Artificial intelligence tools are increasingly allowing non-technical users to build software and automate tasks that previously required programming knowledge, and a new open-source AI agent called Hermes is becoming a major example of that shift.
The discussion gained momentum this week after reports circulated about a 78-year-old marketing executive with no coding background successfully creating a robotics application using only natural-language instructions. The application was reportedly built through the Reachy Mini ecosystem developed by Hugging Face, whose robot app marketplace has surpassed 300 live applications and approximately 10,000 deployed robots worldwide.
According to the shared account, the individual did not use Python programming or specialized robotics software during development. Supporters of AI-assisted development tools pointed to the example as evidence that conversational AI systems are reducing technical barriers that traditionally slowed software creation.
The development also reflects a broader trend across the AI industry. Newer AI agents are increasingly designed to retain information from previous interactions, improve their own workflows, and adapt to user behavior over time. Earlier this week, Anthropic introduced a feature called “Dreaming,” which allows AI agents to process earlier sessions in the background and generate new memory structures automatically. Meanwhile, Hermes Agent from Nous Research is pursuing a similar idea through persistent task learning and automated skill generation.
Hermes Agent, first released in February 2026, has quickly gained traction within the open-source AI community. The project reportedly has more than 135,000 GitHub stars and is distributed under the MIT license. It also includes over 40 built-in skills, which function as reusable instruction modules that help the system repeat previously learned workflows more efficiently.
One of Hermes’ defining features is its self-improving learning architecture. After completing a difficult or multi-step task, the agent enters what developers call a “Reflective Phase.” During this process, the system reviews its own actions, identifies successful execution patterns, and converts those patterns into reusable skill files. When a related task appears later, Hermes can retrieve the previously learned solution instead of generating a new workflow from the beginning.
The platform also uses a layered memory structure consisting of temporary session memory, long-term episodic memory stored through SQLite databases, and procedural memory tied to learned skills. Developers say the software can operate on low-cost virtual private servers, large GPU clusters, or serverless cloud environments. Hermes is also model-agnostic, allowing users to connect the framework to providers such as OpenAI, Anthropic, OpenRouter, Kimi, MiniMax, GLM, Nous Portal, or privately hosted AI endpoints.
Users can access the agent through Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Signal, email services, or command-line interfaces. The project’s latest update, v0.13.0, internally referred to as “The Tenacity Release,” reportedly introduced Google Chat integration as its twentieth supported platform. The update also added durable multi-agent coordination tools, automatic task recovery systems, retry budgeting controls, hallucination filtering mechanisms, persistent goal tracking for long-running tasks, automatic linting after file edits, and session recovery after unexpected gateway interruptions.
According to project details shared by contributors, the release included 864 code commits from 295 contributors in a single week and resolved eight critical security issues. One patched vulnerability reportedly involved a Discord-related flaw that could allow bots to message users across servers outside their intended access scope.
The installation process has also been simplified significantly. Hermes now uses a one-line curl installer that automatically configures dependencies such as Python 3.11, Node.js, ripgrep, and ffmpeg. During setup, the software can automatically detect existing OpenClaw environments and offer to import prior settings, memories, skills, and API credentials.
The growing comparison between Hermes and OpenClaw highlights a design shift occurring within the AI assistant ecosystem. OpenClaw originally gained attention by focusing heavily on messaging integrations and centralized orchestration across communication platforms. Hermes, by contrast, places continuous learning and automated self-improvement at the center of its architecture.
In practical terms, OpenClaw skills are generally predefined instruction sets written manually by users or generated beforehand through prompting. Hermes instead attempts to build those reusable workflows automatically by analyzing completed tasks after roughly every 15 tool interactions or after especially complex operations. Supporters argue this creates a compounding learning effect where the agent gradually improves with repeated use.
Despite the growing interest around Hermes, some developers caution against viewing it as a complete replacement for OpenClaw. OpenClaw still supports more than 24 messaging integrations, offers greater transparency through inspectable file-based memory systems, and has undergone broader public security review. Community discussions suggest that many advanced users currently operate both systems together, using OpenClaw for orchestration while relying on Hermes for adaptive learning capabilities.
Researchers tracking the rapid development of AI agents believe these systems are moving beyond traditional chatbot behavior and evolving into persistent digital assistants capable of handling long-running, multi-step workflows. However, cybersecurity analysts also warn that systems with autonomous memory creation and broad platform access may introduce additional security and privacy risks if governance and safeguards fail to evolve alongside the technology.
The first bug is tracked as CVE-2026-23863, a Windows specific problem. This bug was maliciously crafted with hidden “NUL BYTES” hidden within the filename, to trick WhatsApp into showing it as one filetype such as an authorized PDF while pretending to be running as an executable once opened. Meta fixed this patch in April on both platforms.
The second vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-23866 impacted both android and iOS users. The attack tactic involved partial authorization of AI rich response texts for Instagram Reels shared within Whatsapp. A threat actor could possible launch another user’s device to access media content through an arbitrary URL, such as launching OS level custom URL scheme handles. This flaw was patched in April on both platforms.
The two bugs were given medium severity by researchers. WhatsApp has verified that no bug was abused.
Both were rated medium severity, and WhatsApp confirmed there's no evidence either was actually abused.
These kind of reporting get sidelined by glossy and infamous threat. For instance the recent SMS pumpoing attacks increasing phone bills, or phishing campaigns that used messaging apps as entry points, and lastly the attack on educational institutes that compromised Canvas and Instructure, leaking hundreds of GBs of data.
But Whatsapp did a good job in finding and fixing the flaw before cybercriminals could exploit them and cause harm. The bug bounty program of WhatsApp has been going on for fifteen yesr, and the recent patches show it it is still reliable.
Simple advice: always keep your phones and app updated.
There has never been a better moment to use secure communications services like WhatsApp or Signal. The truth is that Meta does a great job of keeping the app and its users safe and secure, despite some security concerns of its own, such as the recently reported phishing attempts using the encrypted messenger as part of the exploit chain and a spyware threat targeting iOS users.
Security researchers have uncovered a gap in the way Anthropic Skill scanning tools inspect third-party AI packages, allowing malicious code hidden inside test files to execute on developer systems even after scanners marked the Skills as safe.
The issue centers on Anthropic Skills, reusable packages designed for AI coding assistants such as Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf. These packages often include instructions, scripts, and configuration files that help AI agents perform development tasks inside IDE environments.
Researchers from Gecko Security found that existing Skill scanners focus primarily on files tied directly to agent behavior, particularly SKILL.md, while ignoring bundled test files that can still run locally through standard developer tooling.
In the demonstrated attack chain, a Skill passed all scanner checks because its visible instruction files contained no prompt injection attempts, suspicious shell commands, or malicious instructions. However, the repository also included a hidden .test.ts file stored elsewhere in the directory structure. Although the file was outside the agent execution layer, it still executed through the project’s testing framework with full access to local resources.
According to researcher Jeevan Jutla, the problem begins when developers install a Skill using the npx skills add command. The installer copies nearly the entire repository into the project’s .agents/skills/ directory. Only a few items, including .git, metadata.json, and files prefixed with underscores, are excluded during installation.
Once placed inside the repository, testing frameworks such as Jest and Vitest automatically discover matching test files through recursive glob patterns. Both frameworks reportedly enable the dot:true option, allowing them to search inside hidden directories including .agents/. Mocha follows similar recursive discovery behavior in many default configurations.
A malicious Skill can therefore include a file such as reviewer.test.ts containing a beforeAll function that silently executes before visible tests begin. Researchers said these payloads can access environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, AWS credentials, deployment tokens, and other sensitive information commonly available inside local developer environments and CI pipelines. The data can then be transmitted to external servers without triggering obvious warnings during test execution.
The researchers stressed that the AI agent itself is never involved in the compromise. Instead, the malicious behavior occurs through trusted developer tooling already integrated into the software workflow. Existing scanners inspect the files the AI agent can interpret, but not the files executed separately by testing infrastructure.
The technique resembles older software supply-chain attacks involving malicious npm postinstall scripts and poisoned pytest plugins. However, Gecko Security noted that the Anthropic Skill ecosystem creates an additional propagation problem because installed Skills are often committed into shared repositories so teams can reuse them collaboratively.
GitHub’s default .gitignore templates do not automatically exclude .agents/ directories. Once a malicious test file enters the repository, every teammate cloning the project and every CI pipeline running automated tests may execute the payload across branches, forks, and deployment workflows.
The findings arrived shortly after multiple large-scale security audits examining the broader Anthropic Skills ecosystem. A January academic study named SkillScan analyzed 31,132 Skills collected from two major marketplaces and found that 26.1% contained at least one vulnerability spanning 14 separate patterns. Data exfiltration appeared in 13.3% of examined Skills, while privilege escalation appeared in 11.8%. Researchers also determined that Skills bundling executable scripts were 2.12 times more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only packages.
Several weeks later, Snyk published its ToxicSkills audit covering 3,984 Skills from ClawHub and skills.sh. The company reported that 13.4% of scanned Skills contained at least one critical-level security issue. Automated analysis combined with human review identified 76 confirmed malicious payloads, while eight malicious Skills reportedly remained publicly accessible on ClawHub when the findings were released.
In April, Cisco introduced an AI Agent Security Scanner integrated into IDE platforms including VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf. The scanner can detect prompt injection attempts, suspicious shell execution patterns, and data exfiltration behaviors within Skill definitions and agent-referenced scripts. However, Gecko Security said bundled test files remain outside the scanner’s documented detection surface because the tool was designed around agent interaction layers rather than developer execution layers.
Researchers noted that other products, including Snyk Agent Scan and VirusTotal Code Insight, face similar structural limitations. These tools inspect what the agent is instructed to execute but may overlook code paths triggered separately through local development frameworks.
Elia Zaitsev described the broader issue as a distinction between interpreting intent and monitoring actual execution behavior. In this case, the malicious code did not depend on prompt manipulation or AI instructions. It operated as ordinary TypeScript executed through legitimate test runners with full local permissions.
Zaitsev also warned that enterprise AI agents increasingly operate with privileged access to OAuth tokens, API keys, and centralized data sources. If those credentials are accessible through environment variables during automated testing, malicious test payloads can reach sensitive infrastructure without requiring direct agent compromise.
Mike Riemer added that threat actors frequently reverse engineer security patches within 72 hours of release, while many organizations take far longer to deploy fixes. In the case of the Anthropic Skill test-file issue, researchers warned that the exposure window becomes more difficult to manage because the malicious files may execute immediately after installation without triggering scanner alerts.
Security researchers are urging development teams to block test discovery inside .agents/ directories and inspect Skill repositories for files such as *.test.*, *.spec.*, conftest.py, __tests__/, and suspicious configuration scripts before merging code.
The report also recommends pinning Skill installations to verified commit hashes rather than installing the latest repository version. Researchers said this reduces the risk of attackers submitting clean repositories for scanner approval before later inserting malicious files. The approach aligns with guidance published in the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 project.
Organizations that already store Skills inside repositories are advised to audit existing .agents/ directories immediately, rotate exposed credentials if suspicious files are discovered, inspect CI logs for unexplained outbound network traffic, and review repository history to identify when potentially malicious files entered development pipelines.
The researchers additionally called on security vendors to provide greater transparency regarding which directories, execution surfaces, and file categories their scanners actually inspect. They argued that security teams evaluating Anthropic Skill scanners should verify whether products analyze bundled test files, build scripts, and CI configurations rather than focusing exclusively on prompt injection and agent instruction analysis.
The rising AI economy is bringing a new type of cybercrime. Cybercriminals are scamming AI firms by signing up for new accounts to steal tokens via computing power. The problem is getting worse, according to Patrick Collison, CEO of payment behemoth Stripe. The token hackers now amount for one in every six new customer subscriptions.
Experts said that the threat actors steal the tokens to later sell them on the dark web. ‘Token pilfering’ has plagued the cybersecurity world and is becoming quite expensive for AI startups to give free trials to potential customers.
It is not new for hackers to attack startups. With the AI economy rising, it has created fractures for hackers because with traditional software trials, a registration for an AI firm brings valuable tokens for compute power that hackers can sell later.
The most neglected subject in AI is token theft. Because they are using tokens at machine speed, these attackers can swiftly accrue enormous consumption bills that they never plan to pay and burn inference costs. This is one of the most frightening aspects of that.
In order to use the tokens for purposes unrelated to what the company is delivering or to resell them, token theft sometimes involves thieves creating many accounts at an AI company and across multiple firms. They always vanish after using up all of the tokens; Sands compared this swindle to those who "dine and dash" at restaurants.
The problem surfaces as the crooks use agents to steal the tokens in minutes. Unlike a traditional software company, the cybercrime happens too fast for the organization to address the issue.
It is hell for AI firms who want to give out free trials to get more new users. Typically, it costs nothing for a firm to give out free trials on a temporary basis, but for AI firms, the customer-acquisition costs can go up to $500 due to scammers abusing the startup policies of giving out free tokens for trial accounts.
The token epidemic has created problems for startups. Few have stopped free trials, but it has affected their growth as it shuts down the opportunities to get new customers.
Luckily, one solution exists. According to Stripe, there exists a product called Radar that works as a default fraud detector in the credit card payment network, adapts tools, and helps clients find and block token fraud.
Project Eleven, a quantum security firm, published a report that said these quantum computers, even one, is powerful enough to hack the elliptic curve digital signatures securing Ethereum, Bitcoin, and other big blockchains. Experts say they won’t exist beyond 2033, and may end soon by 2030. The window for action is closing fast. According to the report, “Migration to quantum-resistant cryptography is no longer optional but imperative for any blockchain system expected to be trusted and secure into the future."
Recent innovations have significantly lowered the hardware bar needed to launch such attacks. A breakthrough Google paper said that breaking the elliptic curve cryptography threshold could be achieved within 1,200 logical cubits, and less than 90 minutes of computing time on a supercomputing hardware.
Google has put a Q-Day (like D-day) at 2032. Project Eleven’s research has decreased the timeline by two years: 2030. The report estimates that 6.9 million Bitcoin (one third of the total estimated supply) have already been leaked on-chain, exposed to the potential quantum attack. For ETH, exposure is more, with over 65% of all ETH held in quantum-exposed addresses.
The public ledgers and bearer-instruments offer no security. Blockchains has no scam department, no redressal platform for stolen funds, and no chargeback measures. If a quantum hacker recovers a private key and steals money, the loss is permanent. The transition problem is further fouled by slow-moving blockchain governance.
What makes blockchains particularly vulnerable, the report explains, is that their public ledgers and bearer-instrument design offer no safety net. Unlike a bank, a blockchain has no fraud department, no chargeback mechanism, and no way to reverse a forged transaction. Once a quantum attacker recovers a private key and drains a wallet, the loss is permanent.
Bitcoin SegWit upgrade took more than two years to complete whereas ETH’s transition of proof stake took around 6 years to build. Quantum migration reaches the most basic layer of any blockchain mechanism.
The tech world has already started moving. More than half of web traffic (human) is currently post-quantum encrypted, Cloudflare data from December 2025 said.
The digital asset industry lacks preparedness. Crypto developers are suggesting various proposals but these plans will take years to execute while the threat is already brushing businesses and users.
"The internet has already moved," the report added. "The digital asset industry—which arguably has more at stake because blockchains directly protect bearer value with the exact cryptographic primitives that quantum computers threaten—has barely started."
Cybersecurity entered 2026 under stress to deploy AI tech while building foundations for a quantum future. Cybersecurity experts have to defend against advanced AI and hybrid attacks while facing talent scarcity, a rapidly shifting threat scenario, and rising operational challenges.
It is the first time that hackers have access to the same advanced enterprise-level tech that security experts are using to defend their digital assets.
Organizations are in need of the transformational advantage that Quantum computing promises, however, it also risks affecting the cryptographic infrastructure that protects today’s digital world. Worse, cyber attackers are getting together and outbeating experts.
Like experts, threat actors don’t mind playing the long game either, they gain initial access and stay hidden inside systems for longer periods of time. When the right opportunity arrives, they move laterally and hack important data that can affect operations, cause financial damage, and tarnish reputations.
So, what are these four key areas that businesses and users need to address or stay safe from?
As per the ICS2 2025 report, 69% respondents suffered multiple cybersecurity breaches due to skill gaps. This is due to various factors such as budget constraints, misalignment in academia, and high enterprise demand.
Hackers use GenAI to advance their attacks, scaling, and escape security experts. This reactive cycle delays response times, and gives just basic protection. What businesses need today is Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach that offers real-time visibility before flaws can be exploited. But the success depends on AI-based risk prioritization.
Reliability is the new attack vector. Deepfakes have plagued every digital aspect of human life. Traditional measures fail to address content due to AI, therefore AI-based protection is needed. Adaptive deepfake systems can address identity workflows and respond immediately to threats, flagging malicious activity and capturing attacks with detailed metadata for research and audit work.
Quantum computing is making strides in applicability; if sufficiently advanced, the systems can break public-key cryptographic systems in ransomware attacks such as RSA, where hackers extort millions. Hackers are already using the “harvest now, decrypt later” approach, stealing coded data with no promise of returning it.
Thus, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have advised to adopt post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and tracking quantum-vulnerable assets.
To be safe, users should avoid feeding personal data to the AI, as it can be misused, and there are thousands of cases now. Users at the receiver end can not do much except using multifactor authentication, and creating a strong password and using two-factor authentication. But users can be happy now that a new feature is available to individual ChatGPT users.
The new feature is called Advanced Account Security, it aims to provide better security to your account and protect your data. The option is aimed for security-minded users like journalists, politicians, activists, and researchers.
With better security, Advanced Account Security provides four setting standards. The first one requires using a passkey or physical security key to log in. The second one requires better tactics to recover an account besides SMS or email authorization. In the third setting, our active session with an AI chatbot is limited to restrict its exposure. The fourth setting protects your chats from AI misuse.
1. Use passkeys to avoid unauthorized access. Advanced Account Security asks for signing in with a passkey. Users can set up either one or both, but will also have to create two authentication methods.
2. Two-factor authentication for securing your account will help in recovering lost data. However, SMS and Email authentication are vulnerable to attacks. Advanced Account Security disables these two methods, so users are sometimes helpless.
3. Try to shorten your login sessions. Longer sessions are more exposed to malware or cyberattacks.
4. Turn off AI training. ChatGPT uses your conversations for AI training and learns to be human. But this capability is a risk to user privacy.
Advanced Account Security protects users in Codex if they use it to make and fine tune their code. Currently, this feature is only available to paid and free ChatGPT users with their personal accounts. However, OpenAI has said it is planning to expand it to the enterprise public.
Advanced Account Security also protects you in Codex if you use it to develop and fine-tune your own code. For now, the feature is available to free and paid ChatGPT users with their own accounts. But OpenAI said it expects to expand it to the enterprise crowd.