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Researchers at ESET claim that Embargo ransomware is using custom Rust-based tools to overcome cybersecurity defences built by vendors such as Microsoft and IBM.
An instance of this new toolkit was observed during a ransomware incident targeting US companies in July 2024 and was composed of a loader and an EDR killer, namely MDeployer and MS4Killer, respectively, and was observed during a ransomware attack targeting US companies.
Unlike other viruses, MS4Killer was customized for each victim's environment, excluding only selected security solutions. This makes it particularly dangerous to those who are unaware of its existence.
It appears that the tools were created together and that some of the functionality in the tools overlaps.
This report has revealed that the ransomware payloads of MDeployer, MS4Killer and Embargo were all made in Rust, which indicates that this language is the programming language that the group favours.
During the summer of 2024, the first identification of the Embargo gang took place. This company appears to have a good amount of resources, being able to develop custom tools as well as set up its own infrastructure to help communicate with those affected.
A double extortion method is used by the group - as well as encrypting the victims' data and extorting data from them, they threaten to publish those data on a leak site, demonstrating their intention to leak their data.
Moreover, ESET considers Embargo to be a provider of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that provides threats to users.
The group is also able to adjust quickly during attacks.
“The main purpose of the Embargo toolkit is to secure successful deployment of the ransomware payload by disabling the security solution in the victim’s infrastructure. Embargo puts a lot of effort into that, replicating the same functionality at different stages of the attack,” the researchers wrote.
“We have also observed the attackers’ ability to adjust their tools on the fly, during an active intrusion, for a particular security solution,” they added.
MDeployer is the main malicious loader Embargo attempts to deploy on victims’ machines in the compromised network. Its purpose is to facilitate ransomware execution and file encryption.
It executes two payloads, MS4Killer and Embargo ransomware, and decrypts two encrypted files a.cache and b.cache that were dropped by an unknown previous stage.
When the ransomware finishes encrypting the system, MDeployer terminates the MS4Killer process, deletes the decrypted payloads and a driver file dropped by MS4Killer, and finally reboots the system.
Another feature of MDeployer is when it is executed with admin privileges as a DLL file, it attempts to reboot the victim’s system into Safe Mode to disable selected security solutions. As most cybersecurity defenses are not in effect in Safe Mode, it helps threat actors avoid detection.
MS4Killer is a defense evasion tool that terminates security product processes using a technique known as bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD).
MS4Killer terminates security products from the kernel by installing and abusing a vulnerable driver that is stored in a global variable. The process identifier of the process to terminate is passed to s4killer as a program argument.
Embargo has extended the tool’s functionality with features such as running in an endless loop to constantly scan for running processes and hardcoding the list of process names to kill in the binary.
After disabling the security tooling, Embargo affiliates can run the ransomware payload without worrying whether their payload gets detected.
During attacks, the group can also adjust to the environment quickly, which is another advantage.
Basically, what Embargo toolkit does is that it offers a method of ensuring the successful deployment of the ransomware payload and prevents the security solution from being enabled in the victim's infrastructure on the day of deployment. This is something that Embargo invests a lot of time and effort into, replicating the same functionality at different stages of the attack process," wrote the researchers.
They added that the attackers also showed a capability to modify their tools on the fly, during an active intrusion, by adjusting the settings on different security solutions on the fly.
As part of Embargo's campaign against victims in the compromised network, MDeployer is one of the main malicious loaders that it attempts to deploy on victims' machines. With the use of this tool, ransomware can be executed and files can be encrypted easily.
During the execution process, two payloads are executed, MS4Killer and Embargo ransomware, which decrypt two encrypted files a.cache and b.cache that have been left over from an unknown earlier stage onto the system.
After its encryption process, the MDeployer program systematically terminates the MS4Killer process, erases any decrypted payloads, and removes a driver previously introduced by MS4Killer. Upon completing these actions, the MDeployer initiates a system reboot. This process helps ensure that no remnants of the decryption or defence-evasion components persist on the system, potentially aiding threat actors in maintaining operational security.
In scenarios where MDeployer is executed as a DLL file with administrative privileges, it has an additional capability: rebooting the compromised system into Safe Mode.
This mode restricts numerous core functionalities, which is often leveraged by threat actors to minimize the effectiveness of cybersecurity defences and enhance stealth. Since most security tools do not operate in Safe Mode, this functionality enables attackers to evade detection more effectively and hinder any active defences, making detection and response significantly more challenging.
The MS4Killer utility functions as a defense-evasion mechanism that specifically targets security product processes for termination. This is achieved using a technique referred to as "bring your own vulnerable driver" (BYOVD), wherein threat actors exploit a known vulnerable driver.
By installing and leveraging this driver, which is maintained within a global variable, MS4Killer is able to terminate security processes from the kernel level, bypassing higher-level protections. The identifier for the targeted process is supplied as an argument to the MS4Killer program.
To further enhance MS4Killer’s effectiveness, Embargo has incorporated additional capabilities, such as enabling the tool to run continuously in a loop. This looping function allows it to monitor for active processes that match a predefined list, which is hardcoded within the binary, and terminate them as they appear.
By persistently disabling security tools, Embargo affiliates can then deploy ransomware payloads with minimal risk of detection or interference, creating an environment highly conducive to successful exploitation.
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