The phishing email campaign began in September 2023, right after the FBI took down the Qbot (Qakbot) infrastructure.
In a report recently published by Cofense, researchers explain that the DarkGate and Pikabot operations employ strategies and methods that are reminiscent of earlier Qakbot attacks, suggesting that the threat actors behind Qbot have now shifted to more recent malware botnets.
"This campaign is undoubtedly a high-level threat due to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that enable the phishing emails to reach intended targets as well as the advanced capabilities of the malware being delivered," the report reads.
This presents a serious risk to the organization because DarkGate and Pikabot are modular malware loaders that have many of the same features as Qbot, and Qbot was one of the most widely used malware botnets that were spread by malicious email.
Threat actors would likely utilize the new malware loaders, like Qbot, to get initial access to networks and carry out ransomware, espionage, and data theft assaults.
Earlier this year, there had been a dramatic surge in malicious emails promoting the DarkGate ransomware. Starting in October 2023, threat actors have begun using Pikabot as the main payload.
This phishing attack takes place by sending an email – that is a reply or forward of a stolen discussion threat – to the targeted victims, who trust the fraudulent communications.
After clicking on the embedded URL, users are prompted to download a ZIP file containing a malware dropper that retrieves the final payload from a remote location. These tests ensure that the users are legitimate targets.
According to Cofense, the attackers tested a number of early malware droppers to see which one worked best, including:
DarkGate first came to light in 2017, however only became available to the threat actors past summer. As a result, its contribution to conducting phishing attacks and malvertising increases.
This sophisticated modular malware may perform a wide range of malicious actions, such as keylogging, bitcoin mining, reverse shelling, hVNC remote access, clipboard theft, and information (files, browser data) theft.
PikaBot, on the other hand, was discovered much recently in 2023. It consists of a loader and a core module, slotting in extensive anti-debugging, anti-VM, and anti-emulation mechanisms.
The malware profiles targeted systems and transfers the data to its command and control (C2) infrastructure, awaiting additional instructions.
The C2 delivers the commands to the malware that order it to download and run modules in the form of DLL or PE files, shellcode, or command-line commands.
Cofense has further cautioned that PikaBot and DarkGarw campaigns are being conducted by threat actors who are conversant with what they are doing and that their capabilities are top-of-the-line. Thus, organizations must be thoroughly introduced to the TTPs for this phishing campaign.
Last week, a pernicious and multifunctional malware was silenced as a result of Operation "Duck Hunt," a collaborative effort led by the FBI. This operation successfully extracted the malicious code from 700,000 compromised systems, forcibly severing their connection to the Qakbot botnet. Additionally, the FBI took control of 52 servers and recovered $8.6 million in stolen cryptocurrency, vowing to return these funds to the rightful victims.
On August 29, the Justice Department and FBI confirmed to had taken down Qakbot by issuing a search warrant to essentially take over the servers that ran the botnet. The critical malware Qakbot was then forcibly removed from hundreds of computers by the botnet after being distributed to them by federal agents.
In the investigations, the agencies found that Quakbot had access to over 700,000 infected computers, 200,000 of which were based in the US.
Qakbot, aka Qbot, initially commenced its operations in the year 2008, as a Windows-based Trojan designed to acquire access to targeted users’ bank account credentials. It was conventionally spread as malware attachments in phishing emails.
The malware was also designed to develop a botnet, that would follow the commands of a hacker-controlled server. As a result, the Qakbot developers were able to charge other cybercriminal organizations for access to their hacked systems.
The cybercrime organizations might then unleash ransomware on the affected systems or steal data from them. Qakbot has been connected to a number of ransomware gangs, including Conti, Black Basta, Royal, Revil, and Lockbit, among others, by US authorities and security researchers. The unidentified Qakbot operators received fees related to victim ransom payments totalling around $58 million in return. The botnet's operations are anticipated to have caused hundreds of millions of dollars in total victim losses.
The application for the operation’s seizure warrant describes that the FBI gained access to the servers operating the Qakbot botnet infrastructure, which was hosted by an anonymous web hosting company, which also included systems used by the Qakbot operators.
The application further noted that, “Through its investigation, the FBI has gained a comprehensive understanding of the structure and function of the Qakbot botnet[…]Based on that knowledge, the FBI has developed a means to identify infected computers, collect information from them about the infection, disconnect them from the Qakbot botnet and prevent the Qakbot administrators from further communicating with those infected computers.”
Reportedly, Qakbots uses a network in three Tiers in order to control the malware installed on the infected computers.
According to the FBI, Tier 1 systems are regular home or business computers that are infected with Qakbot and also include an additional "supernode" module, making them a part of the botnet's global command and control network. Many of these machines are situated in the United States. In order to hide the primary Tier 3 command and control server, which the administrators use to send encrypted commands to its hundreds of thousands of infected workstations, Tier 1 computers communicate with Tier 2 systems, which act as a proxy for network traffic.
By gaining access to these systems and Qackbot’s encryption keys, the FBI could decode and get a better understanding of the encrypted commands. Moreover, with access to the encryption keys, the FBI can command the Tier 1 “supermode” computers to swap and replace the supernode module with those developed by the FBI, which contains new encryption keys, snatching access to Qakbot from their own administrators.
“Qakbot was the botnet of choice for some of the most infamous ransomware gangs, but we have now taken it out,” US Attorney Martin Estrada said in the announcement.
The US is yet to provide further details on the issue. However, the Justice Department noted that “The FBI was able to redirect Qakbot botnet traffic to and through servers controlled by the FBI, which in turn instructed infected computers in the United States and elsewhere to download a file created by law enforcement that would uninstall the Qakbot malware.”
Malicious actors are adapting their strategies, techniques, and procedures in response to Microsoft's move to automatically block Excel 4.0 (XLM or XL4) and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros across Office programs (TTPs).
Malicious Microsoft Office document attachments sent in phishing emails often contain VBA and XL4 Macros, two short programs designed to automate repetitive processes in Microsoft Office applications that threat actors use to load, drop, or install malware.
Sherrod DeGrippo, vice president of threat research and detection at Proofpoint, stated "the threat landscape has changed significantly as a result of threat actors shifting away from directly disseminating macro-based email attachments."
The change was made as a result of Microsoft's announcement that it will stop the widespread exploitation of the Office subsystem by making it more challenging to activate macros and automatically banning them by default.
New tactics
Use of ISO, RAR, and Windows Shortcut (LNK) attachments to get around the block has multiplied by 66%, according to security firm Proofpoint, which calls this activity 'one of the largest email threat landscape shifts in recent history.' Actors spreading the Emotet malware are also involved in this activity.
The use of container files like ISOs, ZIPs, and RARs has also increased rapidly, increasing by about 175 percent. These are rapidly being used as initial access mechanisms by threat actors, between October 2021 and June 2022, the use of ISO files surged by over 150 percent.
Since October 2021, the number of campaigns including LNK files has climbed by 1,675%. Proofpoint has been tracking a variety of cybercriminal and advanced persistent threat (APT) actors who frequently use LNK files.
Emotet, IcedID, Qakbot, and Bumblebee are some of the famous malware families disseminated using these new techniques.
According to Proofpoint, the usage of HTML attachments employing the HTML smuggling approach to put a botnet on the host system has also increased significantly. Their distribution volumes, however, are still quite limited.
Finally, with a restricted range of potential threats to assess, email security systems are now more likely to detect hazardous files.