Google owned Mandiant’s threat intelligence team is tracking the attacks under various clusters: UNC6661, UNC6671, and UNC6240 (aka ShinyHunters). These gangs might be improving their attack tactics. "While this methodology of targeting identity providers and SaaS platforms is consistent with our prior observations of threat activity preceding ShinyHunters-branded extortion, the breadth of targeted cloud platforms continues to expand as these threat actors seek more sensitive data for extortion," Mandiant said.
"Further, they appear to be escalating their extortion tactics with recent incidents, including harassment of victim personnel, among other tactics.”
UNC6661 was pretending to be IT staff sending employees to credential harvesting links tricking them into multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings. This was found during mid-January 2026.
Threat actors used stolen credentials to register their own device for MFA and further steal data from SaaS platforms. In one incident, the hacker exploited their access to infected email accounts to send more phishing emails to users in cryptocurrency based organizations.
The emails were later deleted to hide the tracks. Experts also found UNC6671 mimicking IT staff to fool victims to steal credentials and MFA login codes on credential harvesting websites since the start of this year. In a few incidents, the hackers got access to Okta accounts.
UNC6671 leveraged PowerShell to steal sensitive data from OneDrive and SharePoint.
The use of different domain registrars to register the credential harvesting domains (NICENIC for UNC6661 and Tucows for UNC6671) and the fact that an extortion email sent after UNC6671 activity did not overlap with known UNC6240 indicators are the two main differences between UNC6661 and UNC6671.
This suggests that other groups of people might be participating, highlighting how nebulous these cybercrime organizations are. Furthermore, the targeting of bitcoin companies raises the possibility that the threat actors are searching for other opportunities to make money.
Ivanti has released urgent security updates for two serious vulnerabilities in its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) platform that were already being abused by attackers before the flaws became public. EPMM is widely used by enterprises to manage and secure mobile devices, which makes exposed servers a high-risk entry point into corporate networks.
The two weaknesses, identified as CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340, allow attackers to remotely run commands on vulnerable servers without logging in. Both flaws were assigned near-maximum severity scores because they can give attackers deep control over affected systems. Ivanti confirmed that a small number of customers had already been compromised at the time the issues were disclosed.
This incident reflects a broader pattern of severe security failures affecting enterprise technology vendors in January in recent years. Similar high-impact vulnerabilities have previously forced organizations to urgently patch network security and access control products. The repeated targeting of these platforms shows that attackers focus on systems that provide centralized control over devices and identities.
Ivanti stated that only on-premises EPMM deployments are affected. Its cloud-based mobile management services, other endpoint management products, and environments using Ivanti cloud services with Sentry are not impacted by these flaws.
If attackers exploit these vulnerabilities, they can move within internal networks, change system settings, grant themselves administrative privileges, and access stored information. The exposed data may include basic personal details of administrators and device users, along with device-related information such as phone numbers and location data, depending on how the system is configured.
Ivanti has not provided specific indicators of compromise because only a limited number of confirmed cases are known. However, the company published technical analysis to support investigations. Security teams are advised to review web server logs for unusual requests, particularly those containing command-like input. Exploitation attempts may appear as abnormal activity involving internal application distribution or Android file transfer functions, sometimes producing error responses instead of successful ones. Requests sent to error pages using unexpected methods or parameters should be treated as highly suspicious.
Previous investigations show attackers often maintain access by placing or modifying web shell files on application error pages. Security teams should also watch for unexpected application archive files being added to servers, as these may be used to create remote connections back to attackers. Because EPMM does not normally initiate outbound network traffic, any such activity in firewall logs should be treated as a strong warning sign.
Ivanti advises organizations that detect compromise to restore systems from clean backups or rebuild affected servers before applying updates. Attempting to manually clean infected systems is not recommended. Because these flaws were exploited before patches were released, organizations that had vulnerable EPMM servers exposed to the internet at the time of disclosure should treat those systems as compromised and initiate full incident response procedures rather than relying on patching alone.
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released new guidance warning that insider threats represent a major and growing risk to organizational security. The advisory was issued during the same week reports emerged about a senior agency official mishandling sensitive information, drawing renewed attention to the dangers posed by internal security lapses.
In its announcement, CISA described insider threats as risks that originate from within an organization and can arise from either malicious intent or accidental mistakes. The agency stressed that trusted individuals with legitimate system access can unintentionally cause serious harm to data security, operational stability, and public confidence.
To help organizations manage these risks, CISA published an infographic outlining how to create a structured insider threat management team. The agency recommends that these teams include professionals from multiple departments, such as human resources, legal counsel, cybersecurity teams, IT leadership, and threat analysis units. Depending on the situation, organizations may also need to work with external partners, including law enforcement or health and risk professionals.
According to CISA, these teams are responsible for overseeing insider threat programs, identifying early warning signs, and responding to potential risks before they escalate into larger incidents. The agency also pointed organizations to additional free resources, including a detailed mitigation guide, training workshops, and tools to evaluate the effectiveness of insider threat programs.
Acting CISA Director Madhu Gottumukkala emphasized that insider threats can undermine trust and disrupt critical operations, making them particularly challenging to detect and prevent.
Shortly before the guidance was released, media reports revealed that Gottumukkala had uploaded sensitive CISA contracting documents into a public version of an AI chatbot during the previous summer. According to unnamed officials, the activity triggered automated security alerts designed to prevent unauthorized data exposure from federal systems.
CISA’s Director of Public Affairs later confirmed that the chatbot was used with specific controls in place and stated that the usage was limited in duration. The agency noted that the official had received temporary authorization to access the tool and last used it in mid-July 2025.
By default, CISA blocks employee access to public AI platforms unless an exception is granted. The Department of Homeland Security, which oversees CISA, also operates an internal AI system designed to prevent sensitive government information from leaving federal networks.
Security experts caution that data shared with public AI services may be stored or processed outside the user’s control, depending on platform policies. This makes such tools particularly risky when handling government or critical infrastructure information.
The incident adds to a series of reported internal disputes and security-related controversies involving senior leadership, as well as similar lapses across other US government departments in recent years. These cases are a testament to how poor internal controls and misuse of personal or unsecured technologies can place national security and critical infrastructure at risk.
While CISA’s guidance is primarily aimed at critical infrastructure operators and regional governments, recent events suggest that insider threat management remains a challenge across all levels of government. As organizations increasingly rely on AI and interconnected digital systems, experts continue to stress that strong oversight, clear policies, and leadership accountability are essential to reducing insider-related security risks.