The CrowdStrike outage in July 2024 exposed significant weaknesses in global IT supply chains, raising concerns about their resilience and dependence on major providers. The disruption caused widespread impact across critical sectors, including healthcare, transportation, banking, and media. Key services—such as parts of the NHS, international transport hubs, and TV networks—experienced significant downtime, highlighting vulnerabilities in centralized IT systems.
The outage was attributed to a faulty software update for Microsoft Windows users provided by cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike. Initial fears of a cyberattack were ruled out, but the incident shed light on the inherent risks of reliance on a few dominant providers in global IT supply chains. Experts warned that such dependencies create singular points of failure, leaving essential infrastructure exposed to systemic disruptions.
One of the most affected sectors was healthcare, where operations in the NHS were forced to revert to manual methods like pen and paper. Dafydd Vaughan, chief technology officer at Public Digital, emphasized the dangers of monopolistic control in critical services. He highlighted that EMIS, a provider serving over 60% of GP surgeries in England and Wales, dominates the healthcare IT landscape. Vaughan advocated for increased competition within IT supply chains to mitigate risks and enhance resilience.
Far-Reaching Impacts
The repercussions of the outage extended beyond healthcare, disrupting transport systems, banking operations, and broadcasting networks. These interruptions prompted calls for enhanced safeguards and reinforced the need for robust IT infrastructure. Recognizing the severity of these vulnerabilities, the UK government elevated data centres to the status of critical national infrastructure (CNI). This designation ensures they receive additional protection and resources, similar to essential utilities like water and energy.
Government Response and Future Legislation
In response to the crisis, the Labour Government, which assumed power in July 2024, announced plans to introduce the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill in 2025. This proposed legislation aims to expand regulatory oversight, enforce stringent cybersecurity standards, and improve reporting protocols. These measures are designed to fortify national defenses against both outages and the escalating threat of cyberattacks, which increasingly target critical IT systems.
The CrowdStrike incident underscores the pressing need for diversified and resilient IT supply chains. While the government has taken steps to address existing vulnerabilities, a sustained focus on fostering competition and enhancing infrastructure is essential. By proactively preparing for evolving threats and ensuring robust safeguards, nations can protect critical services and minimize the impact of future disruptions.
A recent case has highlighted that ransomware threats can sometimes come from within an organisation. Daniel Rhyne, a 57-year-old IT administrator from Kansas City, Missouri, has been accused of holding his own company hostage by locking down their systems and demanding a ransom to restore access.
The incident occurred in November last year when Rhyne was employed at an industrial company based in Somerset County, New Jersey. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Rhyne allegedly took control of the company’s network by resetting the passwords of network administrator accounts as well as those of hundreds of employees. He then proceeded to delete critical backups and locked out both servers and workstations, crippling the organisation’s operations.
An hour after initiating the attack, Rhyne allegedly sent an email to the company's employees informing them of the situation and demanding a ransom in exchange for unlocking the systems. The FBI claims this was an attempt at extortion, with Rhyne threatening further damage if his demands were not met.
Rhyne’s actions were investigated by the FBI, and he has been charged with multiple counts, including extortion, intentional damage to a protected computer, and wire fraud. Should he be convicted of all charges, he faces up to 35 years in prison and a $500,000 fine, as reported by The Register.
Several pieces of evidence were gathered by the FBI to support their case against Rhyne. For instance, he allegedly used a tool known as PsPasswd, a Windows Sysinternals utility, to reset user passwords. The new password set for the accounts was "TheFr0zenCrew!", a telling detail that investigators believe connects him directly to the attack. Rhyne also reportedly kept a hidden virtual machine (VM) on his company-issued laptop, allowing him to maintain remote access to the network's administrative controls.
Adding to the case, the FBI noted that Rhyne's digital activities prior to the attack were suspicious. He allegedly used his work laptop to search for ways to alter administrator passwords via command-line tools, which are often used by IT professionals to manage networks remotely. Investigators claim that on the day of the attack, Rhyne was seen logging into his work laptop, conducting these searches, and reviewing company password spreadsheets while also accessing the hidden VM.
The fact that he used his company-issued laptop to perform these actions leaves a strong digital trail linking him to the crime. The FBI’s detailed investigation paints a clear picture of how the attack was executed, utilising common IT tools to gain unauthorised control over the company’s systems.
If Rhyne is found guilty, his actions could serve as a warning to organisations about the potential for internal threats. It highlights the need for companies to have strong security protocols in place, not just to defend against external hackers but also to safeguard against malicious insiders who have privileged access to sensitive systems.
This case illustrates how cyberattacks are evolving and how attackers, even those within the organisation, can exploit their knowledge and access to launch devastating attacks. Organisations must remain vigilant and continually monitor for suspicious behaviour, no matter the source, to protect their critical digital infrastructure.
In the past ten years, public cloud computing has dramatically changed the IT industry, promising businesses limitless scalability and flexibility. By reducing the need for internal infrastructure and specialised personnel, many companies have eagerly embraced public cloud services. However, as their cloud strategies evolve, some organisations are finding that the expected financial benefits and operational flexibility are not always achieved. This has led to a new trend: cloud repatriation, where businesses move some of their workloads back from public cloud services to private cloud environments.
Choosing to repatriate workloads requires careful consideration and strategic thinking. Organisations must thoroughly understand their specific needs and the nature of their workloads. Key factors include how data is accessed, what needs to be protected, and cost implications. A successful repatriation strategy is nuanced, ensuring that critical workloads are placed in the most suitable environments.
One major factor driving cloud repatriation is the rise of edge computing. Research from Virtana indicates that most organisations now use hybrid cloud strategies, with over 80% operating in multiple clouds and around 75% utilising private clouds. This trend is especially noticeable in industries like retail, industrial sectors, transit, and healthcare, where control over computing resources is crucial. The growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has played a defining role, as these devices collect vast amounts of data at the network edge.
Initially, sending IoT data to the public cloud for processing made sense. But as the number of connected devices has grown, the benefits of analysing data at the edge have become clear. Edge computing offers near real-time responses, improved reliability for critical systems, and reduced downtime—essential for maintaining competitiveness and profitability. Consequently, many organisations are moving workloads back from the public cloud to take advantage of localised edge computing.
Concerns over data sovereignty and privacy are also driving cloud repatriation. In sectors like healthcare and financial services, businesses handle large amounts of sensitive data. Maintaining control over this information is vital to protect assets and prevent unauthorised access or breaches. Increased scrutiny from CIOs, CTOs, and boards has heightened the focus on data sovereignty and privacy, leading to more careful evaluations of third-party cloud solutions.
Public clouds may be suitable for workloads not bound by strict data sovereignty laws. However, many organisations find that private cloud solutions are necessary to meet compliance requirements. Factors to consider include the level of control, oversight, portability, and customization needed for specific workloads. Keeping data within trusted environments offers operational and strategic benefits, such as greater control over data access, usage, and sharing.
The trend towards cloud repatriation shows a growing realisation that the public cloud is only sometimes the best choice for every workload. Organisations are increasingly making strategic decisions to align their IT infrastructure with their specific needs and priorities.