected devices, although some actions are limited to the preparation of drafts during testing. This vulnerability does not imply the bypassing of macOS's underlying permission system directly, but rather the abuse of Muse once sensitive capabilities have been granted. As a result, the compromised process may be able to make requests through legitimate, signed applications, potentially making the results harder to distinguish from normal AI-aided operations. Moreover, the dictation system design of Muse contributed to the vulnerability as well. While Apple's dictation capabilities are available on device, Muse transmits voice inputs to Meta's infrastructure for processing.
Wardle argued that this architecture created an endpoint that can be redirected by another local process. Several security and isolation controls have been implemented in the context of Muse, including its dedicated Secure VM architecture and additional safeguards designed to limit agent actions. However, the flaw revealed is not in the cloud environment designed to isolate user agents but in the macOS application itself.
Personal artificial intelligence agents are increasingly being seen as sources of security concerns, particularly those that provide conversational capabilities as well as access to files, devices, accounts, and external services. In the event of an agent weakness, those permissions can be turned into an attack path. However, even if the underlying operating system enforces its normal security boundaries, the agent could potentially act as an attack vector.
Foreign actors broke into the industrial control systems of two small private water utilities in Colorado last month, altered pumping cycles, changed equipment settings, and shut off the alarms that would have told operators something was wrong. The state confirmed the incidents on Friday. It has not named the utilities or the attackers.
Both systems are privately owned and serve fewer than 200 people each. The intrusions happened in late August. According to the governor's office, the attackers disabled remote access, switched off alarms, and changed how water was being pumped before operators caught on and regained control. Water quality and treatment were not affected at either location.
"These were brief incidents and the risks were quickly addressed by the providers themselves, who subsequently alerted the state," said Ally Sullivan, a spokeswoman for Governor Jared Polis. "To our knowledge, treatment processes and water quality were not impacted at either provider."
Colorado officials did not name a suspect. Sullivan said the office "cannot confirm what foreign actors may have been involved," but pointed to a CISA-tracked Iranian-backed group that has been working to access drinking water and wastewater systems across the country. Federal authorities have made no formal attribution in the Colorado case.
Part of Something Bigger
Colorado is the latest state in a list that has now reached at least 12 reporting intrusions into water system controls this year. The EPA says more than 100 drinking water and wastewater systems have been hit in 2026, most accessed through programmable logic controllers, or PLCs, connected to the open internet via cellular modems, often without the utilities realizing it.
The summer's single worst episode came on July 26 and 27, when attackers hit more than 30 communities in Minnesota in what state IT officials called a coordinated assault. At least four cities publicly confirmed disruptions. One plant went offline entirely; others dropped to manual operation. In Georgia, hackers took down a pump station, cutting pressure enough that residents were advised to boil water before using it. No one reported getting sick.
The FBI and EPA issued a joint warning on July 30 describing attackers who remotely changed IP addresses and passwords on exposed controllers, locking operators out. In some cases, the intrusions created conditions where untreated groundwater could have entered distribution pipes.
CISA said it tracked attacks against more than 100 internet-exposed water sector systems in July alone, the majority accessed through PLCs attached directly to cellular modems.
The Group Investigators Are Watching
The most scrutinized suspect is CyberAv3ngers, a threat group formally tied to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned six of its senior officials in February 2024. The State Department has offered $10 million for information on the group's activities.
The group has run through four documented phases since 2020. It started by exploiting default passwords on Israeli-made water utility controllers, moved on to deploying custom malware called IOCONTROL against industrial and IoT devices, and this year shifted to actively exploiting an authentication bypass flaw in Rockwell Automation's widely used Logix PLCs. No vendor patch exists for that vulnerability.
Six federal agencies, CISA, the FBI, NSA, EPA, the Department of Energy, and U.S. Cyber Command, warned jointly on April 7 that Iranian-affiliated actors were actively hitting internet-facing PLCs across water, energy, government, and manufacturing sites.
Congress and Industry Push Back
Senators Adam Schiff and Amy Klobuchar introduced the Water Cyber Shield Act in August, which would give the EPA authority to audit utilities and mandate corrective action. The bill authorizes $300 million annually through existing water infrastructure funds.
At DEF CON, the National Rural Water Association launched the Water Watch Center, pairing five managed security firms with small utilities at no cost. The program targets systems serving under 10,000 people, which make up 91 percent of the country's roughly 50,000 community water systems.
Denver Water, which supplies about 1.5 million people across the metro area, told Axios it evaluated the threat after the Colorado disclosure and found its systems unaffected. Federal investigators are working with state officials to determine how the two utilities were accessed.