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AWS CodeBuild Misconfiguration Could Have Enabled Full GitHub Repository Takeover

 

One mistake in how Amazon Web Services set up its CodeBuild tool might have let hackers grab control of official AWS GitHub accounts. That access could spill into more parts of AWS, opening doors for wide-reaching attacks on software supplies. Cloud security team Wiz found the weak spot and called it CodeBreach. They told AWS about it on August 25, 2025. Fixes arrived by September that year. Experts say key pieces inside AWS were at stake - like the popular JavaScript SDK developers rely on every day. 

Into trusted repositories, attackers might have slipped harmful code thanks to CodeBreach, said Wiz team members Yuval Avrahami and Nir Ohfeld. If exploited, many apps using AWS SDKs could face consequences - possibly even disruptions in how the AWS Console functions or risks within user setups. Not a bug inside CodeBuild caused this, but gaps found deeper in automated build processes. These weak spots lived where tools merge and deploy code automatically. 

Something went wrong because the webhook filters had been set up incorrectly. They’re supposed to decide which GitHub actions get permission to start CodeBuild tasks. Only certain people or selected branches should be allowed through, keeping unsafe code changes out of high-access areas. But in a few open-source projects run by AWS, the rules meant to check user IDs didn’t work right. The patterns written to match those users failed at their job. 

Notably, some repositories used regex patterns missing boundary markers at beginning or end, leading to incomplete matches rather than full validation. This gap meant a GitHub user identifier only needed to include an authorized maintainer's number within a larger sequence to slip through. Because GitHub hands out IDs in order, those at Wiz showed how likely it became for upcoming identifiers to accidentally align with known legitimate ones. 

Ahead of any manual effort, bots made it possible to spam GitHub App setups nonstop. One after another, these fake apps rolled out - just waiting for a specific ID pattern to slip through broken checks. When the right match appeared, everything changed quietly. A hidden workflow fired up inside CodeBuild, pulled from what should have stayed locked down. Secrets spilled into logs nobody monitored closely. For aws-sdk-js-v3, that leak handed total control away - tied straight to a powerful token meant to stay private. If hackers gained that much control, they might slip harmful code into secure branches without warning. 

Malicious changes could get approved through rigged pull requests, while hidden data stored in the repo gets quietly pulled out. Once inside, corrupted updates might travel unnoticed through trusted AWS libraries to users relying on them. AWS eventually confirmed some repos lacked tight webhook checks. Still, they noted only certain setups were exposed. 

Now fixed, Amazon says it adjusted those flawed settings. Exposed keys were swapped out, safeguards tightened around building software. Evidence shows CodeBreach wasn’t used by attackers, the firm added. Yet specialists warn - small gaps in automated pipelines might lead to big problems down the line. Now worries grow around CI/CD safety, a new report adds fuel. 

Lately, studies have revealed that poorly set up GitHub Actions might spill sensitive tokens. This mistake lets hackers gain higher permissions in large open-source efforts. What we’re seeing shows tighter checks matter. Running on minimal needed access helps too. How unknown data is processed in builds turns out to be critical. Each step shapes whether systems stay secure.

WebRAT Malware Spreads Through Fake GitHub Exploit Repositories

 

The WebRAT malware is being distributed through GitHub repositories that falsely claim to host proof-of-concept exploits for recently disclosed security vulnerabilities. This marks a shift in the malware’s delivery strategy, as earlier campaigns relied on pirated software and cheats for popular games such as Roblox, Counter-Strike, and Rust. First identified at the beginning of the year, WebRAT operates as a backdoor that allows attackers to gain unauthorized access to infected systems and steal sensitive information, while also monitoring user activity. 

A report published by cybersecurity firm Solar 4RAYS in May detailed the scope of WebRAT’s capabilities. According to the findings, the malware can harvest login credentials for platforms including Steam, Discord, and Telegram, along with extracting data from cryptocurrency wallets. Beyond credential theft, WebRAT poses a serious privacy threat by enabling attackers to activate webcams and capture screenshots, exposing victims to covert surveillance. 

Since at least September, the threat actors behind WebRAT have expanded their tactics by creating GitHub repositories designed to appear legitimate. These repositories present themselves as exploit code for high-profile vulnerabilities that have received widespread media attention. Among the issues referenced are a Windows flaw that allows remote code execution, a critical authentication bypass in the OwnID Passwordless Login plugin for WordPress, and a Windows privilege escalation vulnerability that enables attackers to gain elevated system access. By exploiting public awareness of these vulnerabilities, the attackers increase the likelihood that developers and security researchers will trust and download the malicious files. 

Security researchers at Kaspersky identified 15 GitHub repositories linked to the WebRAT campaign. Each repository contained detailed descriptions of the vulnerability, explanations of the supposed exploit behavior, and guidance on mitigation. Based on the structure and writing style of the content, Kaspersky assessed that much of the material was likely generated using artificial intelligence tools, adding to the appearance of legitimacy. The fake exploits are distributed as password-protected ZIP archives containing a mix of decoy and malicious components. 

These include empty files, corrupted DLLs intended to mislead analysis, batch scripts that form part of the execution chain, and a dropper executable named rasmanesc.exe. Once launched, the dropper elevates system privileges, disables Windows Defender, and downloads the WebRAT payload from a hardcoded remote server, enabling full compromise of the system.  

Kaspersky noted that the WebRAT variant used in this campaign does not introduce new features and closely resembles previously documented samples. Although all identified malicious repositories have been removed from GitHub, researchers warn that similar lures could resurface under different names or accounts. 

Security experts continue to advise that exploit code from unverified sources should only be tested in isolated, controlled environments to reduce the risk of infection.

Webrat Malware Targets Students and Junior Security Researchers Through Fake Exploits

 

In early 2025, security researchers uncovered a new malware family dubbed Webrat, which at that time was predominantly targeting ordinary users through fake distribution methods. The first propagation involved masking malware as cheats for online games-like Rust, Counter-Strike, and Roblox-but also as cracked versions of some commercial software. By the second half of that year, though, the Webrat operators had indeed widened their horizons, shifting toward a new target group that covered students and young professionals seeking careers in information security. 

This evolution started to surface in September and October 2025, when researchers discovered a campaign spreading Webrat through open GitHub repositories. The attackers embedded the malicious payloads as proof-of-concept exploits of highly publicized software vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities were chosen due to their resonance in security advisories and high severity ratings, making the repositories look relevant and credible for people searching for hands-on learning materials.  

Each of the GitHub repositories was crafted to closely resemble legitimate exploit releases. They all had detailed descriptions outlining the background of the vulnerability, affected systems, steps to install it, usage, and the most recommended ways of mitigation. Many of the repository descriptions have a similar or almost identical structure; the defensive advice offered is often strikingly similar, adding strong evidence that they were generated through automated or AI-assisted tools rather than various independent researchers. Inside each repository, users were instructed to fetch an archive with a password, labeled as the exploit package. 

The password was hidden in the name of one of the files inside the archive, a move intended to lure users into unzipping the file and researching its contents. Once unpacked, the archive contains a set of files meant to masquerade or divert attention from the actual payload. Among those is a corrupted dynamic-link library file meant as a decoy, along with a batch file whose purpose was to instruct execution of the main malicious executable file. The main executable, when run, executed several high-risk actions: It tried to elevate its privileges to administrator level, disabled the inbuilt security protections such as Windows Defender, and then downloaded the Webrat backdoor from a remote server and started it.

The Webrat backdoor provides a way to attackers for persistent access to infected systems, allowing them to conduct widespread surveillance and data theft activities. Webrat can steal credentials and other sensitive information from cryptocurrency wallets and applications like Telegram, Discord, and Steam. In addition to credential theft, it also supports spyware functionalities such as screen capture, keylogging, and audio and video surveillance via connected microphones and webcams. The functionality seen in this campaign is very similar to versions of Webrat described in previous incidents. 

It seems that the move to dressing the malware up as vulnerability exploits represents an effort to affect hobbyists rather than professionals. Professional analysts normally analyze such untrusted code in a sandbox or isolated environment, where such attacks have limited consequences. 

Consequently, researchers believe the attack focuses on students and beginners with lax operational security discipline. It ranges in topic from the risks in running unverified code downloaded from open-source sites to the need to perform malware analysis and exploit testing in a sandbox or virtual machine environment. 

Security professionals and students are encouraged to be keen in their practices, to trust only known and reputable security tools, and to bypass protection mechanisms only when this is needed with a clear and well-justified reason.

PyStoreRAT Campaign Uses Fake GitHub Projects to Target OSINT and IT Professionals

 


Cybersecurity researchers have identified a previously undocumented malware operation that leverages GitHub to distribute a threat known as PyStoreRAT. The campaign primarily targets individuals working in information technology, cybersecurity, and open-source intelligence research, exploiting their reliance on open-source tools.

The findings were published by Morphisec Threat Labs, which described the operation as a coordinated and deliberate effort rather than random malware distribution. The attackers focused on blending into legitimate developer activity, making the threat difficult to detect during its early stages.

PyStoreRAT functions as a Remote Access Trojan, a type of malware that enables attackers to maintain hidden and persistent access to an infected system. Once deployed, it can gather detailed system information, execute commands remotely, and act as a delivery mechanism for additional malicious software.

According to the research, the attackers began by reviving dormant GitHub accounts that had shown no activity for extended periods. These accounts were then used to upload software projects that appeared polished, functional, and credible. Many of the repositories were created with the help of artificial intelligence, allowing them to closely resemble genuine open-source tools.

The fake projects included OSINT utilities, decentralized finance trading bots, and AI-based applications such as chatbot wrappers. Several of these repositories gained visibility and user trust, with some rising through GitHub’s trending rankings. Only after achieving engagement did the attackers introduce subtle updates that quietly embedded the PyStoreRAT backdoor under the guise of routine maintenance.

Once active, PyStoreRAT demonstrates a high degree of adaptability. Morphisec researchers found that it profiles infected systems and can deploy additional payloads, including known data-stealing malware families and Python-based loaders. The malware also modifies its execution behavior when it detects certain endpoint protection products, reducing its exposure to security monitoring.

The threat is not limited to a single delivery method. PyStoreRAT can propagate through removable storage devices such as USB drives and continuously retrieves updated components from its operators. Its command-and-control infrastructure relies on a rotating network of servers, allowing attackers to issue new instructions quickly while complicating takedown efforts.

Researchers also identified non-English language elements within the malware code, including Russian-language terms. While this does not confirm attribution, Morphisec noted that the level of planning and operational maturity places the campaign well beyond low-effort GitHub-based malware activity.

GitHub has removed the majority of the malicious repositories linked to the campaign, though a small number were still accessible at the time of analysis. Security experts stress that developers and researchers should remain cautious when downloading tools, carefully review code changes, and avoid running projects that cannot be independently verified.

Morphisec concluded that the campaign surfaces a vastly growing trend, where attackers combine AI-generated content, social engineering, and resilient cloud infrastructure to bypass traditional security defenses, making awareness and verification more critical than ever.



Fake GitHub OSINT Tools Spread PyStoreRAT Malware

 

Attackers are using GitHub as part of a campaign to spread a novel JavaScript-based RAT called PyStoreRAT, masquerading as widely used OSINT, GPT, and security utilities targeting developers and analysts. The malware campaign leverages small pieces of Python or JavaScript loader code hosted on fake GitHub repositories, which silently fetch and execute remote HTML Application (HTA) files via mshta.exe, initiating a multi-stage infection chain. 

PyStoreRAT is said to be a modular, multi-stage implant that can load and execute a wide range of payload formats, including EXE, DLL, PowerShell, MSI, Python, JavaScript, and HTA modules, making it highly versatile once a breach has been established. One of the most prominent follow-on payloads is the Rhadamanthys information stealer, which specializes in the exfiltration of sensitive information, including credentials and financial data. The loaders arrive embedded in repositories branded as OSINT frameworks, DeFi trading bots, GPT wrappers, or security tools; many of these hardly work past statically showing menus or other placeholder behavior to appear legitimate.

It is believed the campaign started at around mid-June 2025, with the attackers publishing new repositories at a steady pace, and then artificially inflating stars and forks by promoting those on YouTube, X, and other platforms. When these tools started gaining traction and hit GitHub's trending lists, the threat actors slipped in malicious "maintenance" commits in October and November, quietly swapping or augmenting the code to insert the loader logic. This factor of abusing GitHub's trust model and popularity signals echoes a trend seen in supply chain-like gimmicks such as Stargazers Ghost Network tactic.

Subsequently, the loader retrieves a distant HTA, which installs PyStoreRAT, a tool that profiles the system, identifies whether it has administrator privileges, and searches for cryptocurrency wallet artifacts involving services such as Ledger Live, Trezor, Exodus, Atomic, Guarda, and BitBox02. It also identifies installed anti-virus software and searches for strings such as “Falcon” and “Reason,” which are attributed to CrowdStrike and Cybereason/ReasonLabs, with what appears to be a modification of the path used to execute mshta.exe to avoid detection. 

It uses a scheduled task, which is disguised as an NVIDIA self-update, with the RAT communicating with a distant server for command execution, which includes but is not limited to downloading and executing EXE payloads, delivering Rhadamanthys, unzip archives, loading malicious DLLs via rundll32.exe, unpacking MSI packages, executing PowerShell payloads within a suspended process, instantiating additional mshta.exe, and propagate via portable storage devices by embedding armed LNK documents. 

Additionally, it has the capacity to eliminate its own scheduled tasks, which is attributed to making reverse-engineering even more complicated. The Python-based weapons have revealed Russian language artifacts as well as programming conventions that indicate a probable Eastern European adversary, who has described PyStoreRAT as part of a growth toward adaptable, script-based implants that avoid common detection on a targeted environment until a very late stage in the fight.

700+ Self-hosted Gits Impacted in a Wild Zero-day Exploit


Hackers actively exploit zero-day bug

Threat actors are abusing a zero-day bug in Gogs- a famous self-hosted Git service. The open source project hasn't fixed it yet.

About the attack 

Over 700 incidents have been impacted in these attacks. Wiz researchers described the bug as "accidental" and said the attack happened in July when they were analyzing malware on a compromised system. During the investigation, the experts "identified that the threat actor was leveraging a previously unknown flaw to compromise instances. They “responsibly disclosed this vulnerability to the maintainers."

The team informed Gogs' maintainers about the bug, who are now working on the fix. 

The flaw is known as CVE-2025-8110. It is primarily a bypass of an earlier patched flaw (CVE-2024-55947) that lets authorized users overwrite external repository files. This leads to remote code execution (RCE). 

About Gogs

Gogs is written in Go, it lets users host Git repositories on their cloud infrastructure or servers. It doesn't use GitHub or other third parties. 

Git and Gogs allow symbolic links that work as shortcuts to another file. They can also point to objects outside the repository. The Gogs API also allows file configuration outside the regular Git protocol. 

Patch update 

The previous patch didn't address such symbolic links exploit and this lets threat actors to leverage the flaw and remotely deploy malicious codes. 

While researchers haven't linked the attacks to any particular gang or person, they believe the threat actors are based in Asia.

Other incidents 

Last year, Mandiant found Chinese state-sponsored hackers abusing a critical flaw in F5 through Supershell, and selling the access to impacted UK government agencies, US defense organizations, and others.

Researchers still don't know what threat actors are doing with access to compromised incidents. "In the environments where we have visibility, the malware was removed quickly so we did not see any post-exploitation activity. We don't have visibility into other compromised servers, beyond knowing they're compromised," researchers said.

How to stay safe?

Wiz has advised users to immediately disable open-registration (if not needed) and control internet exposure by shielding self-hosted Git services via VPN. Users should be careful of new repositories with unexpected usage of the PutContents API or random 8-character names. 

For more details, readers can see the full list of indicators published by the researchers.



65% of Top AI Companies Leak Secrets on GitHub

 

Leading AI companies continue to face significant cybersecurity challenges, particularly in protecting sensitive information, as highlighted in recent research from Wiz. The study focused on the Forbes top 50 AI firms, revealing that 65% of them were found to be leaking verified secrets—such as API keys, tokens, and credentials—on public GitHub repositories. 

These leaks often occurred in places not easily accessible to standard security scanners, including deleted forks, developer repositories, and GitHub gists, indicating a deeper and more persistent problem than surface-level exposure. Wiz's approach to uncovering these leaks involved a framework called "Depth, Perimeter, and Coverage." Depth allowed researchers to look beyond just the main repositories, reaching into less visible parts of the codebase. 

Perimeter expanded the search to contributors and organization members, recognizing that individuals could inadvertently upload company-related secrets to their own public spaces. Coverage ensured that new types of secrets, such as those used by AI-specific platforms like Tavily, Langchain, Cohere, and Pinecone, were included in the scan, which many traditional tools overlook.

The findings show that despite being leaders in cutting-edge technology, these AI companies have not adequately addressed basic security hygiene. The researchers disclosed the discovered leaks to the affected organisations, but nearly half of these notifications either failed to reach the intended recipients, were ignored, or received no actionable response, underscoring the lack of dedicated channels for vulnerability disclosure.

Security Tips 

Wiz recommends several essential security measures for all organisations, regardless of size. First, deploying robust secret scanning should be a mandatory practice to proactively identify and remove sensitive information from codebases. Second, companies should prioritise the detection of their own unique secret formats, especially if they are new or specific to their operations. Engaging vendors and the open source community to support the detection of these formats is also advised.

Finally, establishing a clear and accessible disclosure protocol is crucial. Having a dedicated channel for reporting vulnerabilities and leaks enables faster remediation and better coordination between researchers and organisations, minimising potential damage from exposure. The research serves as a stark reminder that even the most advanced companies must not overlook fundamental cybersecurity practices to safeguard sensitive data and maintain trust in the rapidly evolving AI landscape.

GlassWorm Malware Exploits Invisible Unicode to Infect VS Code Extensions

 

A major and ongoing supply-chain attack is currently targeting developers through the OpenVSX and Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension marketplaces via a self-spreading malware dubbed "GlassWorm" that has triggered an estimated 35,800 installations to date. 

The campaign leverages novel techniques, such as embedding malicious code within invisible Unicode characters, enabling it to bypass detection and make the threats literally invisible in code editors. GlassWorm not only infects extensions, but also uses compromised accounts to further propagate itself, posing an accelerating risk through the dependency and update mechanisms of these platforms.

The malware focuses on stealing credentials for GitHub, npm, and OpenVSX accounts, as well as harvesting cryptocurrency wallet information from 49 different extensions. It then escalates the compromise by deploying a SOCKS proxy on infected machines, facilitating covert malicious traffic, and by installing HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) clients for undetectable remote access. 

GlassWorm leverages a hardcoded Solana blockchain wallet that participates in transactions used to distribute base64-encoded links pointing to its next-stage payload, referred to by researchers as the obfuscated "ZOMBI" module. Once installed, ZOMBI transforms the workstation into a node of a decentralized criminal infrastructure, enabling persistent and stealthy cybercriminal operations.

Unique for its resilience, GlassWorm's operators use the Solana blockchain as the primary command-and-control channel, making takedown efforts extremely challenging due to the blockchain’s decentralized, persistent, and anonymous nature. Secondary methods for controlling infected hosts include embedding payload links in Google Calendar event titles and directly contacting specific IP addresses (e.g., 217.69.3[.]218). To ensure redundancy and robust communication, the malware also incorporates BitTorrent’s Distributed Hash Table (DHT).

Researchers at Koi Security have identified at least eleven infected extensions on OpenVSX, with some still available for download as of reporting, and one on Microsoft’s VS Code Marketplace. Notably, the auto-update feature in VS Code means users can become infected without any interaction—the malicious version of extensions is silently pushed to all endpoints. Microsoft quickly removed the compromised extension following the alert, while some extension publishers have issued security updates.

These attacks follow a wider trend, echoing last month’s Shai-Hulud worm attack that affected 187 npm packages. Koi Security warns that the sophistication, propagation methods, and resilience of GlassWorm represent a significant escalation in the threat landscape, underscoring the urgent need for enhanced supply-chain security and vigilant monitoring.