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This Malware is Assaulting Critical US Infrastructure for Almost a Year

 

Over the course of the last 11 months, a threat group has actively engaged in a phishing campaign targeting employees across various companies, distributing an open-source trojan program named AsyncRAT. The victims of this campaign notably include companies responsible for managing critical infrastructure in the United States.

The cybersecurity division of AT&T, known as Alien Labs, has reported that the attackers employ a domain generation algorithm (DGA) within their command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure. This technique helps them rotate through a large number of domains, making it challenging to block traffic. In an effort to evade detection, the threat actors continually generate new samples of the malicious tool. Researchers have identified over 300 samples and 100 domains associated with this particular campaign.

AsyncRAT, an open-source remote access tool released in 2019 and still available on GitHub, serves as the attackers' weapon of choice. As a remote access trojan (RAT), AsyncRAT offers features such as keylogging, exfiltration techniques, and initial access staging for delivering the final payload.

It's not uncommon for even sophisticated threat actors to utilize open-source malware frameworks, providing advantages such as low development costs and plausible deniability. Interestingly, AsyncRAT had been previously employed in 2022 by an APT group known as Earth Berberoka or GamblingPuppet, as tracked by security firm Trend Micro.

The phishing emails, scrutinized by Alien Labs and other researchers, employ a thread hijacking technique to direct users to a phishing page, eventually dropping a JavaScript (.js) file on users' computers. This script, when opened in Notepad, contains numerous randomly commented-out English words, while variants using Sanskrit characters have also been reported in previous campaigns. The highly obfuscated script aims to download the second-stage payload from a URL encoded using a custom cipher and decimal values.

The second-stage payload is another encoded script in PowerShell, executed directly in memory without being saved to disk. The PowerShell script communicates with a rotating C&C server domain, sending information such as computer hostname and a variable indicating the likelihood of the computer being a virtual machine or sandbox.

If deemed a valid target, the C&C server deploys AsyncRAT. In the case of a potential virtual machine or sandbox, the server redirects the request to Google or launches a different PowerShell script that downloads and initiates a decoy RAT, designed to distract researchers investigating the campaign.

To further complicate detection, the attackers regularly randomize the script code and malware samples, and they rotate C&C domains weekly. Despite these efforts, Alien Lab researchers managed to reverse-engineer the domain generation algorithm, providing insights into historical samples and enabling the development of detection signatures for future infrastructure identification. The AT&T Alien Labs report includes detection signatures for the Suricata intrusion detection system and a list of indicators of compromise (IOC) for building detections on other systems.