Search This Blog

Powered by Blogger.

Blog Archive

Labels

Showing posts with label ESET. Show all posts

Embargo Ransomware Uses Custom Rust-Based Tools for Advanced Defense Evasion

 


Researchers at ESET claim that Embargo ransomware is using custom Rust-based tools to overcome cybersecurity defences built by vendors such as Microsoft and IBM. An instance of this new toolkit was observed during a ransomware incident targeting US companies in July 2024 and was composed of a loader and an EDR killer, namely MDeployer and MS4Killer, respectively, and was observed during a ransomware attack targeting US companies. 

Unlike other viruses, MS4Killer was customized for each victim's environment, excluding only selected security solutions. This makes it particularly dangerous to those who are unaware of its existence. It appears that the tools were created together and that some of the functionality in the tools overlaps. This report has revealed that the ransomware payloads of MDeployer, MS4Killer and Embargo were all made in Rust, which indicates that this language is the programming language that the group favours. 

During the summer of 2024, the first identification of the Embargo gang took place. This company appears to have a good amount of resources, being able to develop custom tools as well as set up its own infrastructure to help communicate with those affected. A double extortion method is used by the group - as well as encrypting the victims' data and extorting data from them, they threaten to publish those data on a leak site, demonstrating their intention to leak their data. 

Moreover, ESET considers Embargo to be a provider of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that provides threats to users. The group is also able to adjust quickly during attacks. “The main purpose of the Embargo toolkit is to secure successful deployment of the ransomware payload by disabling the security solution in the victim’s infrastructure. Embargo puts a lot of effort into that, replicating the same functionality at different stages of the attack,” the researchers wrote. 

“We have also observed the attackers’ ability to adjust their tools on the fly, during an active intrusion, for a particular security solution,” they added. MDeployer is the main malicious loader Embargo attempts to deploy on victims’ machines in the compromised network. Its purpose is to facilitate ransomware execution and file encryption. It executes two payloads, MS4Killer and Embargo ransomware, and decrypts two encrypted files a.cache and b.cache that were dropped by an unknown previous stage. 

When the ransomware finishes encrypting the system, MDeployer terminates the MS4Killer process, deletes the decrypted payloads and a driver file dropped by MS4Killer, and finally reboots the system. Another feature of MDeployer is when it is executed with admin privileges as a DLL file, it attempts to reboot the victim’s system into Safe Mode to disable selected security solutions. As most cybersecurity defenses are not in effect in Safe Mode, it helps threat actors avoid detection. 

MS4Killer is a defense evasion tool that terminates security product processes using a technique known as bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD). MS4Killer terminates security products from the kernel by installing and abusing a vulnerable driver that is stored in a global variable. The process identifier of the process to terminate is passed to s4killer as a program argument. 

Embargo has extended the tool’s functionality with features such as running in an endless loop to constantly scan for running processes and hardcoding the list of process names to kill in the binary. After disabling the security tooling, Embargo affiliates can run the ransomware payload without worrying whether their payload gets detected. During attacks, the group can also adjust to the environment quickly, which is another advantage.

Basically, what Embargo toolkit does is that it offers a method of ensuring the successful deployment of the ransomware payload and prevents the security solution from being enabled in the victim's infrastructure on the day of deployment. This is something that Embargo invests a lot of time and effort into, replicating the same functionality at different stages of the attack process," wrote the researchers. They added that the attackers also showed a capability to modify their tools on the fly, during an active intrusion, by adjusting the settings on different security solutions on the fly. 

As part of Embargo's campaign against victims in the compromised network, MDeployer is one of the main malicious loaders that it attempts to deploy on victims' machines. With the use of this tool, ransomware can be executed and files can be encrypted easily. During the execution process, two payloads are executed, MS4Killer and Embargo ransomware, which decrypt two encrypted files a.cache and b.cache that have been left over from an unknown earlier stage onto the system.

After its encryption process, the MDeployer program systematically terminates the MS4Killer process, erases any decrypted payloads, and removes a driver previously introduced by MS4Killer. Upon completing these actions, the MDeployer initiates a system reboot. This process helps ensure that no remnants of the decryption or defence-evasion components persist on the system, potentially aiding threat actors in maintaining operational security. In scenarios where MDeployer is executed as a DLL file with administrative privileges, it has an additional capability: rebooting the compromised system into Safe Mode. 

This mode restricts numerous core functionalities, which is often leveraged by threat actors to minimize the effectiveness of cybersecurity defences and enhance stealth. Since most security tools do not operate in Safe Mode, this functionality enables attackers to evade detection more effectively and hinder any active defences, making detection and response significantly more challenging. The MS4Killer utility functions as a defense-evasion mechanism that specifically targets security product processes for termination. This is achieved using a technique referred to as "bring your own vulnerable driver" (BYOVD), wherein threat actors exploit a known vulnerable driver. 

By installing and leveraging this driver, which is maintained within a global variable, MS4Killer is able to terminate security processes from the kernel level, bypassing higher-level protections. The identifier for the targeted process is supplied as an argument to the MS4Killer program. To further enhance MS4Killer’s effectiveness, Embargo has incorporated additional capabilities, such as enabling the tool to run continuously in a loop. This looping function allows it to monitor for active processes that match a predefined list, which is hardcoded within the binary, and terminate them as they appear. 

By persistently disabling security tools, Embargo affiliates can then deploy ransomware payloads with minimal risk of detection or interference, creating an environment highly conducive to successful exploitation.

Security Defenses Crippled by Embargo Ransomware

 


There is a new gang known as Embargo ransomware that specializes in ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). According to a study by ESET researchers published Wednesday, the Embargo ransomware group is a relatively young and undeveloped ransomware gang. It uses a custom Rust-based toolkit, with one variant utilizing the Windows Safe Mode feature to disable security processes.

ESET researchers say that the Embargo ransomware group is developing custom Rust-based tools to defeat the cybersecurity defenses put in place by companies and governments. There is a new toolkit that was discovered in July 2024 during an attack on US companies by ransomware and is made up of a loader and an EDR killer, MDeployer, and MS4Killer, respectively, which can also be accessed and downloaded online. There are several ways in which MS4Killer can be utilized. 

For instance, it can be compiled according to each victim's environment, targeting only specific security solutions. As it appears that both tools were developed together, there is some overlap in functionality between them. Several of the programs that were developed as part of the group, including MDeployer, MS4Killer, and Embargo's ransomware payload, are written in Rust, thus suggesting that the language is one that the developers use most often. It is claimed that the group has committed ten acts of cybercrime on its dark web leak site, including a non-bank lender from Australia, a police department from South Carolina, and a community hospital from Idaho. 

An interview conducted in June with a self-proclaimed representative of Embargo said that the group specializes in ransomware-as-a-service, with affiliates taking an extortion payment of up to 80%. It is believed that the toolkit discovered by Eset consists of two primary components: MDeployer, which is designed to deploy Embargo's ransomware and other malicious payloads, and MS4Killer, which is built to exploit vulnerable drivers to disable endpoint detection and response systems. 

In both MDeployment and MS4Killer, Rust is used as the programming language. Because of its memory protection features as well as its low-level capabilities, it can be used to create malware that is both effective and resilient. A study conducted by Eset reported that Embargo can target both Windows and Linux systems with Rust. It was in May 2024, one month after the first observation of Embargo in the ESET telemetry in June 2024 that Embargo was publicly observed for the first time. There are several reasons why the group has drawn attention besides the fact that it successfully breached high-profile targets as well as the language it used for its ransomware payload that piqued people's curiosity. 

As part of its development, Embargo chose Rust, which is a cross-platform programming language that provided the potential to develop ransomware that targets both Windows and Linux platforms. The Embargo group follows in the footsteps of BlackCat and Hive as yet another group developing ransomware payloads using Rust programming language. It is clear from Embargo's mode of operation that it is a well-resourced group considering its modus operandi. This system also allows victims to communicate with it via Tox, which results in the communication being managed by the system itself. It is a group that uses double extortion to force victims to pay him and then publishes the stolen information on its leaked website too. 

It is the MDeployer that Embargo uses mainly to install malicious loads on victims' computers within the compromised network to destroy them. An application for this purpose is designed to make it easier to execute ransomware and encrypt files. Two payloads are executed, MS4Killer and Embargo ransomware. Additionally, two encrypted files, a.cache, and b.cache, which were dropped by an unknown stage in the previous step, are decrypted and delivered to the victim. 

If the ransomware finishes encrypting the system, the MDeployer terminates the MS4Killer process, deletes all the decrypted payload files and the driver file dropped by MS4Killer, and finally restarts the computer. Besides the fact that MDeployer can run as a DLL file with administrative privileges, it has also the ability to reboot the victim's system into a Safe Mode if it is executed with administrator access. This is because major cybersecurity defenses aren't switched on in Safe Mode, which allows threat actors to continue operating undetected. The initial intrusion vector is unknown, however, once MDeployer has installed itself on the victim machine, it decrypts MS4Killer from the encrypted file "b.cache" and drops the file "praxisbackup.exe" into the system. 

In every single case observed by ESET, the MDeployer used the same hardcoded RC4 key to decrypt both files from "a.cache" and dropped and executed them as "pay.exe." MDeployer decrypted both files using the same hardcoded RC4 key. It has been reported that MS4Killer allegedly builds upon the S4Killer proof-of-concept tool available on GitHub and drops the vulnerable mini-filter drive problem.sys version 3.0.0.4 as part of what is known as the "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" idea (BYOVD), which is a technique developed to deal with driver vulnerabilities in general. The researchers wrote in their paper that MS4Killer exploits this vulnerability to obtain kernel-level code execution and interacts with security software to carry out its malicious purposes. 

The Embargo's version of MS4Killer differs from the original MS4Killer in that Embargo has hardcoded a list of the processes to be killed into its binary. It has also encrypted the embedded driver blob which is an RC4 hash. Using cloud-based techniques, ESET researchers describe how MS4Killer runs in an endless loop and constantly seeks out processes that need to be terminated.   

MDeployer, a component of the Embargo ransomware attack chain, meticulously logs any errors encountered during its operations in a file named “fail.txt.” Upon completion of the attack — whether by successful ransomware deployment or an error in loader execution halting the attack — the MDeployer initiates a cleanup routine. This process includes terminating the MS4Killer loop and deleting specific files such as praxisbackup.exe, pay.exe, and a vulnerable driver. 

Additionally, it generates a control file named “stop.exe,” which certain MDeployer versions reference to prevent re-execution and, consequently, double encryption. Embargo, developed in Rust, appends each encrypted file with a unique, randomly generated six-character extension combining letters and numbers, such as “.b58eeb.” It also drops a ransom note titled “HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt” in each affected directory. The group has established its secure infrastructure for covert communication with victims but provides the option to negotiate through Tox chat as well. 

Although still developing, Embargo shows signs of ambition, borrowing techniques from established ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) groups. These include implementing the "bring your vulnerable driver" (BYOVD) strategy, exploiting Safe Mode, and leveraging the adaptable Rust programming language. ESET's analysis highlights Embargo’s indicators of compromise (IoCs) and its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), offering guidance to help organizations defend against this emerging threat.

CosmicBeetle Exploits Vulnerabilities in Small Businesses Globally

 

CosmicBeetle is a cybercriminal group exploiting vulnerabilities in software commonly used by small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) across Turkey, Spain, India, and South Africa. Their main tool, a custom ransomware called ScRansom, is still under development, leading to various issues in the encryption process. This sometimes leaves victims unable to recover their data, making the ransomware not only dangerous but also unpredictable. 

Based on analysis by Slovakian cybersecurity firm ESET, CosmicBeetle’s skills as malware developers are relatively immature. This inexperience has led to chaotic encryption schemes, with one victim’s machines being encrypted multiple times. Such issues complicate the decryption process, making it unreliable for victims to restore their data, even if they comply with ransom demands. Unlike well-established ransomware groups that focus on making the decryption process smoother to encourage payment, CosmicBeetle’s flawed approach undermines its effectiveness, leaving victims in a state of uncertainty. 

Interestingly, the group has attempted to boost its reputation by implying ties to the infamous LockBit group, a well-known and more sophisticated ransomware operation. However, these claims seem to be a tactic to appear more credible to their victims. CosmicBeetle has also joined the RansomHub affiliate program, which allows them to distribute third-party ransomware, likely as an attempt to strengthen their attack strategies. The group primarily targets outdated and unpatched software, especially in SMBs with limited cybersecurity infrastructure. They exploit known vulnerabilities in Veeam Backup & Replication and Microsoft Active Directory. 

While CosmicBeetle doesn’t specifically focus on SMBs, their choice of software vulnerabilities makes smaller organizations, which often lack robust patch management, easy targets. According to ESET, businesses in sectors such as manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, education, healthcare, and legal industries are particularly vulnerable. CosmicBeetle’s attacks are opportunistic, scanning for weak spots in various sectors where companies might not have stringent security measures in place. Turkey, in particular, has seen a high concentration of CosmicBeetle’s attacks, suggesting that the group may be operating from within the region. 

However, organizations in Spain, India, and South Africa have also been affected, illustrating the group’s global reach. CosmicBeetle’s focus on exploiting older vulnerabilities demonstrates the need for businesses to prioritize patching and updating their systems regularly. One key issue with CosmicBeetle’s operations is the immaturity of their ransomware development. Unlike more experienced cybercriminals, CosmicBeetle’s encryption tool is in a constant state of flux, making it unreliable for victims. While ESET has been able to verify that the decryption tool technically works, its rapid and frequent updates leave victims uncertain whether they can fully recover their data. To reduce the risk of falling victim to such attacks, SMBs must prioritize several cybersecurity measures. 

First and foremost, regular software updates and patch management are essential. Vulnerabilities in widely used platforms like Veeam Backup and Microsoft Active Directory must be addressed promptly. Businesses should also invest in employee cybersecurity training, emphasizing the importance of recognizing phishing attacks and suspicious links. In addition to these basic cybersecurity practices, companies should back up their data regularly and have robust incident response plans. Having a reliable backup strategy can mitigate the damage in the event of a ransomware attack, ensuring that data can be restored without paying the ransom. Companies should also invest in cybersecurity solutions that monitor for unusual network activity, providing early warning signs of potential breaches.

EvilVideo Exploit: Telegram Zero-Day Vulnerability Allows Disguised APK Attacks

 

A recent zero-day vulnerability in Telegram for Android, dubbed ‘EvilVideo,’ has been exploited by attackers to send malicious Android APK payloads disguised as video files. This significant security flaw was first brought to light when a threat actor named ‘Ancryno’ started selling the exploit on June 6, 2024, on the Russian-speaking XSS hacking forum. 

The vulnerability affected Telegram versions 10.14.4 and older. ESET researchers discovered the flaw after a proof-of-concept demonstration was shared on a public Telegram channel, allowing them to analyze the malicious payload. They confirmed that the exploit worked on Telegram v10.14.4 and older, naming it ‘EvilVideo.’ The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed to Telegram by ESET researcher Lukas Stefanko on June 26 and again on July 4, 2024. Telegram responded on July 4, indicating that they were investigating the report. 

Subsequently, they patched the vulnerability in version 10.14.5, released on July 11, 2024. This timeline suggests that threat actors had at least five weeks to exploit the zero-day vulnerability before it was patched. While it remains unclear if the flaw was actively exploited in attacks, ESET shared a command and control server (C2) used by the payloads at ‘infinityhackscharan.ddns[.]net.’ BleepingComputer identified two malicious APK files using that C2 on VirusTotal that masqueraded as Avast Antivirus and an ‘xHamster Premium Mod.’ 

The EvilVideo zero-day exploit specifically targeted Telegram for Android. It allowed attackers to create specially crafted APK files that, when sent to other users on Telegram, appeared as embedded videos. ESET believes the exploit used the Telegram API to programmatically create a message showing a 30-second video preview. The channel participants received the payload on their devices once they opened the conversation. 

For users who had disabled the auto-download feature, a single tap on the video preview was enough to initiate the file download. When users attempted to play the fake video, Telegram suggested using an external player, which could lead recipients to tap the “Open” button, executing the payload. Despite the threat actor’s claim that the exploit was “one-click,” the multiple clicks, steps, and specific settings required for a successful attack significantly reduced the risk. ESET tested the exploit on Telegram’s web client and Telegram Desktop and found that it didn’t work on these platforms, as the payload was treated as an MP4 video file. 

Telegram’s fix in version 10.14.5 now correctly displays the APK file in the preview, preventing recipients from being deceived by files masquerading as videos. Users who recently received video files requesting an external app to play via Telegram are advised to perform a filesystem scan using a mobile security suite to locate and remove any malicious payloads.

Defending Digital Frontiers: Strategies for Organizations in an Unstable World

Global Stability Issues Alter Cyber Threat Landscape

An overview

  • Geopolitical Tensions: Regional stability issues, such as political conflicts and economic tensions, have a direct impact on cyber threats. As geopolitical events unfold, threat actors adapt their strategies to exploit vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Trends: While no groundbreaking attack methods have emerged, existing techniques continue to evolve. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups remain active, targeting government entities, critical infrastructure, and private organizations.
  • Leading Actors: ESET’s research identifies Russia-aligned APT groups as the most prolific attackers. Their sophisticated campaigns target various sectors, including energy, finance, and defense. China-aligned actors follow closely, focusing on espionage and intellectual property theft.

The current landscape

A recent analysis from threat intelligence analysts ESET claims that threat actors are increasing their attacks worldwide, with geographic events determining which locations are most heavily targeted. The principal author of the research recommends that CISOs to intensify their protection plans in light of the activity, even if he claims that no new attack techniques have been discovered.

The director of threat research at ESET, Jean-Ian Boutin said  that current attack methods "still work well." Thus, attackers don't always need to use innovative vectors. According to Boutin, CISOs are defending against these attacks properly; they only need to fortify themselves even more.

Impact on regional stability

The researchers claim that because the primary worldwide assault trends that ESET has identified have been directly impacted by regional stability difficulties, these challenges are also affecting the cyber sphere. The report focuses on activities of specific advanced persistent threat (APT) groups from October 2023 to March 2024, the experts said in the report.

Researchers from ESET also observed that organizations connected with Russia were concentrating on espionage activities throughout the European Union in addition to assaults against Ukraine.

Along with operations against Ukraine, ESET researchers also saw that entities connected with Russia were concentrating on espionage across the European Union. However, the researchers noted that several threat actors with ties to China took use of flaws in software and public-facing hardware, including firewalls and VPNs, as well as Confluence and Microsoft Exchange Server, to gain first access to targets across a variety of sectors.

Analysis of attacks

Using emotions to keep the assault from being disclosed is one of the more recent strategies ESET is witnessing in North Korea; this will probably increase the tactic's usefulness and duration. According to Boutin, the method has been used for years, but North Korean APT organizations are making a small adjustment.

Under the guise of a job application, the hack targets programmers and other technical talent at numerous significant US corporations. The victim is exposed to the malware and the trap is set when the attacker poses as a recruiter for such companies and requests that the victims complete an online test to demonstrate their technical proficiency.

Implications for CISOs

  • Defense Strategies: Organizations must strengthen their defense mechanisms. Proactive threat intelligence, robust network security, and employee training are essential. Zero-day vulnerabilities and supply chain attacks require constant vigilance.
  • Threat Attribution: Understanding threat actors’ motivations and affiliations is crucial. Attribution helps tailor defenses and prioritize resources effectively. Collaboration among security professionals and law enforcement agencies is vital.
  • Risk Assessment: Organizations should assess their risk exposure based on geopolitical events. Consider the impact of regional instability on critical assets and operations. Regular risk assessments inform decision-making.

XDSpy Hackers Target Russian Military Industrial Companies

XDSpy hackers attack military-industrial companies in Russia

XDSpy attcks Russian industries

A cyberespionage group called XDSpy has recently attacked Russian military-industrial enterprises, as per new research. 

XDSpy is said to be a state-controlled hacker, in the game since 2011, that mainly targets counties across Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In its recent November campaign, attackers tried to get entry into the Russian metallurgical enterprise systems and a research organization involved in the production and development of guided missile weapons, as per Russian cybersecurity form F.A.C.C.T.

F.A.C.C.T. — an offshoot of Singapore-based cybersecurity firm Group IB — reported earlier this week that hackers sent phishing emails to their victims, posing as a research organization dealing in nuclear weapon design.

Similiar tacticts used from previous attacks

The group's tactics were similar to those used in their earlier attack on Russian companies, which included a well-known scientific facility in July. During that event, the hackers pretended to be Russia's Ministry of Emergency Situations and sent phishing emails with malicious PDF files. Researchers did not say whether attackers could break into the victims' systems and steal data.

According to F.A.C.C.T., Russia is the major target of XDSpy hackers. According to analysts, the gang used to target the country's government, military, financial institutions, and energy, research, and mining firms.

Even though the group has been active for years, there is no proof of its strikes on Russia, particularly since many foreign cybersecurity companies fled the country following the Russian takeover of Ukraine.

Spearphishing attacks used in attacks

ESET, a cybersecurity firm based in Slovakia, has been monitoring XDSpy's behavior since 2020, and researcher Matthieu Faou said that the group has constantly undertaken spearphishing efforts aimed mostly at important companies in Eastern Europe.

ESET lost first-hand visibility of cyberattacks occurring in Russia and Belarus after leaving these countries, both targets of XDSpy. However, the business announced last week that it had spotted the group's attack on a Ukrainian aerospace company.

Hackers utilized a breach chain nearly identical to the one described by F.A.C.C.T. in this attempt, which was not officially reported by Ukrainian security services and was likely unsuccessful. "We do agree with their analysis and also attribute this to XDSpy," stated Faou.

Despite the group's extensive history, analysts have not been able to pinpoint the country that is funding it. XDSpy may not have an exceptionally sophisticated toolbox, but "they have very good operative defense," according to Faou. "So far, we haven't found any errors that could point toward a specific country."

Russia: Victim of Cyberattack

Because many Western corporations have little access to computer systems in the region, reports about cyberattacks against Russia are rare.

This week, on the other hand, has been jam-packed with reports from Russian cybersecurity organizations. In addition to the XDSpy attack, F.A.C.C.T. recorded a DarkWatchman malware-based strike on Russian banks, telecom providers, logistics organizations, and IT firms. A phishing email was disguised as a newsletter from a Russian courier delivery firm by the hackers. The outcome of these strikes is uncertain.

According to the Russian cybersecurity firm Positive Technologies, which has been sanctioned by the US, another cyberattack was carried out by a new hacker gang called Hellhounds. Hellhounds has already infiltrated at least 20 Russian businesses, including government institutions, technology firms, and space and energy industries.

Rare Wolf hackers were also recorded by the cybersecurity firm BI.ZONE. According to researchers, the gang has targeted approximately 400 Russian companies since 2019.

These assessments do not reveal which countries are responsible for the attacks against Russia. However, analysts at the cybersecurity firm Solar stated in a November report that the majority of state-sponsored attacks against Russia come from North Korea and China, with a primary focus on data theft.


Scarab Ransomware Toolkit: Unveiling the Ingenious Weaponry

 


In a recent report, cybersecurity researchers from the ESET cybersecurity company highlighted that malware of the Scarab ransomware family has been deployed to spread its variants across global victim organizations using a malicious toolset named Spacecolon. 

ESET has issued an advisory about the vulnerability of the toolset that may allow targeted attackers to penetrate victim organizations by exploiting commonly vulnerable web servers or using brute-force attacks against Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials to gain entry into victim organizations. As a result of ESET's investigation, it was also discovered that certain Spacecolon versions include Turkish strings, which suggests that a Turkish-speaking developer was involved in the development of these versions.  

According to a detailed technical report released on August 22, 2023, by ESET security researcher Jakub Souek, the Spacecolon malicious toolkit is being used by a cyber campaign that is targeting organizations all over the world to spread various variants of the Scarab ransomware, and it is targeting anti-torture organizations in particular. 

As of May 20, 2023, the most recent build of Spacecolon has been carried out, and the roots of the project can be traced back to as early as May 2020. Despite extensive tracking and analysis, ESET does not yet have an explanation as to what threat actor group is likely to be using the toolset to exploit the system. This has led to the name "CosmicBeetle" being used by the firm for the operators behind Spacecolon due to the similarity of their names. 

The threat actor CosmicBeetle is reported to have infiltrated some companies through misconfigured web servers, and they attempt to brute-force login information for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by accessing misconfigured web servers. There have been victims across several countries who have been identified as having been infected by the Spacecolon virus since May 2020. This includes France, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey.

An American school in Mexico was attacked by a group of hackers, who chose a hospital and tourist resort in Thailand as their targets, an insurance company in Israel, a Polish government organization, an entertainment company in Brazil, and a Turkish environmental company based in Turkey. Further, Cosmic Beetle may also target unpatched servers that have not yet been updated with security patches, attempting to infiltrate networks by exploiting these vulnerabilities. 

The CosmicBeetle botnet deploys the main Spacecolon component used by CosmicBeetle to compromise vulnerable web servers after CosmicBeetle compromises the target web server. It is called ScHackTool. This type of attack relies heavily on the operating system's GUI and the active participation of operators; the GUI enables operators to orchestrate attacks and download and execute additional tools on demand, according to their requirements, on compromised machines. 

A CosmicBeetle can deploy ScInstaller over the local network and use it to further secure the target. For example, it can use ScInstaller to install ScService, which provides even further remote access to the target. Ultimately, CosmicBeetle deploys the Scarab ransomware variant as its final payload as a part of its campaign. 

A clipboard monitoring software known as ClipBanker is deployed in this variant, which monitors the contents of the clipboard and changes any suspicious contents, e.g. cryptocurrency wallet addresses, into a controlled address that is controlled by the attacker. Additionally, samples of a new ransomware family are being uploaded to VirusTotal from Turkey, suggesting that this family is being developed. 

As a result of the research conducted by ESET, the company is convinced that this malware has been written by the same developers that wrote Spacecolon, a virus that has been named ScRansom by ESET. In addition to it encrypting all hard drives, removable drives, and remote drives, ScRansom also encrypts e-mail. 

The ransomware has not yet been seen in the wild, and the development stage of this ransomware is still at a pre-release stage. First discovered in February 2023, it is most likely that the attacks have changed intact as a result of the discovery of Spacecolon variants released by Zaufana Trzecia Strona. 

Spacecolon is primarily composed of ScHackTool, an orchestrator based on Delphi that deploys an installer that, just as the name implies, installs ScService, a backdoor that can run customized commands, download and execute payloads, and extract information from compromised systems to obtain system information. It is also responsible for incorporating several third-party tools that are retrieved from a remote server, IP address 193.149.185.23, which can be accessed using ScHackTool. They are aimed at exploiting the access provided by ScService to introduce a ransomware variant called Scarab that has the goal of obtaining ransom money from the user. 

The threat actors using Impacket to deliver ScService in place of ScHackTool is also another alternative infection chain identified by ESET, indicating that the threats are experimenting with different techniques to deploy ScService instead of ScHackTool. 

The motives of CosmicBeetle have been financial, as the ransomware payload includes clipper malware that monitors the system clipboard and replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses with ones the attacker controls through the use of file-sharing programs. 

There is also evidence that suggests that there may be active development of another strain of ransomware known as ScRansom that is actively being developed. AES-128 can be used to encrypt hard drives, removable drives, and networked drives; the encryption key can be derived from a hard-coded string, making the variant suitable for cases when the encryption key must be derived from multiple sources. 

A second issue with CosmicBeetle's malware is the lack of effort to conceal its presence, as well as the fact that their toolset leaves several artifacts behind when compromised machines are compromised, as well as a lack of robust anti-analysis and anti-emulation defenses.

GravityRAT: ESET Researchers Discover New Android Malware Campaign


ESET researchers have recently discovered a new Android malware campaign, apparently infecting devices with an updated version of GravityRAT, distributed via messaging apps BingeChat and Chitaco. The campaign has been active since August 2022.

According to ESET researcher Lukas Stenfanko who examined a sample after getting a tip from MalwareHunterTeam, it was found that one of the noteworthy new features seen in the most recent GravityRAT version is the ability to collect WhatsApp backup files.

GravtiRAT

A remote access tool called GravityRAT has been used in targeted cyberattacks on India since at least 2015 and is known to be in use. There are versions for Windows, Android, and macOS, as previously reported by Cisco Talos, Kaspersky, and Cyble. However it is still unknown who is the actor behind GravityRAT, the group has been internally defined as SpaceCobra.

Although GravityRAT has been active since at least 2015, it only began specifically focusing on Android in 2020. Its operators, 'SpaceCobra,' only employ the malware in specific targeting tasks.

Current Android Campaign

According to ESET, the app is delivered via “bingechat[.]net” and other domains or distribution channels, however, the downloads require invites, entering valid login information, or creating a new account.

While registrations are currently closed, this method only enables the threat actors to distribute the malware to targeted users. Additionally, accessing a copy for analysis becomes more difficult for researchers. 

Upon installation on the target's smartphone, the BingeChat app makes dangerous requests for access to contacts, location, phone, SMS, storage, call records, camera, and microphone.

Since these are some typical permissions asked of the users for any instant messaging apps, the malicious app goes unsuspected.

The program provides call records, contact lists, SMS messages, device location, and basic device information to the threat actor's command and control (C2) server before the user registers on BingeChat.

Along with the aforementioned records, files, and document files of jpg, jpeg, log, png, PNG, JPG, JPEG, txt, pdf, xml, doc, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, docx, opus, crypt14, crypt12, crypt13, crypt18, and crypt32 types, have also been compromised.

While SpaceCobra’s malware campaign is mainly targeting India, all Android users are advised to refrain from downloading APKs anywhere other than Google Play and be very careful with potentially risky permission requests while installing any app.

Vehicles Stolen Using High-Tech Methods by Criminals

 


Over the past 20 years, the number of cars stolen in the United States has been reduced by half. However, authorities are now seeing an increasing number of break-ins associated with high-tech techniques being used in these break-ins. 

There has been evidence to suggest that some employees at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) misused law enforcement databases to spy on their romantic partners, neighbors, and business partners. 

According to a new dataset obtained through records requests, hundreds of ICE employees and contractors have been under scrutiny since 2016 because they attempted to access medical, biometric, and location data without permission. There are more questions raised by the revelations about ICE's rights to protect sensitive information. 

Local intelligence agencies have found that in the current period, criminals are using sophisticated technology to target high-end luxury cars equipped with keyless entry systems and emergency starting features to commit theft. 

It was noted that the group identified three main methods criminals use to gain access to and steal vehicles with these features across the nation.

There was a video that was captured by Michael Shin of Los Angeles two years ago, where he captured the image of a man opening his car while holding just a backpack. As Shin explained, the man was not prepared to break into the car, as he had no break-in tools in his possession.  An NICB official affirmed that 35 vehicles were tested using this type of system by the NICB. As a result, 18 test cars were opened, started, and driven off by the team, with no problems at all. 

Morris said it was believed that professional criminals have discovered how to build their versions of the devices that the NICB used for its break-in tests. Morris explained that the NICB used devices supplied by a company that works closely with law enforcement on security testing for these tests. 

With criminals discovering how to hack into vehicle security systems and defeat them, car owners must be vigilant to protect their vehicles. As Morris pointed out in his statement, this is a serious reminder of the risks associated with today's cars that function as essentially "computers on wheels." 

In a recent study, ESET researchers discovered that there is a significant amount of sensitive data contained within old enterprise routers. The company purchased an old router and analyzed it, discovering it had login details for the company VPN, hashed root admin passwords, and details of the previous owner. The old routers contained login details for the company VPN and other valuable information. As a result of the information available on the router, it is easy to impersonate the company that sold it previously. Passkeys are going to take over all your passwords in the future, but a messy phase is beginning to emerge in the race to replace all your passwords with them. Getting new technologies off to a good start is among the biggest challenges in introducing them to the market. 

The fact that authorities have been puzzled by this type of break-in in the past has been a source of puzzlement for several years now but insurance investigators now believe that criminals are using key fobs - the little authentication devices you use to access newer models that are “keyless” - to start and unlock cars remotely by simply pushing a button. 

As a result of tests conducted by the research and development team, the group found that the vehicle's computer-controlled systems are being exploited by thieves carrying out highly sophisticated cyber-attacks.

It is important to note that a combination of CAN attacks, FOB relays, and key cloning attacks are among these attacks. 

  • When a CAN Attack occurs, high-tech electronic equipment is used to gain entry to the vehicle's Control Area Network and then access the computer system to start the engine using remote access software. As a result, the vehicle begins working as soon as the engine is started. 
  • By utilizing advanced receivers and transmitters aimed at remote reading the vehicle's security key, Fob Relaying is possible, allowing an attacker to unlock and begin the vehicle even if it is in the owner's possession. 
  • In the third method, a variety of sophisticated techniques and equipment are used to disable the vehicle's alarm system and then clone and steal the security key for the vehicle after the vehicle has been forced entry.

A Corporate Secret is not Destroyed, it's Discarded: Threat of Old Routers

 



Many business network environments probably experience the process of removing a defunct router from a rack and accommodating a shiny refurbished replacement now and then. The fate of the disposed router should be as significant, if not more so, as the smooth transition and delivery of the upgraded kit into the rack. The truth is, however, that this is not always the case. 

Home and business security are threatened by security issues stemming from vulnerabilities in routers. These threats can extend beyond email compromises to security breaches in physical homes. However, despite this, people rarely consider security as a concern when using their devices. According to research, approximately 73% of Internet users never consider upgrading their router or securing their system. Therefore, it can be considered one of the major threats to the Internet of Things.

It surprised the ESET research team that in many cases, previously used configurations had not been wiped away when they purchased a few used routers to setup a test environment, causing them to be shocked upon realizing the data on the routers could be used as a source of identification along with the network configurations of the prior owners. 

The researchers purchased 18 used routers made by three popular vendors: Cisco, Fortinet, and Juniper Networks, in a variety of models. Nine of them were found exactly the way their owners left them, fully accessible. Only five of the remaining ones had been properly wiped by their owners. One of the devices was encrypted, one was dead, and the other was a mirror copy of an encrypted device.  

All nine devices left uncovered appear to contain credentials for the organization's VPN. They also contained credentials for another secure network communication service, or hashed passwords for root administrators of the organization. The identifying data included in all of them was sufficient to identify the previous owner or operator of the router. In addition, it enabled router identification.  

Data gathered from these devices could be used to launch cyberattacks – including customer data, router-to-router authentication keys, list of applications, and several other things, if this data is put into the wrong hands. An attacker could have gained access to a company's digital assets by gaining the initial access necessary to research where they are located and what they might be worth. 

An Internet router serves as the hub of an entire home network. This is where all elements of a smart home are connected to the Internet and share information between them. 

When an attacker infects a router, he or she gains access to the network by which data packets are transmitted. This is the network through which the router operates. By doing this, they can install malicious software on the victims' computers, allowing them to steal sensitive data, private photos, and business files. This is potentially irreparable damage to them as a result of this maneuver. Using the infected router, the attacker can redirect users to phishing websites that look exactly like popular webmail and online banking sites. 

KELA Cybercrime Prevention, a cybercrime prevention company that specializes in cybercrime prevention technologies, has found that the average price for access credentials to corporate networks at the time of the initial unauthorized intrusion is $2,800. This price is based on KELA Cybercrime Prevention research. Considering that a used router purchased for a few hundred dollars could provide a cybercriminal with a significant return on investment, a cybercriminal could purchase a used router for a few hundred dollars out of pocket and use it immediately to access the network with little effort. It is assumed that they will simply strip off the access data and sell it on the dark web instead of launching a full-scale cyberattack themselves, although that may very well be the case. 

As a result of the findings of the ESET researchers, organizations may believe that they are conducting business responsibly by contracting with a device-management firm outside their own. 

Those in the e-waste disposal business, or even device-sanitization services that promise to wipe large volumes of corporate devices for resale can be counted on to take care of that for you. 

On the other hand, it may be that these third parties are not performing whatever they claim in practice. Considering that mainstream routers come with encryption and other security features, more organizations might benefit from them to mitigate the negative impacts of fallout should devices that have not been wiped end up roaming the world with no security features. 

Ensure that your router is protected from cybercriminals' attacks by following these steps:

  • There are risks associated with buying second-hand smart appliances. Previous owners of such products may have modified the alarm system firmware so that a remote attacker can collect all the data.
  • It is very important that you change the default password of your account. You should choose a complex password and change it regularly.
  • On social networks, you should not share serial numbers, IP addresses, or other sensitive information concerning your smart devices. 

Hacker Group Cranefly Develops ISS Method

The novel method of reading commands from seemingly innocent Internet Information Services (IIS) logs has been used to install backdoors and other tools by a recently leaked dropper. Cybersecurity experts at Symantec claimed an attacker is utilizing the malware known as Cranefly also known as UNC3524 to install Trojan. Danfuan, another undocumented malware, as well as other tools.

Mandiant reported that Cranefly mainly targeted the emails of individuals who specialized in corporate development, merger and acquisitions, and significant corporate transactions when it was originally founded in May. Mandiant claims that these attackers remained undetected on target networks for at least 18 months by using backdoors on equipment without support for security measures.

One of the main malware strains used by the gang is QUIETEXIT, a backdoor installed on network equipment like cloud services and wireless access point controllers that do not enable antivirus or endpoint monitoring. This allows the attacker to remain undetected for a long time.

Geppei and Danfuan augment Cranefly's arsenal of specialized cyber weapons, with Geppei serving as a dropper by collecting orders from IIS logs that look like normal web access requests delivered to a compromised host.

The most recent Symantec advisory now claims that UNC3524 used Hacktool-based backdoors in some instances. Multiple advanced persistent threat (APT) clusters use the open-source technology Regeorg.
Additionally, Symantec has cautioned that Cranefly is a 'pretty experienced' hacking group as evidenced by the adoption of a new method in conjunction with the bespoke tools and the measures made to conceal their activity.

On its alert and Protection Bulletins website, Symantec lists the indicators of compromise (IoC) for this attack. Polonium is another threat actor that usually focuses on gathering intelligence, and ESET recently saw Polonium utilizing seven different backdoor variants to snoop on Israeli firms.

Cranefly employs this sneaky method to keep a foothold on compromised servers and gather information covertly. As attackers can send commands through various channels, including proxy servers, VPNs, Tor, or online development environments, this method also aids in avoiding detection by investigators and law enforcement.

It is unclear how many systems have been compromised or how often the threat actors may have utilized this technique in ongoing operations.



Hacktivists Target Asian Government Organizations

 

An unknown espionage group called Worok that is active since late 2020 targets high-profile businesses and municipal governments with headquarters largely in Asia.

The cyber gang, originally identified as Worok by ESET experts, also has attacked targets in the Middle East and Africa.

Worok is alleged to have parallels with another antagonistic collective known as TA428 in terms of skills and goals. TA428 has been linked to attacks against military, government, and public sector organizations, as well as telecom, banking, maritime, and energy firms.

Worok's toolkit, according to ESET researcher Thibaut Passilly, "includes a C++ loader CLRLoad, a PowerShell backdoor PowHeartBeat, and a C# loader PNGLoad that employs steganography to extract concealed malicious payloads from PNG files."

Between May 2021 and January 2022, the group's malicious operations took a significant hiatus before picking back up the following month. The Slovak cybersecurity company determined that the group's objectives were compatible with identity theft.

In certain cases, ProxyShell exploits were used to gain an initial foothold on target networks until 2021 and 2022. Additional custom backdoors were then introduced for entrenched access. Other initial compromise approaches are not yet known.

Infection chains in 2022 have now abandoned CLRLoad in favor of PowHeartBeat, a fully functional PowerShell implant that launches PNGLoad and communicates with a remote server via HTTP or ICMP to carry out associated file operations, transmit and receive files, and execute arbitrary commands.

​"In such situations, webshells have often been uploaded after these vulnerabilities have been exploited on order to enable persistence in the victim's network. The operators then utilized a variety of implants to obtain more capabilities, "Passilly continued.

ESET discovered a new PowerShell backdoor called PowHeartBeat, which has replaced CLRLoad in instances recorded since February 2022 as the tool designed to launch PNGLoad on infected systems. However, it has not yet been able to recover one of the final payloads delivered in the group's attacks.

A cyber espionage organization called Worok compromises its targets using both custom-built tools and techniques that already exist.

We believe the attackers are after information theft from their victims as they target high-profile organisations in Asia and Africa, focusing on diverse sectors, both private and public, but with a particular emphasis on government entities.

Symbiote: A Stealth Malware that Attacks Banking Institutions

 

Cybersecurity experts discovered a "nearly-impossible-to-detect" Linux malware that can be exploited to backdoor infected systems. Known as Symbiote by threat intelligence firms Blackberry and intezer, the stealth malware is known for its capability to hide itself in running processes and network traffic and extract the target's data like a parasite. 

The Hacker News says "this is not the first time a malware with similar capabilities has been spotted in the wild. In February 2014, ESET revealed a Linux backdoor called Ebury that's built to steal OpenSSH credentials and maintain access to a compromised server." 

The actors behind Symbiote are believed to have started working on the malware in November 2021, using it for targeting financial institutions in Latin America, which includes banks such as Banco do Brazil and Caixa. 

The main aim of Symbiote is to get credentials and fecilitate backdoor access to the target's systems. What makes Symbiote standout from other Linux malware is that it corrupts running processes instead of using a standalone file execution to cause damage. 

It is done by leveraging a local Linux feature known as LD_PRELOAD- a technique earlier used by malware like Pro-Ocean and Facefish. It is later deployed by the dynamic linker into the running operations and start infecting the host. Other than hiding itself in the file system, Symbiote can also cloak its network traffic via using the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) feature. 

The task is attained via injecting the malware into an inspection software's processing and deploying BPF to categorize the results that will disclose the activities. 

"Upon hijacking all running processes, Symbiote enables rootkit functionality to further hide evidence of its existence and provides a backdoor for the threat actor to log in to the machine and execute privileged commands. It has also been observed storing captured credentials encrypted in files masquerading as C header files," reports The Hacker News.

Viasat: Acid Rain Virus Disable Satellite Modems

 

The cyberattack which targeted the KA-SAT satellite broadband service to erase SATCOM modems on February 24 used a newly discovered data wiper virus. It impacted thousands in Ukraine and thousands more across Europe. 

A cybersecurity firm, SentinelOne, claims to have discovered a malware sample, which disrupted internet connectivity on February 24. The malware, called AcidRain, which was also likely utilized in the Viasat breach, is a Unix executable application which is meant to attack MIPS-based devices. This could indicate the attackers' lack of experience with the filesystem and firmware of the targeted devices, or their desire to create a reusable tool.

The same sample came from SkyLogic, the Viasat operator in charge of the damaged network, which is also situated in Italy. The software sample was also tagged with the moniker "ukrop," which could be a reference to the Ukraine Operation. 

The researchers underscored that Viasat did not offer technical indicators of compromise or a detailed incident response report. Instead, rogue commands damaged modems in Ukraine and other European countries, according to the satellite industry. The SentinelOne duo were perplexed as to how valid orders could produce such mayhem in the modem, "scalable disruption is more feasibly performed by delivering an update, script, or executable," they added. 

The program wipes the system and various storage device files completely. AcidRain executes an initial repetitive replacement and removal of non-standard files in the filesystem if the malware is launched as root "Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen," SentinelOne threat experts, revealed. 

The wipers overwrite file structures with up to 0x40000 bytes of data or utilize MEMGETINFO, MEMUNLOCK, MEMERASE, and MEMWRITEOOB input/output control (IOCTL) service calls to erase data on compromised devices. 

The fact Viasat has supplied nearly 30,000 modems to get clients back online since the February 2022 attack and is still shipping more to speed up service restoration, suggests that SentinelOne's supply-chain threat scenario is correct. The IOCTLs used by this virus also resemble those used by the VPNFilter malware 'dstr' wiper plugin, a destructive program linked to Russian GRU hackers. 

The Ukrainian Computer Emergency Response Team recently stated a data wiper known as DoubleZero had been used in assaults on Ukrainian businesses. On the same day that Russia invaded Ukraine, they discovered IsaacWiper, a data wiper, and HermeticWizard, a new worm which dropped HermeticWiper payloads. ESET has discovered a fourth data-destroying malware strain called CaddyWiper, which wipes data across Windows domains and eliminates user data and partition information from associated drivers. 

Microsoft discovered a sixth wiper, now known as WhisperGate, in mid-January, which was being used in data-wiping attacks targeting Ukraine while masquerading as ransomware.

Hackers from China's 'Mustang Panda' were Utilizing New 'Hodur' Malware

 

Mustang Panda (a.k.a. Temp.Hex, HoneyMyte, TA416 or RedDelta), a China-based advanced persistent threat (APT), has been traced to an ongoing cyberattack campaign using a formerly undocumented variation of the PlugX remote access trojan on affected workstations mostly in and around Southeast Asia. For its similarities to another PlugX (aka Korplug) variation called THOR which surfaced in July 2021, slovak cybersecurity firm ESET termed the current version Hodur. 

Korplug is a proprietary virus used widely, it was initially uncovered in a 2020 investigation that looked into Chinese hackers' activities against Australian targets. Mustang Panda employs phishing lures with counterfeit papers to target European embassies, ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and research institutes in the most recent known campaign, according to cybersecurity firm ESET. "Anti-analysis measures and control-flow obfuscation are used at every level of the deployment process," the firm told.

Hodur is based on PlugX, a remote access tool that "allows remote users to steal data or take control of impacted systems without authorization. It can copy, move, rename, execute, and delete files, as well as log keystrokes and fingerprint the infected system." The infections end with the implementation of the Hodur backdoor on the infected Windows host, irrespective of the phishing lure used. 

As formerly stated, the campaign begins simply, with the group phishing its targets using current events. Proofpoint identified it using a NATO diplomat's email address to send out.ZIP and.EXE files labeled "Situation at the EU Borders with Ukraine" last month. If a victim accepts the bait, a legitimate, properly signed executable prone to DLL search-order hijacking will be delivered. Russia, Greece, Cyprus, South Africa, Vietnam, Mongolia, Myanmar, and South Sudan are the countries targeted in this campaign. 

ESET claims to have sampled sophisticated custom loaders as well as new Korplug (Hodur) versions still using DLL side-loading but has considerably more robust obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques across the infection chain. The side-loading custom DLL loader uses a digitally-signed genuine executable, in this case, a SmadAV file, and leverages a known flaw. Except for one, which loads the new Korplug variation, the loader's many functions are all fake. 

As it is a Chinese actor with a history of pursuing higher political espionage purposes, the scope of its targeting should be rather consistent.

Iranian Hackers Employed a New Marlin Backdoor in a Surveillance Operation 

 

Iranian hackers are using the New Marlin backdoor as part of a long-running surveillance operation that began in April 2018. ESET, a Slovak cybersecurity firm, linked the attacks, entitled "Out to Sea," to a threat actor known as OilRig (aka APT34), firmly linking its actions to another Iranian group known as Lyceum as well (Hexane aka SiameseKitten).

Since 2014, the hacking organization has attacked Middle Eastern governments as well as a range of industry verticals, including chemical, oil, finance, and telecommunications. In April 2021, the threat actors used an implant dubbed SideTwist to assault a Lebanese company. 

"Victims of the campaign include diplomatic institutions, technological businesses, and medical organizations in Israel, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates," according to a report by ESET.

Lyceum has previously conducted campaigns in Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia to single out IT companies. Since the campaign's discovery in 2018, the Lyceum infecting chains have developed to drop many backdoors, starting with DanBot and progressing to Shark and Milan in 2021. Later attacks, utilizing a new data harvesting virus dubbed Marlin, were detected in August 2021. 

The hacking organization discarded the old OilRig TTPs, which comprised command-and-control (C&C) connections over DNS and HTTPS. For its C2 activities, Marlin relies on Microsoft's OneDrive API. ESET identified parallels in tools and tactics between OilRig's backdoors and those of Lyceum as "too numerous and specific," stating the initial access to the network was gained through spear-phishing and management applications like ITbrain and TeamViewer. 

"The ToneDeaf backdoor connected with its C&C primarily over HTTP/S, but featured a secondary route, DNS tunneling, which did not work effectively," the researcher indicated. "Shark has similar problems, with DNS as its primary communication channel and an HTTP/S secondary one which isn't working." 

Marlin randomly selects the executable code's internal structure, denying the attacker a comprehensive assessment of instruction addresses needed to build the intended exploit payload. The findings also revealed the usage of several folders in a backdoor's file menu for sending and receiving data from the C&C server, the concurrent use of DNS as a C&C communication route while also utilizing HTTP/S as a backup communication mechanism.

More than 90% of Russians do not Finish Reading User Agreements on the Internet

A study by the information security company ESET showed that Russian Internet users do not read user agreements on websites in 81% of cases. 

13% of respondents said that they completely ignore the submitted contracts and agree with them without looking. Nearly half of Russians (49%) are either vague about user agreements on the Internet or have no idea what they mean. The absolute majority (92%) do not worry if their data is transferred to third parties: they do not try to leave the site or application, in the user agreement of which such a function is indicated. 

In comparison with citizens of Europe and the United States, Russians, in general, are less responsible for reading user agreements, said Fedor Muzalevsky, Director of the technical department of RTM Group. Experts noted that the reason for the digital illiteracy of Russians maybe those user agreements in the Russian Federation began to be applied later than in Western countries. 

Negligent attitude to user agreements can be fraught with consequences, warned Kirill Podgorny, Director of the ESET Marketing Department. According to him, there are sometimes exotic or impossible conditions in contracts. 

"A good example is the experiment of the British wireless Internet operator Purple, which introduced the clause "I undertake to go to voluntary work on cleaning public toilets" into the agreement. Out of 22 thousand users who agreed with the terms of service, only one noticed this point and complained to the provider," the experts said. 

However, far more often there are potentially dangerous ones. Thus, a condition on automatic consent to the processing of personal data is illegally added to user agreements, said Lyudmila Kurovskaya, head of the Center for Legal Assistance to Citizens in the Digital Environment.

"When citizens submit their data without going into the purpose of its processing, automatically check the boxes on websites and report excessive information about themselves, it can create conditions for leakage of their personal data," she said.

ESET: Criminals will be Able to Steal Personal Data Using Smartwatches

 

ESET analysts reported that cybercriminals can use smartwatches to steal personal data and warned Russians about the main dangers associated with this gadget. 

"According to our estimates, the market for smartwatches and fitness trackers will grow by 12.5 percent annually and will exceed $118 billion by 2028. Such indicators cannot but attract scammers. Therefore, it is worth understanding in advance the security and privacy risks associated with this," the ESET study says. 

The threat of data interception is due to the fact that many smartwatches and fitness trackers are synchronized with the owners' smartphones, including some applications such as e-mail or messengers. Thus, attackers can hijack both devices, which threatens, in particular, the loss of passwords. ESET further warns that the stolen personal data can then be sold on the darknet. 

Another serious risk for a cybercriminal's victim is tracking the GeoPosition of the device. Such data allows hackers to draw up a detailed diagram of the user's movements in order to attack his home or car. "The safety of children's smartwatches, which can be monitored by outsiders, is even more worrying," ESET states. Speaking about the specific vulnerabilities of smart fitness trackers, cyber specialists pay attention to Bluetooth technology, in which "numerous vulnerabilities have been discovered over the years," weak software of gadgets and paired smartphone applications that may contain coding errors. 

According to ESET analysts, risks can be reduced via the use of two-factor authentication, the use of a strong password to lock the screen, as well as a ban on external connections to smartwatches will also prevent threat. 


Data can be leaked both via the Internet and via Bluetooth a critical Bluetooth vulnerabilities allow executing arbitrary malicious code on the device and gaining full control over the device's system, as well as carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack (MiTM), which leads to the unauthorized interception of user data.

Unprotected Access to Windows' Centre: Signed Kernel Drivers

 

ESET researchers investigated the misuse of vulnerable kernel drivers in depth saying "Software" drivers are among the different types of kernel drivers that provide particular, non-hardware-related capabilities such as software debugging and diagnostics, as well as system analysis. These have the potential to greatly increase the attack surface. 

Although it is no longer possible to directly load a malicious, unsigned driver in current versions of Windows, and kernel rootkits are deemed obsolete, there are still ways to load malicious code into the kernel, particularly through manipulating legal, signed drivers. There are many drivers available from a variety of hardware and software suppliers that allow you to completely access the kernel with minimal effort. 

The most common vulnerabilities detected in-kernel drivers:
  • Checks that restrict read and write access to critical model-specific registers are disabled (MSRs). 
  • Exposing the ability to read and write from physical memory in user mode. 
  • The ability to read and write to virtual kernel memory from user mode is now enabled. 

"When malware actors need to run malicious code in the Windows kernel on x64 systems with driver signature enforcement in place, carrying a vulnerable signed kernel driver seems to be a viable option for doing so," says Peter Kálnai, Senior Malware Researcher at ESET and one of the report's co-investigators. 

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver, or BYOVD, is a technique that has been observed in the wild by both high-profile APT actors and commodity malware, such as the RobbinHood ransomware, which, as commodity malware, aims to reach as many people as possible. As a result, seeing it use a BYOVD approach is uncommon but significant. 


Mitigation strategies that work :
  • Virtualization-based security is a Windows 10 feature that uses hardware virtualization to place the kernel in a sandbox, safeguarding the operating system with various protections.
  • Drivers in recent Windows systems have a valid signature based on an "acceptable" certificate, which can be revoked. Revocation of a vulnerable driver's certificate would be a simple approach to "disarm" it and render it useless. 
  • When the most notoriously susceptible drivers are detected on a system, Microsoft and numerous third-party security product suppliers, including ESET, use driver blocklisting to detect and eliminate them. 
Vulnerable drivers have been exploited by both game cheaters and malware producers, and while significant progress has been made to reduce the impacts, the fight continues. The people responsible for the problem want to remedy it — the vendors who were contacted were quite proactive during the disclosure process, eager to repair the flaws that were discovered.