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Cisco Fixes Critical CVE-2024-20418 Vulnerability in Industrial Wireless Access Points

 

Cisco recently disclosed a critical security vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-20418, that affects specific Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB) access points used in industrial settings. These URWB access points are essential for maintaining robust wireless networks in environments like manufacturing plants, transportation systems, and other infrastructure-intensive industries. The vulnerability allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to perform command injection attacks with root privileges by exploiting the device’s web-based management interface. 

This vulnerability results from inadequate validation of input data within Cisco’s Unified Industrial Wireless Software, specifically affecting the web management interface of URWB access points. By sending specially crafted HTTP requests, attackers could exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands with root-level access, potentially leading to unauthorized control over the device. This level of access could compromise critical network infrastructure, posing serious risks to businesses relying on URWB technology for uninterrupted connectivity. The vulnerability specifically impacts Cisco Catalyst models IW9165D, IW9165E, and IW9167E when URWB mode is enabled. 

For users concerned about their device’s security, Cisco advises checking vulnerability status by using the “show mpls-config” command in the command-line interface (CLI). If the command confirms URWB mode is active, the device may be vulnerable to potential attacks. Cisco’s Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) has stated that it is not aware of any instances of this vulnerability being actively exploited in real-world scenarios. However, given the nature of this vulnerability, Cisco urges users to update their devices promptly to mitigate the risk. Currently, Cisco has not issued workarounds for this issue. 

As a result, companies relying on these models are advised to stay alert for firmware updates or patches that Cisco may release to resolve the vulnerability. The lack of a temporary fix underlines the importance of applying any future updates immediately, especially as remote exploitation could have significant consequences for the affected systems. For organizations using these Cisco models, securing network access and strengthening device-level defenses can be critical in mitigating potential risks. Limiting access to the web-based management interface, monitoring device activity, and conducting frequent security audits are some proactive steps administrators can take. These actions may help limit exposure while waiting for Cisco’s permanent fix. This incident serves as a reminder of the evolving threat landscape in industrial and operational technology environments. 

As organizations adopt more wireless technologies to improve operational efficiencies, the need for robust cybersecurity practices is crucial. Regularly updating network devices and addressing vulnerabilities promptly are fundamental to protecting systems from cyber threats. Cisco’s disclosure of CVE-2024-20418 underscores the vulnerabilities that even the most reliable industrial-grade devices can exhibit. It also highlights the critical importance of proactive device management and security measures in preventing unauthorized access. Industrial environments should consider this a timely reminder to prioritize cybersecurity protocols across all network-connected devices.

Energy Sector Faces Heightened Supply Chain Risks Amid Growing Dependence on IT and Software Vendors

 

The energy industry is experiencing a sharp increase in supply chain risks, largely driven by its growing reliance on external vendors. According to a recent report, two-thirds of security breaches in this sector now originate from software and IT vendors.

The study, conducted by SecurityScorecard and KPMG, titled "A Quantitative Analysis of Cyber Risks in the U.S. Energy Supply Chain," draws attention to frequent threats, including ransomware attacks targeting traditional IT systems.

Researchers have emphasized that as the transition to cleaner energy picks up pace, and as the grid becomes more interconnected and software-reliant, vulnerabilities in the energy sector are expected to increase.

Ryan Sherstobitoff, senior vice president of threat research and intelligence at SecurityScorecard, stated, “The energy sector's rising dependence on third-party vendors exposes a significant vulnerability—its security is only as robust as its weakest link."

He added that this growing reliance on external vendors introduces considerable risks, urging the industry to strengthen cybersecurity defenses before a breach escalates into a national crisis.

The report highlighted that third-party risks account for nearly half of all breaches in the energy sector—significantly higher than the global average of 29%. Over 90% of organizations that experienced multiple breaches were attacked through third-party vendors.

Additionally, the report found that software and IT vendors were responsible for 67% of third-party breaches, while only a small number were linked to other energy companies. A notable portion of these incidents stemmed from the MOVEit file transfer software vulnerability, which was exploited by the Clop ransomware group last year.

The report also pointed out application security, DNS health, and network security as some of the most significant weaknesses in the sector.

The findings come at a time when the U.S. Department of Energy is convening with energy sector leaders to promote the Supply Chain Cybersecurity Principles, urging companies to focus on reducing risks posed by software and IT vendors, which represent the highest third-party threats.

As part of this effort, energy operators are encouraged to ensure new technology purchases are secure by incorporating initiatives like CISA’s "Secure by Design" and following the Department of Energy’s Supply Chain Cybersecurity Principles. The industry must also bolster security programs to defend against supply chain risks and geopolitical threats, especially from nation-state actors, and analyze ransomware attacks affecting foreign counterparts to improve resilience.

“The energy sector is a complex system undergoing a significant generational shift, heavily reliant on a stable supply chain," said Prasanna Govindankutty, KPMG's principal and cybersecurity leader for the U.S. sector.

He further explained that with rising geopolitical and technology-based threats, the industry is facing a level of risk exposure that could negatively impact both businesses and citizens. Organizations that can quantify these risks and implement mitigation strategies will be better equipped to navigate the energy transition.

Lessons from the CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor Defect: Enhancing Ransomware Recovery and Business Continuity

 


In recent times, a significant IT disruption was caused by a defect in a content update for CrowdStrike’s Falcon sensor, affecting approximately 8.5 million PCs across diverse sectors. This issue, which disrupted organizations ranging from small businesses and global conglomerates to government agencies and hospitals, highlighted severe vulnerabilities in how entities handle large-scale IT failures. The impact was widespread, leading to delayed flights, transaction failures at gas stations and grocery stores, and significant delays in emergency services such as police and fire departments. 

The scale of this disruption serves as a critical reminder of the importance of robust ransomware recovery and business continuity plans (BCPs). Although the immediate cause of the disruption was not a ransomware attack, the parallels between handling this IT issue and responding to ransomware are striking. This event underscores the need for organizations to evaluate and improve their preparedness for various types of cyber threats. One of the key lessons from this incident is the importance of efficient detection. The mean time to detect (MTTD) is a crucial metric that measures how swiftly an organization can identify a security breach. 

The quick identification of the Falcon sensor defect was vital in managing its effects and preventing further damage. Organizations should focus on strengthening their detection systems to ensure they can quickly identify and respond to potential threats. This includes implementing advanced monitoring tools and refining alert mechanisms to reduce response times during a real cyber incident. Recovery and restoration processes are equally critical. After the Falcon sensor issue, organizations had to mobilize their BCPs to recover systems and restore normal operations from backups. This situation emphasizes the need for well-documented, regularly updated, and thoroughly tested recovery plans. 

Businesses must ensure their backup strategies are reliable and that they can quickly restore operations with minimal disruption. Effective recovery plans should include clear procedures for data restoration, system repairs, and communication with stakeholders during a crisis. The incident also highlights the importance of continuous assessment and improvement of an organization’s cybersecurity posture. By analyzing their response to the Falcon sensor defect, organizations can identify gaps in their strategies and address any weaknesses. This involves reviewing incident response plans, updating communication protocols, and enhancing overall resilience to cyber threats. 

Furthermore, the disruption reinforces the need for comprehensive risk management strategies. Organizations should regularly evaluate their exposure to various types of cyber threats, including ransomware, and implement measures to mitigate these risks. This includes investing in cybersecurity training for employees, conducting regular security audits, and staying informed about the latest threat intelligence. 

In conclusion, the CrowdStrike Falcon sensor defect offers valuable lessons for enhancing ransomware recovery and business continuity planning. By learning from this event, organizations can improve their ability to respond to and recover from cyberattacks, ensuring they are better prepared for future threats. Regular updates to BCPs, enhanced detection capabilities, and robust recovery processes are essential for safeguarding against disruptions and maintaining operational resilience in today’s increasingly complex digital landscape.

Cyble Research Reveals Near-Daily Surge in Supply Chain Attacks

 

The prevalence of software supply chain attacks is on the rise, posing significant threats due to the extensive impact and severity of such incidents, according to threat intelligence researchers at Cyble.

Within a six-month span from February to mid-August, Cyble identified 90 claims of supply chain breaches made by cybercriminals on the dark web. This averages nearly one breach every other day. Supply chain attacks are notably more costly and damaging than other types of cyber breaches, making even a small number of these attacks particularly detrimental.

Cyble’s blog highlights that while infiltrations of an IT supplier’s codebase—similar to the SolarWinds incident in 2020 and Kaseya in 2021—are relatively uncommon, the software supply chain’s various components, including code, dependencies, and applications, remain a continuous source of vulnerabilities. These persistent risks leave all organizations exposed to potential cyberattacks.

Even when supply chain breaches do not compromise codebases, they can still result in the exposure of sensitive data, which attackers can exploit to breach other environments through methods such as phishing, spoofing, and credential theft. The interconnected nature of the physical and digital supply chain means that any manufacturer or supplier involved in downstream distribution could be considered a potential cyber risk, according to the researchers.

In their 2024 analysis, Cyble researchers examined the frequency and characteristics of supply chain attacks and explored defenses that can mitigate these risks.

Increasing Frequency of Supply Chain Attacks

Cyble’s dark web monitoring revealed 90 instances of cybercriminals claiming successful supply chain breaches between February and mid-August 2024.

IT service providers were the primary targets, accounting for one-third of these breaches. Technology product companies were also significantly impacted, experiencing 14 breaches. The aerospace and defense, manufacturing, and healthcare sectors followed, each reporting between eight and nine breaches.

Despite the concentration of attacks in certain industries, Cyble’s data shows that 22 out of 25 sectors tracked have experienced supply chain attacks in 2024. The U.S. led in the number of breaches claimed on the dark web, with 31 incidents, followed by the UK with 10, and Germany and Australia with five each. Japan and India each reported four breaches.

Significant Supply Chain Attacks in 2024

Cyble’s blog detailed eight notable attacks, ranging from codebase hijacks affecting over 100,000 sites to disruptions of essential services. Examples include:

  • jQuery Attack: In July, a supply chain attack targeted the JavaScript npm package manager, using trojanized versions of jQuery to exfiltrate sensitive form data from websites. This attack impacted multiple platforms and highlighted the urgent need for developers and website owners to verify package authenticity and monitor code for suspicious modifications.
  • Polyfill Attack: In late June, a fake domain impersonated the Polyfill.js library, injecting malware into over 100,000 websites. This malware redirected users to unauthorized sites, underscoring the security risks associated with external code libraries and the importance of vigilant website security.
  • Programming Language Breach: The threat actor IntelBroker claimed unauthorized access to a node package manager (npm) and GitHub account related to an undisclosed programming language, including private repositories with privileges to push and clone commits.
  • CDK Global Inc. Attack: On June 19, a ransomware attack targeted CDK Global Inc., a provider of software to automotive dealerships, disrupting sales and inventory operations for weeks across North American auto dealers, including major networks like Group1 Automotive Inc. and AutoNation Inc.
  • Access to 400+ Companies: IntelBroker also claimed in June to have access to over 400 companies through a compromised third-party contractor, with data access to platforms like Jira, GitHub, and AWS, potentially affecting large organizations such as Lockheed Martin and Samsung.
Mitigating Supply Chain Risks through Zero Trust and Resilience

To counter supply chain attacks, Cyble researchers recommend adopting zero trust principles, enhancing cyber resilience, and improving code security. Key defenses include:

  1. Network microsegmentation
  2. Strong access controls
  3. Robust user and device identity authentication
  4. Encrypting data both at rest and in transit
  5. Ransomware-resistant backups that are “immutable, air-gapped, and isolated”
  6. Honeypots for early detection of breaches
  7. Secure configuration of API and cloud service connections
  8. Monitoring for unusual activity using tools like SIEM and DLP
  9. Regular audits, vulnerability scanning, and penetration testing are also essential for maintaining these controls.

Enhancing Secure Development and Third-Party Risk Management

Cyble also emphasizes best practices for code security, including developer audits and partner assessments. The use of threat intelligence services like Cyble’s can further aid in evaluating partner and vendor risks.

Cyble’s third-party risk intelligence module assesses partner security across various areas, such as cyber hygiene, dark web exposure, and network vulnerabilities, providing specific recommendations for improvement. Their AI-powered vulnerability scanning also helps organizations identify and prioritize their own web-facing vulnerabilities.

As security becomes a more critical factor in purchasing decisions, vendors will likely need to improve their security controls and documentation to meet these demands, the report concludes.

The Need For A Vulnerability Operations Center (VOC) in Modern Cybersecurity


 

Many organisations tend to focus on immediate threats, prioritising the detection and mitigation of the latest vulnerabilities. However, this approach overlooks a broader issue: many cyberattacks exploit vulnerabilities that have existed for years. In fact, 76% of vulnerabilities targeted by ransomware were identified more than three years ago, highlighting a critical gap in long-term security strategies.

Why VOCs Matter

To effectively address this gap, organisations should adopt a more centralised and automated approach to vulnerability management. This is where a dedicated Vulnerability Operations Center (VOC) comes into play. A VOC serves as a specialised unit, either integrated within or operating alongside a Security Operations Center (SOC), with the primary task of managing security flaws within the IT infrastructure. Unlike a SOC, which focuses on real-time threat alerts and incidents, a VOC zeroes in on vulnerabilities—identifying, prioritising, and mitigating them before they escalate into serious security breaches.

What Is a VOC?

Creating a seamless connection between a SOC and a VOC is crucial for effective cybersecurity. This integration ensures that vulnerability data is quickly and efficiently passed to threat response teams. The process begins with appointing a team to set up the VOC, overseen by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) or another senior security leader. Given the scope of this initiative, it should be treated as a major security operations project, with clear roles and responsibilities outlined from the start.

Connecting VOC and SOC

The initial step involves using vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the organisation’s current security posture. This assessment helps to identify existing vulnerabilities across all assets. The next phase is to aggregate, clean, and organise this data, making it actionable for further use. Once this dataset is established, it is integrated into the SOC’s security information and event management (SIEM) systems, thereby enhancing the SOC’s ability to monitor and respond to threats with greater context and clarity.

Focusing on Risk

An essential component of VOC operations is moving beyond just technical vulnerability assessments to a more risk-based prioritisation approach. This means evaluating vulnerabilities based on their potential impact on the business and addressing the most critical ones first. Automating routine SOC tasks—such as regular vulnerability scans, alert handling, and patch management—also plays a vital role. By implementing automation tools that leverage the VOC’s data, SOC teams can focus on more complex tasks that require human intervention, improving overall efficiency and effectiveness.

Continuous Improvement

Once the VOC is fully operational, the focus should shift to continuous improvement and adaptation. As new vulnerabilities and trends emerge, the SOC must update its monitoring and response strategies to keep pace. Establishing feedback loops between the SOC and VOC ensures that both teams are aligned and responsive to the incessant development of threats.

Building a Strong Policy

Moreover, a strong policy and governance framework is necessary to support the integration of the VOC and SOC. Security teams need to define clear schedules, rules, and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for addressing vulnerabilities. For example, vulnerabilities like Log4j, which are widely exploited, should trigger immediate notifications to SOC teams to ensure a swift response.

The Future of Security

While setting up a VOC may seem challenging, it is a critical step towards addressing the persistent vulnerability issues. Unlike the current reactive approach, a VOC allows for a more proactive, risk-based management of vulnerabilities across IT and security teams. By moving beyond the outdated, piecemeal strategies of the past, organisations can achieve a higher level of security, protecting their assets from both old and new threats.


Navigating the Impact of Major IT Outages: Lessons from the CrowdStrike Incident

 

On Friday, a critical software update by cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike led to a massive outage, affecting around 8.5 million Windows machines globally. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the importance of preparedness for IT disruptions. Experts from CIO Journal have shared their insights on how organizations can better prepare for similar scenarios in the future. Understanding vendor practices is crucial. 

IT leaders should hold vendors, like CrowdStrike, to high standards regarding development and testing. Neil MacDonald, a Gartner vice president, emphasizes the need for thorough regression testing of all Windows versions before any update is released. IT managers must ensure that vendors are transparent about their software development processes and offer options for phased updates. With automatic software updates becoming standard practice, the CrowdStrike incident highlights the need for caution. Paul Davis from JFrog suggests prioritizing testing for updates based on their potential impact. 

Although testing every update may not be feasible, automation and AI tools can assist in managing this process efficiently. Jack Hidary from SandboxAQ advocates for AI-driven error detection to enhance software reliability. Developing a robust disaster recovery plan is also essential. Gartner’s MacDonald likens a major IT outage to a natural disaster, advising businesses to prepare similar recovery strategies. Establishing a “clean room” environment for restoring critical systems and conducting regular tabletop exercises can help maintain operational resilience. Regular data backups also mitigate the impact of such outages, as noted by Victor Zyamzin from Qrator Labs. Reviewing vendor contracts and insurance coverage is another vital step. Companies should scrutinize their agreements for clauses that ensure vendor reliability and explore compensation options for outages. 

Peter Halprin from Haynes Boone underscores the importance of cyber insurance, which can provide financial protection against business income losses due to IT disruptions. Finally, organizations may need to reassess their reliance on specific platforms. The CrowdStrike update, which primarily affected Windows-based systems, raises questions about whether businesses should consider alternative operating systems like macOS or Linux. As Chirag Mehta of Constellation Research points out, evaluating the necessity of deeper access provided by Windows might lead some to adopt simpler systems like Chromebooks.

The CrowdStrike outage underscores the importance of rigorous testing, effective disaster recovery plans, careful vendor and insurance management, and a thoughtful approach to platform selection. By addressing these areas, businesses can better prepare for future IT challenges and safeguard their operations.

British Library Braces for £7 Million Cyber Woes

 



The British Library faces a potential £7 million expenditure from a severe cyber attack that disrupted its website and internal WiFi in October. Perpetrated by the Rhysida group, the attackers demanded a £600,000 ransom, leading to the compromise of hundreds of thousands of files, including customer and personnel data, when the library refused to pay. 

Reports suggest the library plans to utilise approximately 40% of its reserves, around £6 to £7 million out of an unallocated £16.4 million, to rebuild its digital services. The final recovery costs are yet to be confirmed, and investigations are underway by the National Cyber Security Centre and cybersecurity specialists. 

In a recent post on social media, the library explained the ongoing challenges caused by the cyber attack. The incident affected the website, online systems, and some on-site services. The attack is confirmed as ransomware, raising concerns about the potential exposure of user data on the dark web. 

Working in conjunction with cybersecurity specialists and collaborating with the Metropolitan Police, the library anticipates a prolonged period for the thorough analysis of the breached data. Despite persistent issues with online systems, the library's physical locations remain accessible. To address user needs, a reference-only version of the primary catalogue is expected to be back online by January 15. 

Acknowledging the sustained patience and support from users and partners, Sir Roly Keating, the Chief Executive of the British Library, expressed gratitude. He highlighted the ongoing efforts to assess the impact of this criminal attack and implement measures for the secure and sustainable restoration of online systems. 

Providing a precise timeline for the restoration process is premature at this stage, but regular updates will be offered as progress is made in this critical endeavour. 

The primary motivation behind cyber attacks is financial gain. This criminal activity, aptly named ransomware, involves using malicious software to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorised access to computer systems, compelling organisations and businesses to pay a ransom. 

While the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) chose not to comment on the matter, a Government insider confirmed the expectation that the British Library would tap into its reserves for recovery. 

As the British Library deals with the consequences of this cyber attack, the challenges underscore the pervasive threat posed by ransomware, highlighting organisations must work on their resilience of digital fortifications and guard against the risks posed by such malevolent activities.


Estes Declines Ransom Demand Amidst Personal Data Breach and Theft

 

Estes Express Lines, a major private freight shipping company in the United States, has notified over 20,000 customers about a security breach where their personal information was stolen by unknown hackers.

The company revealed that on October 1, 2023, unauthorized individuals gained access to a part of their IT network and deployed ransomware. Despite the standard advice from the FBI and financial regulators, Estes chose not to pay the ransom demanded by the attackers. 

Initially disclosed in early October as a "cyberattack" affecting their IT infrastructure, Estes later announced the full restoration of their system capabilities by October 24 through a video posted by their chief operating officer, Webb Estes.

A group known as Lockbit claimed responsibility for the breach a month later and disclosed that they leaked data taken from the company on November 13. On New Year's Eve, Estes filed a data breach notice with the Maine Attorney General, providing further insights into the digital intrusion, now confirmed to be a ransomware attack.

According to Estes, they are collaborating with the FBI in the investigation. While the forensic analysis confirmed that personal information was stolen, the specifics of the accessed data were not explicitly mentioned in the sample notification letter. 

However, the Maine filing indicated that it involved names or other personal identifiers combined with Social Security numbers, suggesting a broader scope of compromised information.

Estes has not provided immediate responses to inquiries regarding details about the breach, such as the stolen data specifics, the initial network access point for the hackers, the ransom amount demanded, and the rationale behind the decision to refrain from paying the ransom. 

This decision has sparked a contentious debate encompassing practical considerations like effective backups and financial implications, along with broader ethical concerns such as potential support for criminal activities like human trafficking, terrorism, or future cybercrimes through ransom payments.

Both paying and not paying ransoms have proven to be financially burdensome for affected entities. Caesars Entertainment allegedly paid $15 million to a ransomware group to decrypt their data and prevent customer information leakage after a September breach, while MGM Resorts, despite not paying the ransom in a similar attack, suffered losses surpassing $100 million.

While the US government advises against ransom payments, some voices advocate for a complete ban on such extortion payments. Despite the breach, Estes has stated that they are not currently aware of any instances of identity theft, fraud, or financial losses stemming from the incident. Additionally, they plan to offer affected individuals 12 months of free identity monitoring services through Kroll.