The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre has issued a strong warning about a spreading weakness in artificial intelligence systems, stating that prompt-injection attacks may never be fully solved. The agency explained that this risk is tied to the basic design of large language models, which read all text as part of a prediction sequence rather than separating instructions from ordinary content. Because of this, malicious actors can insert hidden text that causes a system to break its own rules or execute unintended actions.
The NCSC noted that this is not a theoretical concern. Several demonstrations have already shown how attackers can force AI models to reveal internal instructions or sensitive prompts, and other tests have suggested that tools used for coding, search, or even résumé screening can be manipulated by embedding concealed commands inside user-supplied text.
David C, a technical director at the NCSC, cautioned that treating prompt injection as a familiar software flaw is a mistake. He observed that many security professionals compare it to SQL injection, an older type of vulnerability that allowed criminals to send harmful instructions to databases by placing commands where data was expected. According to him, this comparison is dangerous because it encourages the belief that both problems can be fixed in similar ways, even though the underlying issues are completely different.
He illustrated this difference with a practical scenario. If a recruiter uses an AI system to filter applications, a job seeker could hide a message in the document that tells the model to ignore existing rules and approve the résumé. Since the model does not distinguish between what it should follow and what it should simply read, it may carry out the hidden instruction.
Researchers are trying to design protective techniques, including systems that attempt to detect suspicious text or training methods that help models recognise the difference between instructions and information. However, the agency emphasised that all these strategies are trying to impose a separation that the technology does not naturally have. Traditional solutions for similar problems, such as Confused Deputy vulnerabilities, do not translate well to language models, leaving large gaps in protection.
The agency also stressed upon a security idea recently shared on social media that attempted to restrict model behaviour. Even the creator of that proposal admitted that it would sharply reduce the abilities of AI systems, showing how complex and limiting effective safeguards may become.
The NCSC stated that prompt-injection threats are likely to remain a lasting challenge rather than a fixable flaw. The most realistic path is to reduce the chances of an attack or limit the damage it can cause through strict system design, thoughtful deployment, and careful day-to-day operation. The agency pointed to the history of SQL injection, which once caused widespread breaches until better security standards were adopted. With AI now being integrated into many applications, they warned that a similar wave of compromises could occur if organisations do not treat prompt injection as a serious and ongoing risk.
Retailers rely heavily on the year-end shopping season, but it also happens to be the period when online threats rise faster than most organizations can respond. During the rush, digital systems handle far more traffic than usual, and internal teams operate under tighter timelines. This combination creates a perfect opening for attackers who intentionally prepare their campaigns weeks in advance and deploy automated tools when stores are at their busiest.
Security analysts consistently report that fraudulent bot traffic, password-testing attempts, and customer account intrusions grow sharply during the weeks surrounding Black Friday, festive sales, and year-end shopping events. Attackers time their operations carefully because the chance of slipping through undetected is higher when systems are strained and retailers are focused on maintaining performance rather than investigating anomalies.
A critical reason criminals favor this season is the widespread reuse of passwords. Large collections of leaked usernames and passwords circulate on criminal forums, and attackers use automated software to test these combinations across retail login pages. These tools can attempt thousands of logins per minute. When one match succeeds, the attacker gains access to stored payment information, saved addresses, shopping histories, loyalty points, and in some cases stored tokenized payment methods. All of these can be exploited immediately, which makes the attack both low-effort and highly profitable.
Another layer of risk arises from the credentials of external partners. Many retailers depend on vendors for services ranging from maintenance to inventory support, which means third-party accounts often hold access to internal systems. Past retail breaches have shown that attackers frequently begin their intrusion not through the company itself but through a partner whose login rights were not secured with strong authentication or strict access controls. This amplifies the impact far beyond a single compromised account, highlighting the need for retailers to treat vendor and contractor credentials with the same seriousness as internal workforce accounts.
Balancing security with customer experience becomes especially challenging during peak seasons. Retailers cannot introduce so much friction that shoppers abandon their carts, yet they also cannot ignore the fact that most account takeovers begin with weak, reused, or compromised passwords.
Modern authentication frameworks recommend focusing on password length, screening new passwords against known breach data, and reducing reliance on outdated complexity rules that frustrate users without meaningfully improving security. Adaptive multi-factor authentication is viewed as the most practical solution. It triggers an additional verification step only when something unusual is detected, such as a login from an unfamiliar device, a significant change to account settings, or a suspicious location. This approach strengthens security without slowing down legitimate customers.
Internal systems require equal attention. Administrative dashboards, point-of-sale backends, vendor portals, and remote-access platforms usually hold higher levels of authority, which means they must follow a stricter standard. Mandatory MFA, centralized identity management, unique employee credentials, and secure vaulting of privileged passwords significantly reduce the blast radius of any single compromised account.
Holiday preparedness also requires a layered approach to blocking automated abuse. Retailers can deploy tools that differentiate real human activity from bots by studying device behavior, interaction patterns, and risk signals. Rate limits, behavioral monitoring for credential stuffing, and intelligence-based blocking of known malicious sources help limit abuse without overwhelming the customer experience. Invisible or background challenge mechanisms are often more effective than traditional CAPTCHAs, which can hinder sales during peak traffic.
A final but critical aspect of resilience is operational continuity. Authentication providers, SMS delivery routes, and verification systems can fail under heavy demand, and outages during peak shopping hours can have direct financial consequences. Retailers should run rehearsals before the season begins, including testing failover paths for sign-in systems, defining emergency access methods that are short-lived and fully auditable, and ensuring there is a manual verification process that stores can rely on if digital systems lag or fail. Running load tests and tabletop exercises helps confirm that backup procedures will hold under real stress.
Strengthening password policies and monitoring for compromised credentials also plays a vital role. Tools that enforce password screenings against known breach databases, encourage passphrases, restrict predictable patterns, and integrate directly with directory services allow retailers to apply consistent controls across both customer-facing and internal systems. Telemetry from these tools can reveal early signs of suspicious behavior, providing opportunities to intervene before attackers escalate their actions.
With attackers preparing earlier each year and using highly automated methods, retailers must enter the holiday season with defenses that are both proactive and adaptable. By tightening access controls, reinforcing authentication, preparing for system failures, and using layered detection methods, retailers can significantly reduce the likelihood of account takeovers and fraud, all while maintaining smooth and reliable shopping experiences for their customers.
A recent Android update has marked a paradigm shifting change in how text messages are handled on employer-controlled devices. This means Google has introduced a feature called Android RCS Archival, which lets organisations capture and store all RCS, SMS, and MMS communications sent through Google Messages on fully managed work phones. While the messages remain encrypted in transport, they can now be accessed on the device itself once delivered.
This update is designed to help companies meet compliance and record-keeping requirements, especially in sectors that must retain communication logs for regulatory reasons. Until now, many organizations had blocked RCS entirely because of its encryption, which made it difficult to archive. The new feature gives them a way to support richer messaging while still preserving mandatory records.
Archiving occurs via authorized third-party software that integrates directly with Google Messages on work-managed devices. Once enabled by a company's IT, the software will log every interaction inside of a conversation, including messages received, sent, edited, or later deleted. Employees using these devices will see a notification when archiving is active, signaling their conversations are being logged.
Google's indicated that this functionality only refers to work-managed Android devices, personal phones and personal profiles are not impacted, and the update doesn't allow employers access to user data on privately-owned devices. The feature must also be intentionally switched on by the organisation; it is not automatically on.
The update also brings to the surface a common misconception about encrypted messaging: End-to-end encryption protects content only while it's in transit between devices. When a message lands on a device that is owned and administered by an employer, the organization has the technical ability to capture it. It does not extend to over-the-top platforms - such as WhatsApp or Signal - that manage their own encryption. Those apps can expose data as well in cases where backups aren't encrypted or when the device itself is compromised.
This change also raises a broader issue: one of counterparty risk. A conversation remains private only if both ends of it are stored securely. Screenshots, unsafe backups, and linked devices outside the encrypted environment can all leak message content. Work-phone archiving now becomes part of that wider set of risks users should be aware of.
For employees, the takeaway is clear: A company-issued phone is a workplace tool, not a private device. Any communication that originates from a fully managed device can be archived, meaning personal conversations should stay on a personal phone. Users reliant on encrypted platforms have reason to review their backup settings and steer clear of mixing personal communication with corporate technology.
Google's new archival option gives organisations a compliance solution that brings RCS in line with traditional SMS logging, while for workers it is a further reminder that privacy expectations shift the moment a device is brought under corporate management.