The increasing prevalence of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) featuring embedded web servers has opened avenues for potential catastrophic remote attacks on operational technology (OT) within industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructure sectors.
Researchers from the Georgia Institute of Technology have developed malware that could enable adversaries to remotely access embedded web servers in PLCs, potentially leading to manipulation of output signals, falsification of sensor readings, disabling safety systems, and other actions with severe consequences, including loss of life.
PLCs are integral components of ICS, responsible for controlling physical processes and machinery in manufacturing, industrial, and critical infrastructure settings.
Malware targeting PLCs typically aims to disrupt or sabotage the physical processes they control.
The newly developed web-based PLC malware differs fundamentally from traditional PLC malware. Unlike previous versions that required prior physical or network access, the web-based malware attacks the front-end web layer in PLCs using malicious JavaScript.
This approach eliminates some limitations faced by previous malicious code, providing advantages such as platform independence, ease of deployment, and higher levels of persistence.
Historically, PLC malware-infected firmware or control logic, requires specific access or is easily erasable via factory resets. The web-based malware targets the web layer, making it fundamentally different and more challenging to mitigate.
The outcomes of cyberattacks using this new strain of malware mirror those of previous successful PLC attacks, including the infamous Stuxnet campaign that targeted Siemens PLCs to dismantle high-speed centrifuges at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
While other attacks, such as BlackEnergy, Triton/Trisis, and INCONTROLLER, have demonstrated the potential damage to systems controlling physical processes, the Georgia Tech researchers' web-based PLC malware offers a more persistent and easier-to-deploy method.
The researchers conducted a proof-of-concept cyberattack in a scenario resembling a Stuxnet-like attack on a widely used PLC controlling an industrial motor. The PLC featured a web-based interface for remote monitoring, programming, and configuration.
In their test scenario, the researchers explored how an attacker could gain initial access to the PLC by remotely injecting malicious code into the web server.
The web-based PLC malware allowed the attacker to physically damage the industrial motor, manipulate admin settings for further compromise, and steal data for industrial espionage.
The unique aspect of this web-based PLC malware lies in its residence in PLC memory while being executed client-side by various browser-equipped devices across the ICS environment. The malware utilizes ambient browser-based credentials to interact with the PLC's legitimate web APIs, facilitating attacks on real-world machinery.
This type of malware presents challenges for defenders due to its ease of deployment and platform-agnostic nature. As industrial systems continue to integrate web-based interfaces for remote access and monitoring, the security community must stay vigilant to address evolving threats like web-based PLC malware and ensure the resilience of critical infrastructure against potential cyber-physical attacks.
