When Rubrik launched Project Hourglass at its FORWARD 2026 conference in Las Vegas back in June, the initiative set out to answer a question CISOs were already losing sleep over: what happens when an AI agent writing and deploying your code does something catastrophic and nobody can stop it in time?
On Thursday, at its GSI Summit in Goa, India, the cybersecurity firm announced the next step. Rubrik has expanded Project Hourglass to include a new tool called Rubrik Code Guardian, and has welcomed AHEAD, Trace3, and World Wide Technology (WWT) into the alliance, joining the six systems integrators that signed on at launch. The new capability is powered by Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5 and extends the alliance's reach from securing AI agents during execution to proactively identifying vulnerabilities in software code before deployment.
The Problem Driving All of This
Rubrik Zero Labs surveyed more than 1,600 IT and security leaders for its State of the Agent report and found that 86 percent expect AI agents to outpace their security guardrails within a year, while only 23 percent report full visibility into agents operating in their environments. More than 80 percent said agents require more manual oversight than the efficiency they save.
A separate Rubrik and Economist Enterprise study found 88 percent of enterprises experienced an AI agent security breach in 2026. The picture those numbers paint is one of organizations racing to deploy autonomous systems while the controls meant to govern them are still catching up.
What Code Guardian Does
The original Project Hourglass, which launched with Cognizant, Deloitte, LTM, HCLTech, NTT DATA, and Wipro as founding partners, focused on protecting AI agents at runtime through Rubrik Agent Cloud. That platform operates across three layers: Runtime Agent Security for behavioral guardrails and blast-radius control, Agent Rewind for fast repository recovery, and AI Context Guard for prompt integrity and control-plane protection.
Code Guardian shifts the security lens earlier in the development cycle. Rather than running against live production environments, the system tests a cloned, air-gapped copy of customer repositories. Claude Mythos 5 operates inside Rubrik's security harness to evaluate code against sophisticated, multi-step threat scenarios.
Three core capabilities define the product: isolated red-team analysis inside the air-gapped environment; attack chain discovery that reasons across files, services, identity roles, and cloud perimeters to find chained vulnerabilities that conventional static tools miss; and business impact prioritization that filters findings by actual exploitability and business criticality to reduce alert fatigue.
Alok Agrawal, Chief Solutions Officer at Rubrik, put the challenge plainly. "Engineering teams are turning to AI models to accelerate software delivery, but speed cannot compromise security or architectural integrity. By incorporating Rubrik Code Guardian into Project Hourglass, we are ensuring engineering teams are able to conduct red-team analysis, prioritize business impact and reduce risk."
The New Partners
Each of the three incoming partners brings a different angle to the coalition.
AHEAD, which builds enterprise technology architectures for large clients, framed the problem as one of inherited risk. Steven Sorensen, Specialty Solutions Engineer for Cyber Resiliency at AHEAD, said the goal is to get code attacked, tested, and validated in a safe environment before it ships, so teams can move faster knowing Rubrik's recovery capabilities sit underneath them as a safety net.
WWT's Chris Konrad, Vice President of Global Cyber, pointed to the company's Advanced Technology Center, where isolated threat testing has long been part of how it validates security solutions before recommending them. He said Code Guardian integrates naturally with that process.
Trace3 brought a perspective the others did not: its own teams have been running Rubrik Agent Cloud internally to protect their own agentic AI work before recommending it to clients. Sandy Salty, Chief Marketing Officer at Trace3, said that experience as both a user and a partner gives the firm a clearer view of what actually makes agentic environments more resilient at scale.
Where Things Stand
Rubrik Code Guardian is currently in private preview and accepting select design partners. It is not yet generally available and may change or be discontinued. Rubrik Agent Cloud, the original platform at the center of Project Hourglass, remains available to enterprise clients.
Dev Rishi, GM of AI at Rubrik, has previously described the core problem in stark terms: with AI agents, there is the potential for ten times the damage in one-tenth the time. That framing captures why the urgency behind Project Hourglass is unlikely to ease. As the volume of AI-generated code increases across enterprise environments, the window between a vulnerability being introduced and it being found by someone with bad intentions keeps getting smaller.
Reported by TechRadar, the vulnerability could allow attackers who already have valid login credentials to increase their privileges within Exchange and access mailboxes belonging to other users. Microsoft released the fix on October 2, ahead of its originally intended schedule.
The security issue stems from a weakness in authorization controls, which determine what information a user can access. By exploiting the flaw over a network, an authenticated attacker could gain permissions beyond those assigned to their account.
Threat actors could first obtain credentials through phishing attacks or by purchasing stolen login details from underground online markets. Once inside an organization’s Exchange environment, they could exploit the vulnerability to read emails and attachments belonging to other employees.
However, the flaw does not provide unrestricted access across different customer environments, known as tenants. It also does not directly grant administrator-level or SYSTEM-level privileges on the underlying Windows server.
Successful exploitation could expose sensitive business information, including financial records, invoices, contracts, customer correspondence, internal discussions, and confidential documents.
Attackers could use the stolen information to support further cyberattacks. For example, they might impersonate company employees, send convincing fraudulent emails, or conduct business email compromise (BEC) scams to trick organizations into transferring money or disclosing additional information.
The vulnerability is particularly problematic because an ordinary employee’s compromised account could potentially provide an entry point for accessing information held in other employees’ mailboxes.
The vulnerability affects the following on-premises products:
Microsoft has confirmed that Exchange Online customers are protected by a server-side fix. Organizations running affected on-premises installations should install the appropriate security updates promptly.
Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 have reached the end of their standard support lifecycle. Eligible organizations must be enrolled in Microsoft’s Extended Security Update programme to receive the relevant updates for these versions. Microsoft recommends that organizations without the required coverage migrate to Exchange Server Subscription Edition.
Microsoft reported no evidence that the vulnerability was being actively exploited at the time of the report. However, the company assessed that exploitation was more likely, making timely patching important.
Administrators should run Microsoft’s Exchange Server Health Checker after installing the update to verify successful deployment and identify any additional actions required.
Researchers from Russian cybersecurity company Solar said they discovered the intrusion in December 2025. However, their investigation found evidence suggesting that the attackers had entered parts of the organization’s infrastructure as early as 2024.
The attack was attributed to the Belarusian Cyber Partisans, a group known for cyber operations against Belarusian and Russian government organizations and businesses.
Despite remaining inside the network for an extended period, the attackers did not appear to destroy systems or cause major disruption. Researchers believe maintaining access may have been more valuable to the attackers than immediately carrying out destructive activity.
Solar researchers identified several tools associated with the intrusion, including an updated version of the Vasilek Windows backdoor.
Vasilek was previously documented by Kaspersky as malware used by the Cyber Partisans. The backdoor can communicate with attackers through the Telegram Bot API and receive commands through a Telegram group. It can collect information from infected computers, execute Windows commands, transfer files, capture screenshots and record keystrokes.
Solar said the newer version found during its investigation was version 1.5.8. Researchers also identified techniques for maintaining persistence inside the victim’s environment. These included Windows services and the replacement of the vmtools.dll library associated with VMware Tools.
The attackers also used other communication and tunnelling tools, including DNS tunnels and proxy chains. This gave them alternative methods of communicating with compromised systems if one channel became unavailable.
Telegram restrictions in Russia affected Vasilek’s communications, but researchers said the attackers could use other methods to maintain their access.
The compromised organization was not publicly identified. However, researchers said it operated a large infrastructure connected to multiple other healthcare organizations.
This created a potential trusted-relationship attack risk. Once attackers gained control of one organization, its connections with other trusted healthcare entities could potentially provide opportunities to reach additional networks.
The researchers said the attackers accessed sensitive medical data but did not destroy the victim’s systems. The long period of access suggests that espionage, intelligence gathering and maintaining future access may have been more important than immediate disruption.
One of the most unusual features of the malware is its use of zero-width Unicode characters to hide information about a stolen password inside what appears to be a normal configuration file.
CloudSyncD is distributed through a malicious disk image designed to look like a legitimate Zoom installer. The installer includes instructions telling users to bypass macOS Gatekeeper by going to System Settings and manually allowing the application to run.
Once the fake installer is launched, the first-stage program, called app_installer, displays a fake authorization window asking for the user’s administrator password. It checks the entered password locally using macOS’s dscl command. If the password is incorrect, the malware can continue prompting the victim.
The stolen password is not immediately sent to the attackers. Instead, the malware stores it inside a file called data.json. The password is Base64-encoded and placed inside a larger string containing random characters.
The malware then uses U+200B ZERO WIDTH SPACE and U+200C ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER characters. These characters are invisible during normal viewing and encode the location and length of the hidden password. This technique allows malicious information to be concealed without obviously changing the appearance of the file.
The second stage is an embedded Mach-O executable capable of running on both Intel-based and Apple Silicon Macs. The malware attempts to execute the payload without initially writing it to disk. When that approach fails because of macOS security protections, it can create a temporary file and use the captured password with sudo to execute the backdoor with elevated privileges.
After execution, CloudSyncD collects information about the infected Mac, including hardware and operating-system details, account information and network-related data. It communicates with a command-and-control server and can periodically check for additional instructions.
Researchers observed check-ins occurring approximately every 8 to 16 seconds in analyzed samples. The backdoor can receive executable files or compressed archives, potentially allowing attackers to deploy additional malware on an infected system.
